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T1422 System Network Configuration Discovery

Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of operating systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems.

On Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the java.net.NetworkInterface class.1 Previously, the Android TelephonyManager class could be used to gather telephony-related device identifiers, information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number. However, starting with Android 10, only preloaded, carrier, the default SMS, or device and profile owner applications can access the telephony-related device identifiers.2

On iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access.

Adversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.

Item Value
ID T1422
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0032
Platforms Android, iOS
Version 2.3
Created 25 October 2017
Last Modified 20 March 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1061 AbstractEmu AbstractEmu can collect device IP address and SIM information.24
S0310 ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A
ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A gathers the device IMEI and IMSI.7
S0540 Asacub Asacub can collect various pieces of device network configuration information, such as mobile network operator.15
S0432 Bread Bread collects the device’s IMEI, carrier, mobile country code, and mobile network code.27
S0529 CarbonSteal CarbonSteal has collected device network information, including 16-bit GSM Cell Identity, 16-bit Location Area Code, Mobile Country Code (MCC), and Mobile Network Code (MNC). CarbonSteal has also called netcfg to get stats.4
S0425 Corona Updates Corona Updates can collect device network configuration information, such as Wi-Fi SSID and IMSI.25
S0315 DualToy DualToy collects the connected iOS device’s information including IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, serial number and phone number.14
S0478 EventBot EventBot can gather device network information.21
S0522 Exobot Exobot can obtain the device’s IMEI, phone number, and IP address.23
S0405 Exodus Exodus One queries the device for its IMEI code and the phone number in order to validate the target of a new infection.11
S0509 FakeSpy FakeSpy can collect device networking information, including phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.8
S0577 FrozenCell FrozenCell has collected phone metadata such as cell location, mobile country code (MCC), and mobile network code (MNC).12
S0535 Golden Cup Golden Cup can collect the device’s phone number and IMSI.29
S0536 GPlayed GPlayed can collect the device’s IMEI, phone number, and country.16
S0406 Gustuff Gustuff gathers the device IMEI to send to the command and control server.31
S0463 INSOMNIA INSOMNIA can collect the device’s phone number, ICCID, IMEI, and the currently active network interface (Wi-Fi or cellular).10
S0407 Monokle Monokle checks if the device is connected via Wi-Fi or mobile data.28
S0316 Pegasus for Android Pegasus for Android checks if the device is on Wi-Fi, a cellular network, and is roaming.33
S0291 PJApps PJApps has the capability to collect and leak the victim’s phone number, mobile device unique identifier (IMEI).5
S0326 RedDrop RedDrop collects and exfiltrates information including IMEI, IMSI, MNC, MCC, nearby Wi-Fi networks, and other device and SIM-related info.18
S0403 Riltok Riltok can query the device’s IMEI.26
S0411 Rotexy Rotexy collects the device’s IMEI and sends it to the command and control server.30
S0313 RuMMS RuMMS gathers the device phone number and IMEI and transmits them to a command and control server.3
S0324 SpyDealer SpyDealer harvests the device phone number, IMEI, and IMSI.6
S0328 Stealth Mango Stealth Mango collects and uploads information about changes in SIM card or phone numbers on the device.13
S0329 Tangelo Tangelo contains functionality to gather cellular IDs.13
S0545 TERRACOTTA TERRACOTTA has collected the device’s phone number and can check if the active network connection is metered.34
S1056 TianySpy TianySpy can check to see if WiFi is enabled.9
S0427 TrickMo TrickMo can collect device network configuration information such as IMSI, IMEI, and Wi-Fi connection state.20
S0506 ViperRAT ViperRAT can collect network configuration data from the device, including phone number, SIM operator, and network operator.22
S0489 WolfRAT WolfRAT sends the device’s IMEI with each exfiltration request.32
S0318 XLoader for Android XLoader for Android collects the device’s IMSI and ICCID.17
S0490 XLoader for iOS XLoader for iOS can obtain the device’s IMEM, ICCID, and MEID.17
S0311 YiSpecter YiSpecter has collected compromised device MAC addresses.19

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1006 Use Recent OS Version Android 10 introduced changes that prevent normal applications from accessing sensitive device identifiers.2

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0041 Application Vetting Permissions Requests

References

  1. Android. (n.d.). NetworkInterface. Retrieved December 21, 2016. ↩

  2. Android. (n.d.). TelephonyManager. Retrieved December 21, 2016. ↩↩

  3. Wu Zhou, Deyu Hu, Jimmy Su, Yong Kang. (2016, April 26). RUMMS: THE LATEST FAMILY OF ANDROID MALWARE ATTACKING USERS IN RUSSIA VIA SMS PHISHING. Retrieved February 6, 2017. ↩

