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T1071.001 Web Protocols

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.

Item Value
ID T1071.001
Sub-techniques T1071.001, T1071.002, T1071.003, T1071.004
Tactics TA0011
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 1.0
Created 15 March 2020
Last Modified 26 March 2020

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0066 3PARA RAT 3PARA RAT uses HTTP for command and control.44
S0065 4H RAT 4H RAT uses HTTP for command and control.44
S0469 ABK ABK has the ability to use HTTP in communications with C2.34
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL ADVSTORESHELL connects to port 80 of a C2 server using Wininet API. Data is exchanged via HTTP POSTs.130
S0331 Agent Tesla Agent Tesla has used HTTP for C2 communications.104105
S0504 Anchor Anchor has used HTTP and HTTPS in C2 communications.101
S0584 AppleJeus AppleJeus has sent data to its C2 server via POST requests.203
S0622 AppleSeed AppleSeed has the ability to communicate with C2 over HTTP.174175
G0026 APT18 APT18 uses HTTP for C2 communications.301
G0073 APT19 APT19 used HTTP for C2 communications. APT19 also used an HTTP malware variant to communicate over HTTP for C2.329330
G0007 APT28 Later implants used by APT28, such as CHOPSTICK, use a blend of HTTP, HTTPS, and other legitimate channels for C2, depending on module configuration.164321
G0016 APT29 APT29 has used HTTP for C2 and data exfiltration.320
G0050 APT32 APT32 has used JavaScript that communicates over HTTP or HTTPS to attacker controlled domains to download additional frameworks. The group has also used downloaded encrypted payloads over HTTP.319221
G0064 APT33 APT33 has used HTTP for command and control.281
G0067 APT37 APT37 uses HTTPS to conceal C2 communications.316
G0082 APT38 APT38 used a backdoor, QUICKRIDE, to communicate to the C2 server over HTTP and HTTPS.325
G0087 APT39 APT39 has used HTTP in communications with C2.344345
G0096 APT41 APT41 used HTTP to download payloads for CVE-2019-19781 and CVE-2020-10189 exploits.294
S0456 Aria-body Aria-body has used HTTP in C2 communications.136
S0473 Avenger Avenger has the ability to use HTTP in communication with C2.34
S0475 BackConfig BackConfig has the ability to use HTTPS for C2 communiations.212
S0031 BACKSPACE BACKSPACE uses HTTP as a transport to communicate with its command server.78
S0128 BADNEWS BADNEWS establishes a backdoor over HTTP.56
S0337 BadPatch BadPatch uses HTTP for C2.32
S0239 Bankshot Bankshot uses HTTP for command and control communication.23
S0534 Bazar Bazar can use HTTP and HTTPS over ports 80 and 443 in C2 communications.278279
S0470 BBK BBK has the ability to use HTTP in communications with C2.34
S0127 BBSRAT BBSRAT uses GET and POST requests over HTTP or HTTPS for command and control to obtain commands and send ZLIB compressed data back to the C2 server.137
S0268 Bisonal Bisonal has used HTTP for C2 communications.4647
S0089 BlackEnergy BlackEnergy communicates with its C2 server over HTTP.100
S0564 BlackMould BlackMould can send commands to C2 in the body of HTTP POST requests.126
S0520 BLINDINGCAN BLINDINGCAN has used HTTPS over port 443 for command and control.276
S0657 BLUELIGHT BLUELIGHT can use HTTP/S for C2 using the Microsoft Graph API.256
S0635 BoomBox BoomBox has used HTTP POST requests for C2.189
G0060 BRONZE BUTLER BRONZE BUTLER malware has used HTTP for C2.156
S0043 BUBBLEWRAP BUBBLEWRAP can communicate using HTTP or HTTPS.17
S0482 Bundlore Bundlore uses HTTP requests for C2.110
S0030 Carbanak The Carbanak malware communicates to its command server using HTTP with an encrypted payload.30
S0484 Carberp Carberp has connected to C2 servers via HTTP.205
S0335 Carbon Carbon can use HTTP in C2 communications.109
S0348 Cardinal RAT Cardinal RAT is downloaded using HTTP over port 443.231
S0631 Chaes Chaes has used HTTP for C2 communications.138
