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T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.12

Item Value
ID T1195.002
Sub-techniques T1195.001, T1195.002, T1195.003
Tactics TA0001
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 1.1
Created 11 March 2020
Last Modified 28 April 2022

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0096 APT41 APT41 gained access to production environments where they could inject malicious code into legitimate, signed files and widely distribute them to end users.16
S0222 CCBkdr CCBkdr was added to a legitimate, signed version 5.33 of the CCleaner software and distributed on CCleaner’s distribution site.451
G0080 Cobalt Group Cobalt Group has compromised legitimate web browser updates to deliver a backdoor. 15
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has placed trojanized installers for control system software on legitimate vendor app stores.1718
G0115 GOLD SOUTHFIELD GOLD SOUTHFIELD has distributed ransomware by backdooring software installers via a strategic web compromise of the site hosting Italian WinRAR.121314
S0493 GoldenSpy GoldenSpy has been packaged with a legitimate tax preparation software.6
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has distributed NotPetya by compromising the legitimate Ukrainian accounting software M.E.Doc and replacing a legitimate software update with a malicious one.10911
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 gained initial network access to some victims via a trojanized update of SolarWinds Orion software.22192120
S0562 SUNSPOT SUNSPOT malware was designed and used to insert SUNBURST into software builds of the SolarWinds Orion IT management product.7
G0027 Threat Group-3390 Threat Group-3390 has compromised the Able Desktop installer to gain access to victim’s environments.8

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1051 Update Software A patch management process should be implemented to check unused applications, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable software, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation.
M1016 Vulnerability Scanning Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.3

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0022 File File Metadata

References

  1. Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018. ↩↩

  2. Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018. ↩

  3. OWASP. (2018, February 23). OWASP Top Ten Project. Retrieved April 3, 2018. ↩

  4. Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018. ↩

  5. Rosenberg, J. (2017, September 20). Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active: Supply Chain Attack Through CCleaner. Retrieved February 13, 2018. ↩

  6. Trustwave SpiderLabs. (2020, June 25). The Golden Tax Department and Emergence of GoldenSpy Malware. Retrieved July 23, 2020. ↩

  7. CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021. ↩

  8. Lunghi, D. and Lu, K. (2021, April 9). Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate Malware. Retrieved November 12, 2021. ↩

  9. Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020. ↩

  10. Counter Threat Research Team. (2017, June 28). NotPetya Campaign: What We Know About the Latest Global Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 11, 2020. ↩

  11. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. ↩

  12. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. ↩

  13. Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020. ↩

  14. Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SOUTHFIELD. Retrieved October 6, 2020. ↩

  15. Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020. ↩

  16. Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. ↩

  17. Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. ↩

  18. Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021. ↩

  19. FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021. ↩

  20. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021. ↩

  21. NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021. ↩

  22. Sudhakar Ramakrishna . (2021, January 11). New Findings From Our Investigation of SUNBURST. Retrieved January 13, 2021. ↩