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T1531 Account Access Removal

Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS platforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts.3 Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a System Shutdown/Reboot to set malicious changes into place.12

In Windows, Net utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword PowerShell cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified via esxcli (system account set, system account remove).

Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as Data Destruction and Defacement, in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the Data Encrypted for Impact objective.

Item Value
ID T1531
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0040
Platforms ESXi, IaaS, Linux, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Version 1.5
Created 09 October 2019
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G1024 Akira Akira deletes administrator accounts in victim networks prior to encryption.7
S1134 DEADWOOD DEADWOOD changes the password for local and domain users via net.exe to a random 32 character string to prevent these accounts from logging on. Additionally, DEADWOOD will terminate the winlogon.exe process to prevent attempts to log on to the infected system.6
G1004 LAPSUS$ LAPSUS$ has removed a targeted organization’s global admin accounts to lock the organization out of all access.8
S0372 LockerGoga LockerGoga has been observed changing account passwords and logging off current users.12
S0576 MegaCortex MegaCortex has changed user account passwords and logged users off the system.4
S0688 Meteor Meteor has the ability to change the password of local users on compromised hosts and can log off users.5

References

  1. CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019. ↩↩

  2. Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. ↩↩

  3. Obsidian Threat Research Team. (2023, June 6). SaaS Ransomware Observed in the Wild for Sharepoint in Microsoft 365. Retrieved October 5, 2025. ↩

  4. Del Fierro, C. Kessem, L.. (2020, January 8). From Mega to Giga: Cross-Version Comparison of Top MegaCortex Modifications. Retrieved February 15, 2021. ↩

  5. Check Point Research Team. (2021, August 14). Indra - Hackers Behind Recent Attacks on Iran. Retrieved February 17, 2022. ↩

  6. Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024. ↩

  7. Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SAHARA. Retrieved February 20, 2024. ↩

  8. MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022. ↩