DET0548 Detection Strategy for Exfiltration Over Web Service
| Item |
Value |
| ID |
DET0548 |
| Version |
1.0 |
| Created |
21 October 2025 |
| Last Modified |
21 October 2025 |
Technique Detected: T1567 (Exfiltration Over Web Service)
Analytics
Windows
AN1511
Processes that normally do not initiate network communications suddenly making outbound HTTPS connections with high outbound-to-inbound data ratios. Defender view: correlation between process creation logs (e.g., Word, Excel, PowerShell) and subsequent anomalous network traffic volumes toward common web services (Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive).
Log Sources
Mutable Elements
| Field |
Description |
| MonitoredServices |
List of legitimate web services to baseline (Dropbox, OneDrive, Google Drive). |
| ExfilVolumeThreshold |
Outbound data threshold for flagging unusual activity, tunable by environment. |
| TimeWindow |
Aggregation period to calculate anomalies in outbound data volume. |
Linux
AN1512
Processes (tar, curl, python scripts) accessing large file sets and initiating outbound HTTPS POST requests with payload sizes inconsistent with baseline activity. Defender perspective: detect abnormal sequence of file archival followed by encrypted uploads to external web services.
Log Sources
Mutable Elements
| Field |
Description |
| MonitoredTools |
Suspicious command-line utilities used for exfiltration (curl, wget, python). |
| DataVolumeThreshold |
Bytes transferred threshold per session to flag unusual uploads. |
macOS
AN1513
Office apps or scripts writing files followed by xattr manipulation (to evade quarantine) and subsequent HTTPS uploads. Defender perspective: anomalous file modification + outbound TLS traffic originating from non-networking apps (Word, Excel, Preview).
Log Sources
Mutable Elements
| Field |
Description |
| WatchedApplications |
Applications not expected to perform bulk data transfers (Office apps, Preview). |
SaaS
AN1514
Abnormal API calls from user accounts invoking file upload endpoints outside normal baselines (M365, Google Drive, Box). Defender perspective: monitor unified audit logs for elevated frequency of Upload, Create, or Copy operations from compromised accounts.
Log Sources
Mutable Elements
| Field |
Description |
| APICallThreshold |
Maximum number of API calls per user/session before triggering alert. |
| UserBaselineProfiles |
Baseline normal data transfer patterns by user/role. |
ESXi
AN1515
ESXi guest OS or management interface processes establishing unexpected external HTTPS connections. Defender perspective: monitor vmx or hostd processes making outbound web requests with significant data transfer.
Log Sources
Mutable Elements
| Field |
Description |
| DatastoreTransferThreshold |
Threshold for outbound transfers from ESXi datastores. |