T1132.002 Non-Standard Encoding
Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.1 2
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | T1132.002 |
Sub-techniques | T1132.001, T1132.002 |
Tactics | TA0011 |
Platforms | Linux, Windows, macOS |
Permissions required | User |
Version | 1.0 |
Created | 14 March 2020 |
Last Modified | 14 March 2020 |
Procedure Examples
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0031 | BACKSPACE | Newer variants of BACKSPACE will encode C2 communications with a custom system.6 |
S0239 | Bankshot | Bankshot encodes commands from the control server using a range of characters and gzip.8 |
S0687 | Cyclops Blink | Cyclops Blink can use a custom binary scheme to encode messages with specific commands and parameters to be executed.7 |
S0260 | InvisiMole | InvisiMole can use a modified base32 encoding to encode data within the subdomain of C2 requests.9 |
S0346 | OceanSalt | OceanSalt can encode data with a NOT operation before sending the data to the control server.5 |
S0495 | RDAT | RDAT can communicate with the C2 via subdomains that utilize base64 with character substitutions.10 |
S0596 | ShadowPad | ShadowPad has encoded data as readable Latin characters.4 |
Mitigations
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M1031 | Network Intrusion Prevention | Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. |
Detection
ID | Data Source | Data Component |
---|---|---|
DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Traffic Content |
References
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Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017. ↩
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Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017. ↩
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Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. ↩
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GReAT. (2017, August 15). ShadowPad in corporate networks. Retrieved March 22, 2021. ↩
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Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A. (2018, October 18). ‘Operation Oceansalt’ Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group. Retrieved November 30, 2018. ↩
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FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015. ↩
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NCSC. (2022, February 23). Cyclops Blink Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved March 3, 2022. ↩
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Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 08). Hidden Cobra Targets Turkish Financial Sector With New Bankshot Implant. Retrieved May 18, 2018. ↩
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Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020. ↩
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Falcone, R. (2020, July 22). OilRig Targets Middle Eastern Telecommunications Organization and Adds Novel C2 Channel with Steganography to Its Inventory. Retrieved July 28, 2020. ↩