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T1574.008 Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.

Search order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike DLL Search Order Hijacking, the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program. 1 2 3 However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program’s directory.

For example, “example.exe” runs “cmd.exe” with the command-line argument net user. An adversary may place a program called “net.exe” within the same directory as example.exe, “net.exe” will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called “net.com” in the same directory as “net.exe”, then cmd.exe /C net user will execute “net.com” instead of “net.exe” due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. 4

Search order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL Search Order Hijacking.

Item Value
ID T1574.008
Sub-techniques T1574.001, T1574.002, T1574.004, T1574.005, T1574.006, T1574.007, T1574.008, T1574.009, T1574.010, T1574.011, T1574.012, T1574.013
Tactics TA0003, TA0004, TA0005
CAPEC ID CAPEC-159
Platforms Windows
Permissions required Administrator, SYSTEM, User
Version 1.0
Created 13 March 2020
Last Modified 17 September 2020

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0363 Empire Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities.13
S0194 PowerSploit PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities.1415

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1047 Audit Find and eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for executing or loading binaries and use fully qualified paths wherever appropriate.
M1038 Execution Prevention Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, AppLocker, or Software Restriction Policies where appropriate.789101112
M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for execution. Require that all executables be placed in write-protected directories.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0022 File File Creation
DS0009 Process Process Creation

References

  1. Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. ↩

  2. Tim Hill. (2014, February 2). The Windows NT Command Shell. Retrieved December 5, 2014. ↩

  3. Microsoft. (n.d.). WinExec function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. ↩

  4. Microsoft. (2011, October 24). Environment Property. Retrieved July 27, 2016. ↩

  5. Kanthak, S.. (2016, July 20). Vulnerability and Exploit Detector. Retrieved February 3, 2017. ↩

  6. Beechey, J.. (2014, November 18). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014. ↩

  7. Gorzelany, A., Hall, J., Poggemeyer, L.. (2019, January 7). Windows Defender Application Control. Retrieved July 16, 2019. ↩

  8. Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016. ↩

  9. NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016. ↩

  10. Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P.. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014. ↩

  11. Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016. ↩

  12. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016. ↩

  13. PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018. ↩

  14. PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018. ↩

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