G0061 FIN8
FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group known to launch tailored spearphishing campaigns targeting the retail, restaurant, and hospitality industries. 1 2
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | G0061 |
Associated Names | |
Version | 1.3 |
Created | 18 April 2018 |
Last Modified | 22 March 2023 |
Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Techniques Used
Domain | ID | Name | Use |
---|---|---|---|
enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | - |
enterprise | T1134.001 | Token Impersonation/Theft | FIN8 has used a malicious framework designed to impersonate the lsass.exe/vmtoolsd.exe token.4 |
enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | - |
enterprise | T1071.001 | Web Protocols | FIN8 has used HTTPS for command and control.4 |
enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | - |
enterprise | T1560.001 | Archive via Utility | FIN8 has used RAR to compress collected data before exfiltration.3 |
enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | - |
enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShell | FIN8‘s malicious spearphishing payloads are executed as PowerShell. FIN8 has also used PowerShell for lateral movement and credential access.143 |
enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | FIN8 has used a Batch file to automate frequently executed post compromise cleanup activities.3 FIN8 has also executed commands remotely via cmd.14 |
enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged | - |
enterprise | T1074.002 | Remote Data Staging | FIN8 aggregates staged data from a network into a single location.3 |
enterprise | T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | FIN8 has retrieved a list of trusted domains by using Nltest.exe /domain_trusts .4 |
enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | - |
enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric Cryptography | FIN8 has used the Plink utility to tunnel RDP back to C2 infrastructure.3 |
enterprise | T1546 | Event Triggered Execution | - |
enterprise | T1546.003 | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription | FIN8 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.4 |
enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | - |
enterprise | T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | FIN8 has used FTP to exfiltrate collected data.3 |
enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | FIN8 has exploited the CVE-2016-0167 local vulnerability.23 |
enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | - |
enterprise | T1070.001 | Clear Windows Event Logs | FIN8 has cleared logs during post compromise cleanup activities.3 |
enterprise | T1070.004 | File Deletion | FIN8 has deleted tmp and prefetch files during post compromise cleanup activities.3 |
enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | FIN8 has used remote code execution to download subsequent payloads.24 |
enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities.3 |
enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | - |
enterprise | T1027.010 | Command Obfuscation | FIN8 has used environment variables and standard input (stdin) to obfuscate command-line arguments. FIN8 also obfuscates malicious macros delivered as payloads.134 |
enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | - |
enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | FIN8 harvests credentials using Invoke-Mimikatz or Windows Credentials Editor (WCE).3 |
enterprise | T1566 | Phishing | - |
enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing Word documents with embedded malicious macros.123 |
enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link | FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing links to malicious documents with embedded macros.3 |
enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | - |
enterprise | T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call | FIN8 has injected malicious code into a new svchost.exe process.4 |
enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | - |
enterprise | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | FIN8 has used RDP for lateral movement.3 |
enterprise | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | FIN8 has attempted to map to C$ on enumerated hosts to test the scope of their current credentials/context.3 |
enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | FIN8 has used dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts; they have also used nltest.exe /dclist to retrieve a list of domain controllers.34 |
enterprise | T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | - |
enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | FIN8 has used scheduled tasks to maintain RDP backdoors.3 |
enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | - |
enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software Discovery | FIN8 has used Registry keys to detect and avoid executing in potential sandboxes.3 |
enterprise | T1204 | User Execution | - |
enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious Link | FIN8 has used emails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.123 |
enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious File | FIN8 has used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malware.123 |
enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | FIN8 has used valid accounts for persistence and lateral movement.3 |
enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | FIN8 has used sslip.io , a free IP to domain mapping service that also makes SSL certificate generation easier for traffic encryption, as part of their command and control.4 |
enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | FIN8‘s malicious spearphishing payloads use WMI to launch malware and spawn cmd.exe execution. FIN8 has also used WMIC for lateral movement as well as during and post compromise cleanup activities.143 |
Software
References
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Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 12, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Kizhakkinan, D. et al.. (2016, May 11). Threat Actor Leverages Windows Zero-day Exploit in Payment Card Data Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Martin Zugec. (2021, July 27). Deep Dive Into a FIN8 Attack - A Forensic Investigation. Retrieved September 1, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