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T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary’s payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user’s system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.

Item Value
ID T1566.001
Sub-techniques T1566.001, T1566.002, T1566.003
Tactics TA0001
CAPEC ID CAPEC-163
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 2.2
Created 02 March 2020
Last Modified 18 October 2021

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0018 admin@338 admin@338 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.141
S0331 Agent Tesla The primary delivered mechaism for Agent Tesla is through email phishing messages.4
G0130 Ajax Security Team Ajax Security Team has used personalized spearphishing attachments.176
G0138 Andariel Andariel has conducted spearphishing campaigns that included malicious Word or Excel attachments.165166
S0622 AppleSeed AppleSeed has been distributed to victims through malicious e-mail attachments.48
G0099 APT-C-36 APT-C-36 has used spearphishing emails with password protected RAR attachment to avoid being detected by the email gateway.92
G0006 APT1 APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.93
G0005 APT12 APT12 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents and PDFs attached.200201
G0073 APT19 APT19 sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments in RTF and XLSM formats to deliver initial exploits.216
G0007 APT28 APT28 sent spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office and RAR attachments.221222223224225226227228
G0016 APT29 APT29 has used spearphishing emails with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.153154155156157158
G0013 APT30 APT30 has used spearphishing emails with malicious DOC attachments.161
G0050 APT32 APT32 has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious executable disguised as a document or spreadsheet.1121131141151166
G0064 APT33 APT33 has sent spearphishing e-mails with archive attachments.189
G0067 APT37 APT37 delivers malware using spearphishing emails with malicious HWP attachments.173174175
G0082 APT38 APT38 has conducted spearphishing campaigns using malicious email attachments.204
G0087 APT39 APT39 leveraged spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.183184185
G0096 APT41 APT41 sent spearphishing emails with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially compromise their victims.81
S0642 BADFLICK BADFLICK has been distributed via spearphishing campaigns containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.23
S0234 Bandook Bandook is delivered via a malicious Word document inside a zip file.39
S0268 Bisonal Bisonal has been delivered as malicious email attachments.47
G0098 BlackTech BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with malicious password-protected archived files (ZIP or RAR) to deliver malware.7924
S0520 BLINDINGCAN BLINDINGCAN has been delivered by phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office documents.38
G0060 BRONZE BUTLER BRONZE BUTLER used spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to infect victims.139140
S0631 Chaes Chaes has been delivered by sending victims a phishing email containing a malicious .docx file.45
S0660 Clambling Clambling has been delivered to victim’s machines through malicious e-mail attachments.60
G0080 Cobalt Group Cobalt Group has sent spearphishing emails with various attachment types to corporate and personal email accounts of victim organizations. Attachment types have included .rtf, .doc, .xls, archives containing LNK files, and password protected archives containing .exe and .scr executables.8384858687888990
G0142 Confucius Confucius has crafted and sent victims malicious attachments to gain initial access.43
G0012 Darkhotel Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails with malicious RAR and .LNK attachments.187188
G0079 DarkHydrus DarkHydrus has sent spearphishing emails with password-protected RAR archives containing malicious Excel Web Query files (.iqy). The group has also sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office documents that use the “attachedTemplate” technique to load a template from a remote server.170171172
S0673 DarkWatchman DarkWatchman has been delivered via spearphishing emails that contain a malicious zip file.49
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has sent emails with malicious attachments to gain initial access.182
G0066 Elderwood Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing malicious attachments.150151
S0367 Emotet Emotet has been delivered by phishing emails containing attachments. 282930313233343536
S0634 EnvyScout EnvyScout has been distributed via spearphishing as an email attachment.37
G0137 Ferocious Kitten Ferocious Kitten has conducted spearphishing campaigns containing malicious documents to lure victims to open the attachments.149
G0085 FIN4 FIN4 has used spearphishing emails containing attachments (which are often stolen, legitimate documents sent from compromised accounts) with embedded malicious macros.180181
G0037 FIN6 FIN6 has targeted victims with e-mails containing malicious attachments.94
G0046 FIN7 FIN7 sent spearphishing emails with either malicious Microsoft Documents or RTF files attached.20520620717208
G0061 FIN8 FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing Word documents with embedded malicious macros.143144145
S0696 Flagpro Flagpro has been distributed via spearphishing as an email attachment.24
G0101 Frankenstein Frankenstein has used spearphishing emails to send trojanized Microsoft Word documents.82
G0084 Gallmaker Gallmaker sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.91
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has delivered spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to targets.101102103104105106
G0078 Gorgon Group Gorgon Group sent emails to victims with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.78
S0499 Hancitor Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails with malicious attachments.22
G0126 Higaisa Higaisa has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.137138
S0483 IcedID IcedID has been delivered via phishing e-mails with malicious attachments.40
G0100 Inception Inception has used weaponized documents attached to spearphishing emails for reconnaissance and initial compromise.212213214215
G0136 IndigoZebra IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious password-protected RAR attachments.147148
S0528 Javali Javali has been delivered as malicious e-mail attachments.51
S0648 JSS Loader JSS Loader has been delivered by phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Excel attachments.17