S0674 CharmPower CharmPower can use HTTP to communicate with C2.274
S0144 ChChes ChChes communicates to its C2 server over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header.228229
G0114 Chimera Chimera has used HTTPS for C2 communications.343
S0020 China Chopper China Chopper‘s server component executes code sent via HTTP POST commands.102
S0023 CHOPSTICK Various implementations of CHOPSTICK communicate with C2 over HTTP.163
S0660 Clambling Clambling has the ability to communicate over HTTP.61
S0054 CloudDuke One variant of CloudDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2.24
G0080 Cobalt Group Cobalt Group has used HTTPS for C2.246297298
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike can use a custom command and control protocol that can be encapsulated in HTTP or HTTPS. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.258259260261
S0244 Comnie Comnie uses HTTP for C2 communication.88
S0126 ComRAT ComRAT has used HTTP requests for command and control.251252253
G0142 Confucius Confucius has used HTTP for C2 communications.341
S0137 CORESHELL CORESHELL can communicate over HTTP for C2.164210
S0050 CosmicDuke CosmicDuke can use HTTP or HTTPS for command and control to hard-coded C2 servers.24149
S0046 CozyCar CozyCar‘s main method of communicating with its C2 servers is using HTTP or HTTPS.158
S0115 Crimson Crimson can use a HTTP GET request to download its final payload.111
S0538 Crutch Crutch has conducted C2 communications with a Dropbox account using the HTTP API.220
S0527 CSPY Downloader CSPY Downloader can use GET requests to download additional payloads from C2.3
S0687 Cyclops Blink Cyclops Blink can download files via HTTP and HTTPS.7374
S0497 Dacls Dacls can use HTTPS in C2 communications.3839
G0070 Dark Caracal Dark Caracal‘s version of Bandook communicates with their server over a TCP port using HTTP payloads Base64 encoded and suffixed with the string “&&&”.335
S0334 DarkComet DarkComet can use HTTP for C2 communications.227
S0673 DarkWatchman DarkWatchman uses HTTPS for command and control.141
S0187 Daserf Daserf uses HTTP for C2.156
S0243 DealersChoice DealersChoice uses HTTP for communication with the C2 server.262
S0616 DEATHRANSOM DEATHRANSOM can use HTTPS to download files.37
S0659 Diavol Diavol has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2.127
S0200 Dipsind Dipsind uses HTTP for C2.43
S0600 Doki Doki has communicated with C2 over HTTPS.240
S0695 Donut Donut can use HTTP to download previously staged shellcode payloads.14
S0472 down_new down_new has the ability to use HTTP in C2 communications.34
S0186 DownPaper DownPaper communicates to its C2 server over HTTP.280
S0694 DRATzarus DRATzarus can use HTTP or HTTPS for C2 communications.209
S0384 Dridex Dridex has used POST requests and HTTPS for C2 communications.201202
S0502 Drovorub Drovorub can use the WebSocket protocol and has initiated communication with C2 servers with an HTTP Upgrade request.254
S0062 DustySky DustySky has used both HTTP and HTTPS for C2.86
S0024 Dyre Dyre uses HTTPS for C2 communications.215216
S0554 Egregor Egregor has communicated with its C2 servers via HTTPS protocol.165
S0081 Elise Elise communicates over HTTP or HTTPS for C2.91
S0064 ELMER ELMER uses HTTP for command and control.268
S0082 Emissary Emissary uses HTTP or HTTPS for C2.185
S0363 Empire Empire can conduct command and control over protocols like HTTP and HTTPS.5
S0091 Epic Epic uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.263264
S0396 EvilBunny EvilBunny has executed C2 commands directly via HTTP.217
S0401 Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Linux uses HTTPS for C2 communications.5718
S0569 Explosive Explosive has used HTTP for communication.177
S0512 FatDuke FatDuke can be controlled via a custom C2 protocol over HTTP.87
S0171 Felismus Felismus uses HTTP for C2.230
