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T1420 File and Directory Discovery

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or search in specific device locations for desired information within a filesystem. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including deciding if the adversary should fully infect the target and/or attempt specific actions.

On Android, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies typically stringently restrict what can be accessed by apps without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit. The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concerns if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there. iOS’s security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform any type of File and Directory Discovery without use of escalated privileges.

Item Value
ID T1420
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0032
Platforms Android, iOS
Version 1.2
Created 25 October 2017
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1095 AhRat AhRat can enumerate files on external storage.4
C0033 C0033 During C0033, PROMETHIUM used StrongPity to collect file lists on the victim device.13
S0529 CarbonSteal CarbonSteal has searched device storage for various files, including .amr files (audio recordings) and superuser binaries.1
S1225 CherryBlos CherryBlos has accessed media files stored in external storage and has used optical character recognition (OCR) to recognize potential mnemonic phrases in pictures.3
S0505 Desert Scorpion Desert Scorpion can list files stored on external storage.2
S0550 DoubleAgent DoubleAgent has searched for specific existing data directories, including the Gmail app, Dropbox app, Pictures, and thumbnails.1
S1092 Escobar Escobar can access external storage.10
S0577 FrozenCell FrozenCell has searched for pdf, doc, docx, ppt, pptx, xls, and xlsx file types for exfiltration.8
S0535 Golden Cup Golden Cup can collect a directory listing of external storage.7
S0551 GoldenEagle GoldenEagle has looked for .doc, .txt, .gif, .apk, .jpg, .png, .mp3, and .db files on external storage.1
S1077 Hornbill Hornbill has a list of file extensions that it may use to log certain operations (creation, open, close, modification, movement, deletion) on files of those types.5
C0016 Operation Dust Storm During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used Android backdoors capable of enumerating specific files on the infected devices.14
C0054 Operation Triangulation During Operation Triangulation, the threat actors have obtained a list of files in a specified directory using the fts API.6
S1241 RatMilad RatMilad has listed files and pictures on the device starting from /mnt/sdcard/.11
S0549 SilkBean SilkBean can get file lists on the SD card.1
S0558 Tiktok Pro Tiktok Pro can list all hidden files in the /DCIM/.dat/ directory.9
S1216 TriangleDB TriangleDB has obtained a list of files using the fts API and has obtained files that match a specified regular expression.6
G0112 Windshift Windshift has included file enumeration in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.12

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1006 Use Recent OS Version Security architecture improvements in each new version of Android and iOS make it more difficult to escalate privileges. Additionally, newer versions of Android have strengthened the sandboxing applied to applications, restricting their ability to enumerate file system contents.

References

  1. A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020. ↩↩↩↩

  2. A. Blaich, M. Flossman. (2018, April 16). Lookout finds new surveillanceware in Google Play with ties to known threat actor targeting the Middle East. Retrieved September 11, 2020. ↩

  3. Trend Micro Research. (2023, July 28). Related CherryBlos and FakeTrade Android Malware Involved in Scam Campaigns. Retrieved March 28, 2025. ↩

  4. Lukas Stefanko. (2023, May 23). Android app breaking bad: From legitimate screen recording to file exfiltration within a year. Retrieved December 18, 2023. ↩

  5. Apurva Kumar, Kristin Del Rosso. (2021, February 10). Novel Confucius APT Android Spyware Linked to India-Pakistan Conflict. Retrieved June 9, 2023. ↩

  6. Kucherin, G., et al. (2023, June 21). Dissecting TriangleDB, a Triangulation spyware implant. Retrieved April 18, 2024. ↩↩

  7. R. Iarchy, E. Rynkowski. (2018, July 5). GoldenCup: New Cyber Threat Targeting World Cup Fans. Retrieved October 29, 2020. ↩

  8. Michael Flossman. (2017, October 5). FrozenCell: Multi-platform surveillance campaign against Palestinians. Retrieved November 11, 2020. ↩

  9. S. Desai. (2020, September 8). TikTok Spyware. Retrieved January 5, 2021. ↩

  10. B. Toulas. (2022, March 12). Android malware Escobar steals your Google Authenticator MFA codes. Retrieved September 28, 2023. ↩

  11. Gupta, N. (2022, October 5). We Smell A RatMilad Android Spyware. Retrieved August 27, 2025. ↩

  12. The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team. (2020, October). BAHAMUT: Hack-for-Hire Masters of Phishing, Fake News, and Fake Apps. Retrieved February 8, 2021. ↩

  13. Stefanko, L. (2023, January 10). StrongPity espionage campaign targeting Android users. Retrieved January 31, 2023. ↩

  14. Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. ↩