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T1070 Indicator Removal

Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.

Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.

Item Value
ID T1070
Sub-techniques T1070.001, T1070.002, T1070.003, T1070.004, T1070.005, T1070.006, T1070.007, T1070.008, T1070.009, T1070.010
Tactics TA0005
Platforms Containers, ESXi, Linux, Network Devices, Office Suite, Windows, macOS
Version 2.4
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G1044 APT42 APT42 has cleared Chrome browser history.27
G1023 APT5 APT5 has used the THINBLOOD utility to clear SSL VPN log files located at /home/runtime/logs.2930
S0239 Bankshot Bankshot deletes all artifacts associated with the malware from the infected machine.22
S0089 BlackEnergy BlackEnergy has removed the watermark associated with enabling the TESTSIGNING boot configuration option by removing the relevant strings in the user32.dll.mui of the system.8
S1161 BPFDoor BPFDoor clears the file location /proc/<PID>/environ removing all environment variables for the process.6
S0527 CSPY Downloader CSPY Downloader has the ability to remove values it writes to the Registry.3
C0029 Cutting Edge During Cutting Edge, threat actors cleared logs to remove traces of their activity and restored compromised systems to a clean state to bypass manufacturer mitigations for CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887.3233
S0673 DarkWatchman DarkWatchman can uninstall malicious components from the Registry, stop processes, and clear the browser history.24
S0695 Donut Donut can erase file references to payloads in-memory after being reflectively loaded and executed.1
S1159 DUSTTRAP DUSTTRAP restores the .text section of compromised DLLs after malicious code is loaded into memory and before the file is closed.12
S0568 EVILNUM EVILNUM has a function called “DeleteLeftovers” to remove certain artifacts of the attack.9
S0696 Flagpro Flagpro can close specific Windows Security and Internet Explorer dialog boxes to mask external connections.23
S1044 FunnyDream FunnyDream has the ability to clean traces of malware deployment.18
S0697 HermeticWiper HermeticWiper can disable pop-up information about folders and desktop items and delete Registry keys to hide malicious services.1413
S1132 IPsec Helper IPsec Helper can delete various registry keys related to its execution and use.4
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has restored malicious KernelCallbackTable code to its original state after the process execution flow has been hijacked.31
S0449 Maze Maze has used the “Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection” function following attempts to delete the shadow volumes, in order to leave the system in the same state as it was prior to redirection.20
S0455 Metamorfo Metamorfo has a command to delete a Registry key it uses, \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes.15
S1135 MultiLayer Wiper MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch script to clear file system cache memory via the ProcessIdleTasks export in advapi32.dll as an anti-analysis and anti-forensics technique.10
G0129 Mustang Panda Mustang Panda has deleted registry keys that store data and maintained persistence.28
S0691 Neoichor Neoichor can clear the browser history on a compromised host by changing the ClearBrowsingHistoryOnExit value to 1 in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Privacy Registry key.26
S0229 Orz Orz can overwrite Registry settings to reduce its visibility on the victim.11
S0448 Rising Sun Rising Sun can clear a memory blog in the process by overwriting it with junk bytes.17
S1085 Sardonic Sardonic has the ability to delete created WMI objects to evade detections.19
S0461 SDBbot SDBbot has the ability to clean up and remove data structures from a compromised host.5
S0596 ShadowPad ShadowPad has deleted arbitrary Registry values.7
S0589 Sibot Sibot will delete an associated registry key if a certain server response is received.21
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can remove artifacts from the compromised host, including created Registry keys.2
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 temporarily replaced legitimate utilities with their own, executed their payload, and then restored the original file.34
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet can delete OLE Automation and SQL stored procedures used to store malicious payloads.16
S0559 SUNBURST SUNBURST removed HTTP proxy registry values to clean up traces of execution.25

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1041 Encrypt Sensitive Information Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.
M1029 Remote Data Storage Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system.
M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities.

References

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  16. Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

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  21. Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. ↩

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