S0267 FELIXROOT FELIXROOT uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with the C2 server.12231
G0085 FIN4 FIN4 has used HTTP POST requests to transmit data.289290
G0061 FIN8 FIN8 has used HTTPS for command and control.288
S0355 Final1stspy Final1stspy uses HTTP for C2.48
S0696 Flagpro Flagpro can communicate with its C2 using HTTP.232
S0381 FlawedAmmyy FlawedAmmyy has used HTTP for C2.153
S0661 FoggyWeb FoggyWeb has the ability to communicate with C2 servers over HTTP GET/POST requests.135
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.233338336339337340
S0168 Gazer Gazer communicates with its C2 servers over HTTP.277
S0666 Gelsemium Gelsemium can use HTTP/S in C2 communications.187
S0049 GeminiDuke GeminiDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for command and control.24
S0460 Get2 Get2 has the ability to use HTTP to send information collected from an infected host to C2.89
S0249 Gold Dragon Gold Dragon uses HTTP for communication to the control servers.140
S0493 GoldenSpy GoldenSpy has used the Ryeol HTTP Client to facilitate HTTP internet communication.49
S0597 GoldFinder GoldFinder has used HTTP for C2.58
S0588 GoldMax GoldMax has used HTTPS and HTTP GET requests with custom HTTP cookies for C2.58166
S0477 Goopy Goopy has the ability to communicate with its C2 over HTTP.221
S0531 Grandoreiro Grandoreiro has the ability to use HTTP in C2 communications.237238
S0237 GravityRAT GravityRAT uses HTTP for C2.70
S0342 GreyEnergy GreyEnergy uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.31
S0632 GrimAgent GrimAgent has the ability to use HTTP for C2 communications.85
S0561 GuLoader GuLoader can use HTTP to retrieve additional binaries.150151
G0125 HAFNIUM HAFNIUM has used open-source C2 frameworks, including Covenant.299
S0037 HAMMERTOSS The “Uploader” variant of HAMMERTOSS visits a hard-coded server over HTTP/S to download the images HAMMERTOSS uses to receive commands.255
S0391 HAWKBALL HAWKBALL has used HTTP to communicate with a single hard-coded C2 server.53
S0170 Helminth Helminth can use HTTP for C2.106
S0087 Hi-Zor Hi-Zor communicates with its C2 server over HTTPS.128
G0126 Higaisa Higaisa used HTTP and HTTPS to send data back to its C2 server.307308
S0009 Hikit Hikit has used HTTP for C2.250
S0070 HTTPBrowser HTTPBrowser has used HTTP and HTTPS for command and control.7172
S0068 httpclient httpclient uses HTTP for command and control.44
S0398 HyperBro HyperBro has used HTTPS for C2 communications.243
S0483 IcedID IcedID has used HTTPS in communications with C2.93
G0100 Inception Inception has used HTTP, HTTPS, and WebDav in network communications.287139
S0604 Industroyer Industroyer’s main backdoor connected to a remote C2 server using HTTPS.15
S0260 InvisiMole InvisiMole uses HTTP for C2 communications.242
S0015 Ixeshe Ixeshe uses HTTP for command and control.132133
S0044 JHUHUGIT JHUHUGIT variants have communicated with C2 servers over HTTP and HTTPS.818283
S0265 Kazuar Kazuar uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with the C2 server. Kazuar can also act as a webserver and listen for inbound HTTP requests through an exposed API.115
G0004 Ke3chang Ke3chang malware including RoyalCli and BS2005 have communicated over HTTP with the C2 server through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2.296182
S0276 Keydnap Keydnap uses HTTPS for command and control.33
S0526 KGH_SPY KGH_SPY can send data to C2 with HTTP POST requests.3
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2.317
S0599 Kinsing Kinsing has communicated with C2 over HTTP.90
S0250 Koadic Koadic has used HTTP for C2 communications.2
S0162 Komplex The Komplex C2 channel uses HTTP POST requests.19
S0356 KONNI KONNI has used HTTP POST for C2.191192
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS.3153839311314313312
S0513 LiteDuke LiteDuke can use HTTP GET requests in C2 communications.87
S0680 LitePower LitePower can use HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.206
