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T1027.002 Software Packing

Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable’s original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.2

Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.1

Item Value
ID T1027.002
Sub-techniques T1027.001, T1027.002, T1027.003, T1027.004, T1027.005, T1027.006
Tactics TA0005
CAPEC ID CAPEC-570
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 1.2
Created 05 February 2020
Last Modified 19 April 2022

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0504 Anchor Anchor has come with a packed payload.41
S0622 AppleSeed AppleSeed has used UPX packers for its payload DLL.18
G0016 APT29 APT29 used UPX to pack files.84
G0022 APT3 APT3 has been known to pack their tools.7879
G0082 APT38 APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium, to pack their implants.74
G0087 APT39 APT39 has packed tools with UPX, and has repacked a modified version of Mimikatz to thwart anti-virus detection.8081
S0373 Astaroth Astaroth uses a software packer called Pe123\RPolyCryptor.35
S0638 Babuk Versions of Babuk have been packed.141516
S0534 Bazar Bazar has a variant with a packed payload.6162
S0268 Bisonal Bisonal has used the MPRESS packer and similar tools for obfuscation.19
S0520 BLINDINGCAN BLINDINGCAN has been packed with the UPX packer.28
S0020 China Chopper China Chopper‘s client component is packed with UPX.37
S0611 Clop Clop has been packed to help avoid detection.4243
S0614 CostaBricks CostaBricks can implement a custom-built virtual machine mechanism to obfuscate its code.30
S0527 CSPY Downloader CSPY Downloader has been packed with UPX.4
S0625 Cuba Cuba has a packed payload when delivered.54
G0070 Dark Caracal Dark Caracal has used UPX to pack Bandook.82
S0334 DarkComet DarkComet has the option to compress its payload using UPX or MPRESS.31
S0187 Daserf A version of Daserf uses the MPRESS packer.52
S0281 Dok Dok is packed with an UPX executable packer.53
S0695 Donut Donut can generate packed code modules.3
S0694 DRATzarus DRATzarus‘s dropper can be packed with UPX.9
S0024 Dyre Dyre has been delivered with encrypted resources and must be unpacked for execution.66
S0554 Egregor Egregor‘s payloads are custom-packed, archived and encrypted to prevent analysis.78
G0066 Elderwood Elderwood has packed malware payloads before delivery to victims.69
S0367 Emotet Emotet has used custom packers to protect its payloads.55
S0512 FatDuke FatDuke has been regularly repacked by its operators to create large binaries and evade detection.29
S0182 FinFisher A FinFisher variant uses a custom packer.5758
S0628 FYAnti FYAnti has used ConfuserEx to pack its .NET module.27
G0093 GALLIUM GALLIUM packed some payloads using different types of packers, both known and custom.68
S0588 GoldMax GoldMax has been packed for obfuscation.64
S0342 GreyEnergy GreyEnergy is packed for obfuscation.48
S0132 H1N1 H1N1 uses a custom packing algorithm.56
S0601 Hildegard Hildegard has packed ELF files into other binaries.23
S0431 HotCroissant HotCroissant has used the open source UPX executable packer.36
S0398 HyperBro HyperBro has the ability to pack its payload.13
S0483 IcedID IcedID has packed and encrypted its loader module.63
S0283 jRAT jRAT payloads have been packed.10
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has packed malware with UPX.18
S0356 KONNI KONNI has been packed for obfuscation.12
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has used Themida to pack malicious DLLs and other files.960
S0513 LiteDuke LiteDuke has been packed with multiple layers of encryption.29
S0447 Lokibot Lokibot has used several packing methods for obfuscation.59
S0532 Lucifer Lucifer has used UPX packed binaries.38
S0409 Machete Machete has been packed with NSIS.67
S0530 Melcoz Melcoz has been packed with VMProtect and Themida.45
S0455 Metamorfo Metamorfo has used VMProtect to pack and protect files.6
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE has used .NET packer tools to evade detection.65
G0014 Night Dragon Night Dragon is known to use software packing in its tools.75
S0264 OopsIE OopsIE uses the SmartAssembly obfuscator to pack an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2.24
S0352 OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has a variant that is packed with UPX.5
G0040 Patchwork A Patchwork payload was packed with UPX.77
S0650 QakBot QakBot can encrypt and pack malicious payloads.32
S0565 Raindrop Raindrop used a custom packer for its Cobalt Strike payload, which was compressed using the LZMA algorithm.4647
G0106 Rocke Rocke‘s miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.707172
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz.73
S0461 SDBbot SDBbot has used a packed installer file.17
S0053 SeaDuke SeaDuke has been packed with the UPX packer.44
S0444 ShimRat ShimRat‘s loader has been packed with the compressed ShimRat core DLL and the legitimate DLL for it to hijack.40
S0543 Spark Spark has been packed with Enigma Protector to obfuscate its contents.21
S0663 SysUpdate SysUpdate can use packed binaries.13
G0092 TA505 TA505 has used UPX to obscure malicious code.17
G0139 TeamTNT TeamTNT has used UPX and Ezuri packer to pack its binaries.86
G0089 The White Company The White Company has obfuscated their payloads through packing.85
G0027 Threat Group-3390 Threat Group-3390 has packed malware and tools.83
S0671 Tomiris Tomiris has been packed with UPX.26
S0678 Torisma Torisma has been packed with Iz4 compression.60
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot leverages a custom packer to obfuscate its functionality.22
S0094 Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Karagany samples sometimes use common binary packers such as UPX and Aspack on top of a custom Delphi binary packer.4950
S0022 Uroburos Uroburos uses a custom packer.20
S0476 Valak Valak has used packed DLL payloads.39
S0257 VERMIN VERMIN is initially packed.51
S0248 yty yty packs a plugin with UPX.11
S0251 Zebrocy Zebrocy‘s Delphi variant was packed with UPX.3334
S0230 ZeroT Some ZeroT DLL files have been packed with UPX.25
G0128 ZIRCONIUM ZIRCONIUM has used multi-stage packers for exploit code.76

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1049 Antivirus/Antimalware Employ heuristic-based malware detection. Ensure updated virus definitions and create custom signatures for observed malware.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0022 File File Metadata

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