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T1016.001 Internet Connection Discovery

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using Ping, tracert, and GET requests to websites.

Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.

Item Value
ID T1016.001
Sub-techniques T1016.001
Tactics TA0007
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Permissions required User
Version 1.0
Created 17 March 2021
Last Modified 25 March 2021

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1066 DarkTortilla DarkTortilla can check for internet connectivity by issuing HTTP GET requests.8
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has tested connectivity between a compromised machine and a C2 server using Ping with commands such as CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ping -n 1.15
S0597 GoldFinder GoldFinder performed HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity and identify HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors that an HTTP request traveled through.4
G0125 HAFNIUM HAFNIUM has checked for network connectivity from a compromised host using ping, including attempts to contact google[.]com.11
G1001 HEXANE HEXANE has used tools including BITSAdmin to test internet connectivity from compromised hosts.12
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has conducted a network call out to a specific website as part of their initial discovery activity.14
S0284 More_eggs More_eggs has used HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity.1
S0691 Neoichor Neoichor can check for Internet connectivity by contacting bing[.]com with the request format bing[.]com?id=<GetTickCount>.2
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a Visual Basic script that checked for internet connectivity.16
S0650 QakBot QakBot can measure the download speed on a targeted host.10
S0686 QuietSieve QuietSieve can check C2 connectivity with a ping to 8.8.8.8 (Google public DNS).6
S0448 Rising Sun Rising Sun can test a connection to a specified network IP address over a specified port number.9
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used GoldFinder to perform HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity and identify HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors that an HTTP request travels through.4
S1049 SUGARUSH SUGARUSH has checked for internet connectivity from an infected host before attempting to establish a new TCP connection.7
S0663 SysUpdate SysUpdate can contact the DNS server operated by Google as part of its C2 establishment process.5
G0010 Turla Turla has used tracert to check internet connectivity.13
S1065 Woody RAT Woody RAT can make Ping GET HTTP requests to its C2 server at regular intervals for network connectivity checks.3

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0009 Process Process Creation

References

  1. Villadsen, O.. (2019, August 29). More_eggs, Anyone? Threat Actor ITG08 Strikes Again. Retrieved September 16, 2019. ↩

  2. MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022. ↩

  3. MalwareBytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2022, August 3). Woody RAT: A new feature-rich malware spotted in the wild. Retrieved December 6, 2022. ↩

  4. Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. ↩↩

  5. Daniel Lunghi. (2023, March 1). Iron Tiger’s SysUpdate Reappears, Adds Linux Targeting. Retrieved March 20, 2023. ↩

  6. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2022, February 4). ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations. Retrieved February 18, 2022. ↩

  7. Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022. ↩

  8. Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, August 17). DarkTortilla Malware Analysis. Retrieved November 3, 2022. ↩

  9. Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020. ↩

  10. Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021. ↩

  11. Eoin Miller. (2021, March 23). Defending Against the Zero Day: Analyzing Attacker Behavior Post-Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 27, 2022. ↩

  12. Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022. ↩

  13. Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020. ↩

  14. DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023. ↩

  15. Symantec. (2022, January 31). Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine. Retrieved February 17, 2022. ↩

  16. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020. ↩