S0447 Lokibot Lokibot has used HTTP for C2 communications.4142
S0582 LookBack LookBack’s C2 proxy tool sends data to a C2 server over HTTP.225
S0042 LOWBALL LOWBALL command and control occurs via HTTPS over port 443.17
S0409 Machete Machete uses HTTP for Command & Control.198199200
S0282 MacSpy MacSpy uses HTTP for command and control.129
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound malware has used HTTP for C2.300
S0652 MarkiRAT MarkiRAT can initiate communication over HTTP/HTTPS for its C2 server.188
S0449 Maze Maze has communicated to hard-coded IP addresses via HTTP.16
S0500 MCMD MCMD can use HTTPS in communication with C2 web servers.10
S0459 MechaFlounder MechaFlounder has the ability to use HTTP in communication with C2.69
S0455 Metamorfo Metamorfo has used HTTP for C2.5152
S0339 Micropsia Micropsia uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2 network communications.196197
S0051 MiniDuke MiniDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for command and control.2487
S0084 Mis-Type Mis-Type network traffic can communicate over HTTP.50
S0284 More_eggs More_eggs uses HTTPS for C2.246247
G0069 MuddyWater MuddyWater has used HTTP for C2 communications.2854
G0129 Mustang Panda Mustang Panda has communicated with its C2 via HTTP POST requests.331332333334
S0699 Mythic Mythic supports HTTP-based C2 profiles.13
S0691 Neoichor Neoichor can use HTTP for C2 communications.182
S0034 NETEAGLE NETEAGLE will attempt to detect if the infected host is configured to a proxy. If so, NETEAGLE will send beacons via an HTTP POST request. NETEAGLE will also use HTTP to download resources that contain an IP address and Port Number pair to connect to for further C2.78
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE has the ability to communicate over HTTP.9899
G0014 Night Dragon Night Dragon has used HTTP for C2.324
S0385 njRAT njRAT has used HTTP for C2 communications.26
S0353 NOKKI NOKKI has used HTTP for C2 communications.84
S0340 Octopus Octopus has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2 communications.6564
G0049 OilRig OilRig has used HTTP for C2.83184286
S0439 Okrum Okrum uses HTTP for communication with its C2.154
S0138 OLDBAIT OLDBAIT can use HTTP for C2.164
S0052 OnionDuke OnionDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2.24
S0264 OopsIE OopsIE uses HTTP for C2 communications.218219
G0071 Orangeworm Orangeworm has used HTTP for C2.302
S0352 OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can use HTTP POST and GET requests to send and receive C2 information.249
S0594 Out1 Out1 can use HTTP and HTTPS in communications with remote hosts.4
S0072 OwaAuth OwaAuth uses incoming HTTP requests with a username keyword and commands and handles them as instructions to perform actions.71
S0598 P.A.S. Webshell P.A.S. Webshell can issue commands via HTTP POST.18
S0664 Pandora Pandora can communicate over HTTP.118
S0643 Peppy Peppy can use HTTP to communicate with C2.111
S0048 PinchDuke PinchDuke transfers files from the compromised host via HTTP or HTTPS to a C2 server.24
S0435 PLEAD PLEAD has used HTTP for communications with command and control (C2) servers.235236
S0013 PlugX PlugX can be configured to use HTTP for command and control.71186
S0067 pngdowner pngdowner uses HTTP for command and control.44
S0428 PoetRAT PoetRAT has used HTTP and HTTPs for C2 communications.152
S0518 PolyglotDuke PolyglotDuke has has used HTTP GET requests in C2 communications.87
S0453 Pony Pony has sent collected information to the C2 via HTTP POST request.214
S0378 PoshC2 PoshC2 can use protocols like HTTP/HTTPS for command and control traffic.12
S0441 PowerShower PowerShower has sent HTTP GET and POST requests to C2 servers to send information and receive instructions.139
S0371 POWERTON POWERTON has used HTTP/HTTPS for C2 traffic.181
