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T1584 Compromise Infrastructure

Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.74812 Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.

Use of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with Digital Certificates) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or Phishing campaigns.3 Adversaries may also compromise numerous machines to support Proxy and/or proxyware services or to form a botnet.12 Additionally, adversaries may compromise infrastructure residing in close proximity to a target in order to gain Initial Access via Wi-Fi Networks.6

By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may enable follow-on malicious operations. Prior to targeting, adversaries may also compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.9

Item Value
ID T1584
Sub-techniques T1584.001, T1584.002, T1584.003, T1584.004, T1584.005, T1584.006, T1584.007, T1584.008
Tactics TA0042
Platforms PRE
Version 1.6
Created 01 October 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0051 APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 compromised third-party infrastructure in physical proximity to targets of interest for follow-on activities.6
C0043 Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions included the use of compromised infrastructure, such as DVR and IP camera devices, for command and control purposes in ShadowPad activity.13

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1056 Pre-compromise This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.

References

  1. Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022. ↩

  2. Crystal Morin. (2023, April 4). Proxyjacking has Entered the Chat. Retrieved July 6, 2023. ↩

  3. Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020. ↩

  4. ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  5. Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021. ↩

  6. Koessel, Sean. Adair, Steven. Lancaster, Tom. (2024, November 22). The Nearest Neighbor Attack: How A Russian APT Weaponized Nearby Wi-Fi Networks for Covert Access. Retrieved February 25, 2025. ↩↩

  7. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016. ↩

  8. Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. ↩

  9. NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020. ↩

  10. Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  11. ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. ↩

  12. Winters, R. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016. ↩

  13. Recorded Future Insikt Group. (2022, April 6). Continued Targeting of Indian Power Grid Assets by Chinese State-Sponsored Activity Group. Retrieved November 21, 2024. ↩