T1422 System Network Configuration Discovery
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of devices they access or through information discovery of remote systems.
Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.
On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net.NetworkInterface class.1 Previously, the Android TelephonyManager class could be used to gather telephony-related device identifiers, information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number. However, starting with Android 10, only preloaded, carrier, the default SMS, or device and profile owner applications can access the telephony-related device identifiers.2
On iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access.
Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | T1422 |
| Sub-techniques | T1422.001, T1422.002 |
| Tactics | TA0032 |
| Platforms | Android, iOS |
| Version | 2.4 |
| Created | 25 October 2017 |
| Last Modified | 24 October 2025 |
Procedure Examples
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S1061 | AbstractEmu | AbstractEmu can collect device IP address and SIM information.7 |
| S1214 | Android/SpyAgent | Android/SpyAgent has collected device network information, such as the IMEI and the phone number.38 |
| S0310 | ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A | |
| ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A gathers the device IMEI and IMSI.26 | ||
| S0292 | AndroRAT | AndroRAT collects the device’s location through GPS or through network settings.33 |
| G1028 | APT-C-23 | APT-C-23 can collect the victim’s phone number, device information, IMSI, etc.45 |
| S0540 | Asacub | Asacub can collect various pieces of device network configuration information, such as mobile network operator.20 |
| S1215 | Binary Validator | Binary Validator has collected the device’s phone number and IMEI.36 |
| S1079 | BOULDSPY | BOULDSPY can collect network information, such as IP address, SIM card information, and Wi-Fi information.14 |
| S0432 | Bread | Bread collects the device’s IMEI, carrier, mobile country code, and mobile network code.24 |
| S0529 | CarbonSteal | CarbonSteal has collected device network information, including 16-bit GSM Cell Identity, 16-bit Location Area Code, Mobile Country Code (MCC), and Mobile Network Code (MNC). CarbonSteal has also called netcfg to get stats.25 |
| S0425 | Corona Updates | Corona Updates can collect device network configuration information, such as Wi-Fi SSID and IMSI.30 |
| S0315 | DualToy | DualToy collects the connected iOS device’s information including IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, serial number and phone number.19 |
| S0478 | EventBot | EventBot can gather device network information.13 |
| S0522 | Exobot | Exobot can obtain the device’s IMEI, phone number, and IP address.32 |
| S0405 | Exodus | Exodus One queries the device for its IMEI code and the phone number in order to validate the target of a new infection.22 |
| S0509 | FakeSpy | FakeSpy can collect device networking information, including phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.3 |
| S1093 | FlyTrap | FlyTrap can collect IP address and network configuration information.44 |
| S0577 | FrozenCell | FrozenCell has collected phone metadata such as cell location, mobile country code (MCC), and mobile network code (MNC).17 |
| S1231 | GodFather | GodFather has accessed the device’s current cellular network information, including the phone number and the serial number.29 |
| S0535 | Golden Cup | Golden Cup can collect the device’s phone number and IMSI.16 |
| S0536 | GPlayed | GPlayed can collect the device’s IMEI, phone number, and country.15 |
| S0406 | Gustuff | Gustuff gathers the device IMEI to send to the command and control server.28 |
| S1077 | Hornbill | Hornbill can collect a device’s phone number and IMEI, and can check to see if WiFi is enabled.4 |
| S0463 | INSOMNIA | INSOMNIA can collect the device’s phone number, ICCID, IMEI, and the currently active network interface (Wi-Fi or cellular).18 |
| S1185 | LightSpy | LightSpy has collected device information such as IMEI, phone number, MAC address and IP address.23 |
| S0407 | Monokle | Monokle checks if the device is connected via Wi-Fi or mobile data.27 |
| C0054 | Operation Triangulation | During Operation Triangulation, the threat actors use the heartbeat beacons from the implant to obtain device information, such as the IMEI, MEID, and the serial number.40 |
| S0316 | Pegasus for Android | Pegasus for Android checks if the device is on Wi-Fi, a cellular network, and is roaming.39 |
| S0291 | PJApps | PJApps has the capability to collect and leak the victim’s phone number, mobile device unique identifier (IMEI).21 |
| S1241 | RatMilad | RatMilad has collected device information such as MAC address, IMEI and phone number.42 |
| S0326 | RedDrop | RedDrop collects and exfiltrates information including IMEI, IMSI, MNC, MCC, nearby Wi-Fi networks, and other device and SIM-related info.34 |
| S0403 | Riltok | Riltok can query the device’s IMEI.5 |
| S0411 | Rotexy | Rotexy collects the device’s IMEI and sends it to the command and control server.35 |
| S0313 | RuMMS | RuMMS gathers the device phone number and IMEI and transmits them to a command and control server.10 |
| S0324 | SpyDealer | SpyDealer harvests the device phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.43 |
| S0328 | Stealth Mango | Stealth Mango collects and uploads information about changes in SIM card or phone numbers on the device.12 |
| S1082 | Sunbird | Sunbird can exfiltrate phone number and IMEI.4 |
| S0329 | Tangelo | Tangelo contains functionality to gather cellular IDs.12 |
| S0545 | TERRACOTTA | TERRACOTTA has collected the device’s phone number and can check if the active network connection is metered.37 |
| S1056 | TianySpy | TianySpy can check to see if Wi-Fi is enabled.41 |
| S1216 | TriangleDB | TriangleDB has collected and sent information on the device’s IMEI, MEID, serial number and other device information.40 |
| S0427 | TrickMo | TrickMo can collect device network configuration information such as IMSI, IMEI, and Wi-Fi connection state.6 |
| S0506 | ViperRAT | ViperRAT can collect network configuration data from the device, including phone number, SIM operator, and network operator.31 |
| S0489 | WolfRAT | WolfRAT sends the device’s IMEI with each exfiltration request.8 |
| S0318 | XLoader for Android | XLoader for Android collects the device’s IMSI and ICCID.11 |
| S0490 | XLoader for iOS | XLoader for iOS can obtain the device’s IMEM, ICCID, and MEID.11 |
| S0311 | YiSpecter | YiSpecter has collected compromised device MAC addresses.9 |
Mitigations
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1006 | Use Recent OS Version | Android 10 introduced changes that prevent normal applications from accessing sensitive device identifiers.2 |
References
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