Skip to content

T1589.002 Email Addresses

Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.

Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).12 Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. Active Scanning), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.3

Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Email Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Brute Force via External Remote Services).

Item Value
ID T1589.002
Sub-techniques T1589.001, T1589.002, T1589.003
Tactics TA0043
Platforms PRE
Version 1.1
Created 02 October 2020
Last Modified 09 December 2021

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0677 AADInternals AADInternals can check for the existence of user email addresses using public Microsoft APIs.45
G0050 APT32 APT32 has collected e-mail addresses for activists and bloggers in order to target them with spyware.8
G0125 HAFNIUM HAFNIUM has collected e-mail addresses for users they intended to target.13
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has collected valid email addresses that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.10
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns.6
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has acquired the personal email addresses of some individuals they intend to target.9
G0069 MuddyWater MuddyWater has specifically targeted government agency employees with spearphishing e-mails.7
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has obtained valid emails addresses while conducting research against target organizations that were subsequently used in spearphishing campaigns.12
G0122 Silent Librarian Silent Librarian has collected e-mail addresses from targeted organizations from open Internet searches.14
G0127 TA551 TA551 has used spoofed company emails that were acquired from email clients on previously infected hosts to target other individuals.11

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1056 Pre-compromise This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Traffic Content

References


  1. Hackers Arise. (n.d.). Email Scraping and Maltego. Retrieved October 20, 2020. 

  2. Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020. 

  3. GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021. 

  4. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 18, 2022. 

  5. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2020, June 13). Just looking: Azure Active Directory reconnaissance as an outsider. Retrieved February 1, 2022. 

  6. Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021. 

  7. Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021. 

  8. Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021. 

  9. Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021. 

  10. Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021. 

  11. Duncan, B. (2021, January 7). TA551: Email Attack Campaign Switches from Valak to IcedID. Retrieved March 17, 2021. 

  12. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. 

  13. Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021. 

  14. DOJ. (2018, March 23). U.S. v. Rafatnejad et al . Retrieved February 3, 2021. 

Back to top