T1481.002 Bidirectional Communication
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Popular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | T1481.002 |
Sub-techniques | T1481.001, T1481.002, T1481.003 |
Tactics | TA0037 |
Platforms | Android, iOS |
Version | 1.1 |
Created | 06 April 2022 |
Last Modified | 16 March 2023 |
Procedure Examples
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0655 | BusyGasper | BusyGasper can be controlled via IRC using freenode.net servers.2 |
S0485 | Mandrake | Mandrake has used Firebase for C2.3 |
S0545 | TERRACOTTA | TERRACOTTA has used Firebase for C2 communication.1 |
Detection
ID | Data Source | Data Component |
---|---|---|
DS0041 | Application Vetting | Network Communication |
DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Connection Creation |
References
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Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team. (2020, August). TERRACOTTA Android Malware: A Technical Study. Retrieved December 18, 2020. ↩
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Alexey Firsh. (2018, August 29). BusyGasper – the unfriendly spy. Retrieved October 1, 2021. ↩
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R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020. ↩