S0184 POWRUNER POWRUNER can use HTTP for C2 communications.183184
S0238 Proxysvc Proxysvc uses HTTP over SSL to communicate commands with the control server.226
S0078 Psylo Psylo uses HTTPS for C2.29
S0147 Pteranodon Pteranodon can use HTTP for C2.233
S0196 PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHBUGGY enables remote interaction and can obtain additional code over HTTPS GET and POST requests.144145146
S0192 Pupy Pupy can communicate over HTTP for C2.11
S0650 QakBot QakBot has the ability to use HTTP and HTTPS in communication with C2 servers.202122
S0269 QUADAGENT QUADAGENT uses HTTPS and HTTP for C2 communications.265
S0686 QuietSieve QuietSieve can use HTTPS in C2 communications.103
S0629 RainyDay RainyDay can use HTTP in C2 communications.213
S0458 Ramsay Ramsay has used HTTP for C2.162
G0075 Rancor Rancor has used HTTP for C2.318
S0241 RATANKBA RATANKBA uses HTTP/HTTPS for command and control communication.113114
S0662 RCSession RCSession can use HTTP in C2 communications.6162
S0495 RDAT RDAT can use HTTP communications for C2, as well as using the WinHTTP library to make requests to the Exchange Web Services API.27
S0172 Reaver Some Reaver variants use HTTP for C2.68
S0153 RedLeaves RedLeaves can communicate to its C2 over HTTP and HTTPS if directed.193194
S0019 Regin The Regin malware platform supports many standard protocols, including HTTP and HTTPS.92
S0375 Remexi Remexi uses BITSAdmin to communicate with the C2 server over HTTP.75
S0125 Remsec Remsec is capable of using HTTP and HTTPS for C2.949596
S0496 REvil REvil has used HTTP and HTTPS in communication with C2.269270271272273
S0258 RGDoor RGDoor uses HTTP for C2 communications.167
S0003 RIPTIDE APT12 has used RIPTIDE, a RAT that uses HTTP to communicate.79
S0448 Rising Sun Rising Sun has used HTTP for command and control.108
G0106 Rocke Rocke has executed wget and curl commands to Pastebin over the HTTPS protocol.291
S0240 ROKRAT ROKRAT can use HTTP and HTTPS for command and control communication.119120121
S0148 RTM RTM has initiated connections to external domains using HTTPS.124
S0085 S-Type S-Type uses HTTP for C2.50
S0074 Sakula Sakula uses HTTP for C2.239
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team‘s BCS-server tool connects to the designated C2 server via HTTP.293
S0053 SeaDuke SeaDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2.24
S0345 Seasalt Seasalt uses HTTP for C2 communications.241
S0382 ServHelper ServHelper uses HTTP for C2.123
S0596 ShadowPad ShadowPad communicates over HTTP to retrieve a string that is decoded into a C2 server URL.155
S0140 Shamoon Shamoon has used HTTP for C2.45
S0444 ShimRat ShimRat communicated over HTTP and HTTPS with C2 servers.9
S0445 ShimRatReporter ShimRatReporter communicated over HTTP with preconfigured C2 servers.9
S0589 Sibot Sibot communicated with its C2 server via HTTP GET requests.58
S0610 SideTwist SideTwist has used HTTP GET and POST requests over port 443 for C2.207
G0121 Sidewinder Sidewinder has used HTTP in C2 communications.282283284
G0083 SilverTerrier SilverTerrier uses HTTP for C2 communications.295
S0633 Sliver Sliver has the ability to support C2 communications over HTTP/S.678
S0533 SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOTHFULMEDIA has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.257
S0226 Smoke Loader Smoke Loader uses HTTP for C2.25
S0649 SMOKEDHAM SMOKEDHAM has communicated with its C2 servers via HTTPS and HTTP POST requests.211
S0159 SNUGRIDE SNUGRIDE communicates with its C2 server over HTTP.193
S0516 SoreFang SoreFang can use HTTP in C2 communications.7677
S0543 Spark Spark has used HTTP POST requests to communicate with its C2 server to receive commands.97
S0374 SpeakUp SpeakUp uses POST and GET requests over HTTP to communicate with its main C&C server. 176
G0038 Stealth Falcon Stealth Falcon malware communicates with its C2 server via HTTPS.303