S0585 Kerrdown Kerrdown has been distributed through malicious e-mail attachments.6
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has used emails containing Word, Excel and/or HWP (Hangul Word Processor) documents in their spearphishing campaigns.11812212312011948117121
S0669 KOCTOPUS KOCTOPUS has been distributed via spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.61
S0356 KONNI KONNI has been delivered via spearphishing campaigns through a malicious Word document.44
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.1255126127128
G0140 LazyScripter LazyScripter has used spam emails weaponized with archive or document files as its initial infection vector.61
G0065 Leviathan Leviathan has sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments, including .rtf, .doc, and .xls files.6364
S0447 Lokibot Lokibot is delivered via a malicious XLS attachment contained within a spearhpishing email.50
G0095 Machete Machete has delivered spearphishing emails that contain a zipped file with malicious contents.167168169
G0045 menuPass menuPass has sent malicious Office documents via email as part of spearphishing campaigns as well as executables disguised as documents.190191192193
S0455 Metamorfo Metamorfo has been delivered to victims via emails with malicious HTML attachments.1920
G0103 Mofang Mofang delivered spearphishing emails with malicious documents, PDFs, or Excel files attached.136
G0021 Molerats Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word and PDF attachments.656667
G0069 MuddyWater MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments to recipients.194195196197198199
G0129 Mustang Panda Mustang Panda has used spearphishing attachments to deliver initial access payloads.162163164
G0019 Naikon Naikon has used malicious e-mail attachments to deliver malware.80
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE has been spread via e-mail campaigns utilizing malicious attachments.2627
G0133 Nomadic Octopus Nomadic Octopus has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.15215
S0346 OceanSalt OceanSalt has been delivered via spearphishing emails with Microsoft Office attachments.7
S0340 Octopus Octopus has been delivered via spearsphishing emails.15
G0049 OilRig OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious attachments to potential victims using compromised and/or spoofed email accounts.209210211
G0040 Patchwork Patchwork has used spearphishing with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.217218219220
G0068 PLATINUM PLATINUM has sent spearphishing emails with attachments to victims as its primary initial access vector.142
S0428 PoetRAT PoetRAT was distributed via malicious Word documents.18
S0453 Pony Pony has been delivered via spearphishing attachments.21
S0650 QakBot QakBot has spread through emails with malicious attachments.52535455565758
S0458 Ramsay Ramsay has been distributed through spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.59
G0075 Rancor Rancor has attached a malicious document to an email to gain initial access.146
S0496 REvil REvil has been distributed via malicious e-mail attachments including MS Word Documents.910111213
S0433 Rifdoor Rifdoor has been distributed in e-mails with malicious Excel or Word documents.25
S0240 ROKRAT ROKRAT has been delivered via spearphishing emails that contain a malicious Hangul Office or Microsoft Word document.46
S0148 RTM RTM has been delivered via spearphishing attachments disguised as PDF documents.8
G0048 RTM RTM has used spearphishing attachments to distribute its malware.159
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has delivered malicious Microsoft Office attachments via spearphishing emails.132133134135
G0104 Sharpshooter Sharpshooter has sent malicious attachments via emails to targets.68
G0121 Sidewinder Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments often crafted for specific targets.100
G0091 Silence Silence has sent emails with malicious DOCX, CHM, LNK and ZIP attachments. 129130131
G0062 TA459 TA459 has targeted victims using spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments.124
G0092 TA505 TA505 has used spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.697071727374757677
G0127 TA551 TA551 has sent spearphishing attachments with password protected ZIP files.16178179
S0011 Taidoor Taidoor has been delivered through spearphishing emails.41
G0089 The White Company The White Company has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to victims.177
G0027 Threat Group-3390 Threat Group-3390 has used e-mail to deliver malicious attachments to victims.60
S0665 ThreatNeedle ThreatNeedle has been distributed via a malicious Word document within a spearphishing email.5
G0131 Tonto Team Tonto Team has delivered payloads via spearphishing attachments.186
G0134 Transparent Tribe Transparent Tribe has sent spearphishing e-mails with attachments to deliver malicious payloads.107108109110111
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot has used an email with an Excel sheet containing a malicious macro to deploy the malware14
G0081 Tropic Trooper Tropic Trooper sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office and fake installer file attachments.9596979899
S0476 Valak Valak has been delivered via spearphishing e-mails with password protected ZIP files.16
S0670 WarzoneRAT WarzoneRAT has been distributed as a malicious attachment within an email.4243
G0112 Windshift Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with attachment to harvest credentials and deliver malware.160
G0090 WIRTE WIRTE has sent emails to intended victims with malicious MS Word and Excel attachments.62
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used spearphishing attachments to deliver Microsoft documents containing macros or PDFs containing malicious links to download either Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, or Bazar.202203

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1049 Antivirus/Antimalware Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.
M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity.
M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content Block unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments.
M1054 Software Configuration Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may enable recipients (intra-org and cross domain) to perform similar message filtering and validation.12
M1017 User Training Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0015 Application Log Application Log Content
DS0022 File File Creation
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Traffic Content

References

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