T0867 Lateral Tool Transfer
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. 1 Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. 1
In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | T0867 |
| Sub-techniques | |
| Tactics | TA0109 |
| Platforms | None |
| Version | 1.1 |
| Created | 21 May 2020 |
| Last Modified | 16 April 2025 |
Procedure Examples
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0028 | 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team moved their tools laterally within the ICS network. 8 |
| C0025 | 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a VBS script to facilitate lateral tool transfer. The VBS script was used to copy ICS-specific payloads with the following command: cscript C:\Backinfo\ufn.vbs C:\Backinfo\101.dll C:\Delta\101.dll7 |
| S0606 | Bad Rabbit | Bad Rabbit can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. 4 |
| S1045 | INCONTROLLER | INCONTROLLER can use a Telnet session to load a malware implant on Omron PLCs.56 |
| S0368 | NotPetya | NotPetya can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. 4 |
| S0603 | Stuxnet | Stuxnet sends an SQL statement that creates a table and inserts a binary value into the table. The binary value is a hex string representation of the main Stuxnet DLL as an executable file (formed using resource 210) and an updated configuration data block. 3 |
| C0030 | Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles made attempts on multiple victim machines to transfer and execute the WMImplant tool.9 |
| S0366 | WannaCry | WannaCry can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. 4 |
Mitigations
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M0931 | Network Intrusion Prevention | Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. 2 |
References
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Enterprise ATT&CK Enterprise ATT&CK Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ↩↩
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Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S 2014, February Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting Retrieved. 2016/04/20 ↩
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Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩
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Joe Slowik 2019, April 10 Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ↩↩↩
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DHS/CISA. (2022, May 25). Alert (AA22-103A) APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices. Retrieved September 28, 2022. ↩
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Jimmy Wylie. (2022, August). Analyzing PIPEDREAM: Challenges in Testing an ICS Attack Toolkit. Defcon 30. ↩
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Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020. ↩
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Booz Allen Hamilton. (2016). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved December 18, 2024. ↩
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FireEye Intelligence . (2018, October 23). TRITON Attribution: Russian Government-Owned Lab Most Likely Built Custom Intrusion Tools for TRITON Attackers. Retrieved April 16, 2019. ↩