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T1532 Archive Collected Data

Adversaries may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing data can help to obfuscate its contents and minimize use of network resources. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.

Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm.

Item Value
ID T1532
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0035
Platforms Android, iOS
Version 2.0
Created 10 October 2019
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0422 Anubis Anubis exfiltrates data encrypted (with RC4) by its ransomware module.4
S0540 Asacub Asacub has encrypted C2 communications using Base64-encoded RC4.13
S1079 BOULDSPY BOULDSPY can encrypt its data before exfiltration.3
S1094 BRATA BRATA has compressed data with the zlib library before exfiltration.7
C0033 C0033 During C0033, PROMETHIUM used StrongPity to exfiltrate encrypted data to the C2 server.15
S1243 DCHSpy DCHSpy has compressed and encrypted collected data with a password from the C2 server.11
S0505 Desert Scorpion Desert Scorpion can encrypt exfiltrated data.1
S0405 Exodus Exodus One encrypts data using XOR prior to exfiltration.2
S0577 FrozenCell FrozenCell has compressed and encrypted data before exfiltration using password protected .7z archives.12
S0535 Golden Cup Golden Cup has encrypted exfiltrated data using AES in ECB mode.9
S0421 GolfSpy GolfSpy encrypts data using a simple XOR operation with a pre-configured key prior to exfiltration.14
S1185 LightSpy LightSpy collects and compresses data to be exfiltrated using SSZipArchive.56
S1082 Sunbird Sunbird can exfiltrate collected data as a ZIP file.10
S0424 Triada Triada encrypts data prior to exfiltration.8

References

  1. A. Blaich, M. Flossman. (2018, April 16). Lookout finds new surveillanceware in Google Play with ties to known threat actor targeting the Middle East. Retrieved September 11, 2020. ↩

  2. Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  3. Kyle Schmittle, Alemdar Islamoglu, Paul Shunk, Justin Albrecht. (2023, April 27). Lookout Discovers Android Spyware Tied to Iranian Police Targeting Minorities: BouldSpy. Retrieved July 21, 2023. ↩

  4. M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved September 25, 2024. ↩

  5. Dmitry Bestuzhev. (2025, April 7). The Coordinated Kill Switch: LightSpy’s iOS Destructive Plugin Architecture Manages Device Disablement. Retrieved April 14, 2025. ↩

  6. ThreatFabric. (2024, October 29). LightSpy: Implant for iOS. Retrieved January 30, 2025. ↩

  7. Federico Valentini, Francesco Lubatti. (2022, January 24). How BRATA is monitoring your bank account. Retrieved December 18, 2023. ↩

  8. Lukasz Siewierski. (2019, June 6). PHA Family Highlights: Triada. Retrieved July 16, 2019. ↩

  9. R. Iarchy, E. Rynkowski. (2018, July 5). GoldenCup: New Cyber Threat Targeting World Cup Fans. Retrieved October 29, 2020. ↩

  10. Apurva Kumar, Kristin Del Rosso. (2021, February 10). Novel Confucius APT Android Spyware Linked to India-Pakistan Conflict. Retrieved June 9, 2023. ↩

  11. Albrecht, J., Islamoglu, A. (2025, July 21). Lookout Discovers Iranian APT MuddyWater Leveraging DCHSpy During Israel-Iran Conflict . Retrieved September 19, 2025. ↩

  12. Michael Flossman. (2017, October 5). FrozenCell: Multi-platform surveillance campaign against Palestinians. Retrieved November 11, 2020. ↩

  13. T. Shishkova. (2018, August 28). The rise of mobile banker Asacub. Retrieved December 14, 2020. ↩

  14. E. Xu, G. Guo. (2019, June 28). Mobile Cyberespionage Campaign ‘Bouncing Golf’ Affects Middle East. Retrieved January 27, 2020. ↩

  15. Stefanko, L. (2023, January 10). StrongPity espionage campaign targeting Android users. Retrieved January 31, 2023. ↩