  4. A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020. ↩

  5. Lookout. (2016, May 25). 5 active mobile threats spoofing enterprise apps. Retrieved December 19, 2016. ↩

  6. Wenjun Hu, Cong Zheng and Zhi Xu. (2017, July 6). SpyDealer: Android Trojan Spying on More Than 40 Apps. Retrieved September 18, 2018. ↩

  7. Karl Dominguez. (2011, September 27). ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A. Retrieved November 30, 2018. ↩

  8. O. Almkias. (2020, July 1). FakeSpy Masquerades as Postal Service Apps Around the World. Retrieved September 15, 2020. ↩

  9. Trend Micro. (2022, January 25). TianySpy Malware Uses Smishing Disguised as Message From Telco. Retrieved January 11, 2023. ↩

  10. I. Beer. (2019, August 29). Implant Teardown. Retrieved June 2, 2020. ↩

  11. Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved September 3, 2019. ↩

  12. Michael Flossman. (2017, October 5). FrozenCell: Multi-platform surveillance campaign against Palestinians. Retrieved November 11, 2020. ↩

  13. Lookout. (n.d.). Stealth Mango & Tangelo. Retrieved September 27, 2018. ↩↩

  14. Claud Xiao. (2016, September 13). DualToy: New Windows Trojan Sideloads Risky Apps to Android and iOS Devices. Retrieved January 24, 2017. ↩

  15. T. Shishkova. (2018, August 28). The rise of mobile banker Asacub. Retrieved December 14, 2020. ↩

  16. V. Ventura. (2018, October 11). GPlayed Trojan - .Net playing with Google Market . Retrieved November 24, 2020. ↩

  17. Hiroaki, H., Wu, L., Wu, L.. (2019, April 2). XLoader Disguises as Android Apps, Has FakeSpy Links. Retrieved July 20, 2020. ↩↩

  18. Nell Campbell. (2018, February 27). RedDrop: the blackmailing mobile malware family lurking in app stores. Retrieved September 18, 2018. ↩

  19. Claud Xiao. (2015, October 4). YiSpecter: First iOS Malware That Attacks Non-jailbroken Apple iOS Devices by Abusing Private APIs. Retrieved March 3, 2023. ↩

  20. P. Asinovsky. (2020, March 24). TrickBot Pushing a 2FA Bypass App to Bank Customers in Germany. Retrieved April 24, 2020. ↩

  21. D. Frank, L. Rochberger, Y. Rimmer, A. Dahan. (2020, April 30). EventBot: A New Mobile Banking Trojan is Born. Retrieved June 26, 2020. ↩

  22. M. Flossman. (2017, February 16). ViperRAT: The mobile APT targeting the Israeli Defense Force that should be on your radar. Retrieved September 11, 2020. ↩

  23. Threat Fabric. (2017, February). Exobot - Android banking Trojan on the rise. Retrieved October 29, 2020. ↩

  24. P Shunk, K Balaam. (2021, October 28). Rooting Malware Makes a Comeback: Lookout Discovers Global Campaign. Retrieved February 6, 2023. ↩

  25. T. Bao, J. Lu. (2020, April 14). Coronavirus Update App Leads to Project Spy Android and iOS Spyware. Retrieved April 24, 2020. ↩

  26. Tatyana Shishkova. (2019, June 25). Riltok mobile Trojan: A banker with global reach. Retrieved August 7, 2019. ↩

  27. A. Guertin, V. Kotov, Android Security & Privacy Team. (2020, January 9). PHA Family Highlights: Bread (and Friends) . Retrieved April 27, 2020. ↩

  28. Bauer A., Kumar A., Hebeisen C., et al. (2019, July). Monokle: The Mobile Surveillance Tooling of the Special Technology Center. Retrieved September 4, 2019. ↩

  29. R. Iarchy, E. Rynkowski. (2018, July 5). GoldenCup: New Cyber Threat Targeting World Cup Fans. Retrieved October 29, 2020. ↩

  30. T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019. ↩

  31. Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019. ↩

  32. W. Mercer, P. Rascagneres, V. Ventura. (2020, May 19). The wolf is back… . Retrieved July 20, 2020. ↩

  33. Mike Murray. (2017, April 3). Pegasus for Android: the other side of the story emerges. Retrieved April 16, 2017. ↩

  34. Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team. (2020, August). TERRACOTTA Android Malware: A Technical Study. Retrieved December 18, 2020. ↩