M1050 Exploit Protection
Deploy capabilities that detect, block, and mitigate conditions indicative of software exploits. These capabilities aim to prevent exploitation by addressing vulnerabilities, monitoring anomalous behaviors, and applying exploit-mitigation techniques to harden systems and software.
Operating System Exploit Protections:
- Use Case: Enable built-in exploit protection features provided by modern operating systems, such as Microsoft’s Exploit Protection, which includes techniques like Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG).
- Implementation: Enforce DEP for all programs and enable ASLR to randomize memory addresses used by system and application processes. Windows: Configure Exploit Protection through the Windows Security app or deploy settings via Group Policy.
ExploitProtectionExportSettings.exe -path "exploit_settings.xml"Linux: Use Kernel-level hardening features like SELinux, AppArmor, or GRSEC to enforce memory protections and prevent exploits.
Third-Party Endpoint Security:
- Use Case: Use endpoint protection tools with built-in exploit protection, such as enhanced memory protection, behavior monitoring, and real-time exploit detection.
- Implementation: Deploy tools to detect and block exploitation attempts targeting unpatched software.
Virtual Patching: - Use Case: Use tools to implement virtual patches that mitigate vulnerabilities in applications or operating systems until official patches are applied. - Implementation: Use Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to block exploitation attempts on known vulnerabilities in outdated applications.
Hardening Application Configurations:
- Use Case: Disable risky application features that can be exploited, such as macros in Microsoft Office or JScript in Internet Explorer.
- Implementation: Configure Microsoft Office Group Policies to disable execution of macros in downloaded files.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | M1050 |
| Version | 1.2 |
| Created | 11 June 2019 |
| Last Modified | 11 December 2024 |
| Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Techniques Addressed by Mitigation
| Domain | ID | Name | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior.1 Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring.2 Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility. |
| enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Web Application Firewalls may be used to limit exposure of applications to prevent exploit traffic from reaching the application. |
| enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. 1 Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. 2 Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility. |
| enterprise | T1212 | Exploitation for Credential Access | Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior.1 Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring.2 Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion. |
| enterprise | T1211 | Exploitation for Defense Evasion | Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. 1 Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. 2 Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion. |
| enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. 1 Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. 2 Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software components targeted for privilege escalation. |
| enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services | Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. 1 Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. 2 Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for all software or services targeted. |
| enterprise | T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution | Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using using trusted binaries to bypass application control. |
| enterprise | T1218.010 | Regsvr32 | Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass application control. 7 Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through regsvr32 functionality by using application control 3 tools, like Windows Defender Application Control5, AppLocker, 9 8 or Software Restriction Policies 4 where appropriate. 6 |
| enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32 | Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using rundll32.exe to bypass application control. |
| enterprise | T1218.015 | Electron Applications | Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block methods of using trusted binaries to bypass application control. |
| Ensure that Electron is updated to the latest version and critical vulnerabilities (such as nodeIntegration bypasses) are patched and cannot be exploited. | |||
| enterprise | T1080 | Taint Shared Content | Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET). |
References
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Nunez, N. (2017, August 9). Moving Beyond EMET II – Windows Defender Exploit Guard. Retrieved March 12, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Wikipedia. (2018, January 11). Control-flow integrity. Retrieved March 12, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014. ↩
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Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved September 12, 2024. ↩
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Gorzelany, A., Hall, J., Poggemeyer, L.. (2019, January 7). Windows Defender Application Control. Retrieved July 16, 2019. ↩
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Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016. ↩
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National Security Agency. (2016, May 4). Secure Host Baseline EMET. Retrieved June 22, 2016. ↩
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NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016. ↩
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Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016. ↩