S0491 StrongPity StrongPity can use HTTP and HTTPS in C2 communications.6667
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet uses HTTP to communicate with a command and control server. 157
S0559 SUNBURST SUNBURST communicated via HTTP GET or HTTP POST requests to third party servers for C2.267
S0578 SUPERNOVA SUPERNOVA had to receive an HTTP GET request containing a specific set of parameters in order to execute.5960
S0060 Sys10 Sys10 uses HTTP for C2.80
G0092 TA505 TA505 has used HTTP to communicate with C2 nodes.342
G0127 TA551 TA551 has used HTTP for C2 communications.148
S0011 Taidoor Taidoor has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2.222
G0139 TeamTNT TeamTNT has the curl command to send credentials over HTTP and download new software.304305 TeamTNT has also used a custom user agent HTTP header in shell scripts.306
S0595 ThiefQuest ThiefQuest uploads files via unencrypted HTTP. 5455
G0027 Threat Group-3390 Threat Group-3390 malware has used HTTP for C2.292
S0668 TinyTurla TinyTurla can use HTTPS in C2 communications.204
S0671 Tomiris Tomiris can use HTTP to establish C2 communications.266
S0678 Torisma Torisma can use HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.248
S0682 TrailBlazer TrailBlazer has used HTTP requests for C2.40
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot uses HTTPS to communicate with its C2 servers, to get malware updates, modules that perform most of the malware logic and various configuration files.131101
S0094 Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Karagany can communicate with C2 via HTTP POST requests.28
G0081 Tropic Trooper Tropic Trooper has used HTTP in communication with the C2.322323
S0436 TSCookie TSCookie can multiple protocols including HTTP and HTTPS in communication with command and control (C2) servers.223224
S0647 Turian Turian has the ability to use HTTP for its C2.234
G0010 Turla Turla has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.327328
S0333 UBoatRAT UBoatRAT has used HTTP for C2 communications.125
S0275 UPPERCUT UPPERCUT has used HTTP for C2, including sending error codes in Cookie headers.208
S0386 Ursnif Ursnif has used HTTPS for C2.159160161
S0476 Valak Valak has used HTTP in communications with C2.147148
S0636 VaporRage VaporRage can use HTTP to download shellcode from compromised websites.189
S0207 Vasport Vasport creates a backdoor by making a connection using a HTTP POST.190
S0442 VBShower VBShower has attempted to obtain a VBS script from command and control (C2) nodes over HTTP.117
S0257 VERMIN VERMIN uses HTTP for C2 communications.195
S0514 WellMess WellMess can use HTTP and HTTPS in C2 communications.17817918077
S0689 WhisperGate WhisperGate can make an HTTPS connection to download additional files.244245
G0112 Windshift Windshift has used tools that communicate with C2 over HTTP.310
S0466 WindTail WindTail has the ability to use HTTP for C2 communications.112
S0059 WinMM WinMM uses HTTP for C2.80
S0430 Winnti for Linux Winnti for Linux has used HTTP in outbound communications.275
S0141 Winnti for Windows Winnti for Windows has the ability to use encapsulated HTTP/S in C2 communications.116
G0090 WIRTE WIRTE has used HTTP for network communication.309
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used HTTP for network communications.326
S0341 Xbash Xbash uses HTTP for C2 communications.142
S0653 xCaon xCaon has communicated with the C2 server by sending POST requests over HTTP.107
S0388 YAHOYAH YAHOYAH uses HTTP for C2.143
S0251 Zebrocy Zebrocy uses HTTP for C2.168169170171172173
S0230 ZeroT ZeroT has used HTTP for C2.3536
S0330 Zeus Panda Zeus Panda uses HTTP for C2 communications.134
S0086 ZLib ZLib communicates over HTTP for C2.50
S0412 ZxShell ZxShell has used HTTP for C2 connections.63

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Traffic Content

References

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