S0603 Stuxnet
Stuxnet was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different behaviors including multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.3124 Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.3
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | S0603 |
| Associated Names | W32.Stuxnet |
| Type | MALWARE |
| Version | 1.3 |
| Created | 14 December 2020 |
| Last Modified | 20 March 2023 |
| Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Associated Software Descriptions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| W32.Stuxnet | 3 |
Techniques Used
| Domain | ID | Name | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | - |
| enterprise | T1134.001 | Token Impersonation/Theft | Stuxnet attempts to impersonate an anonymous token to enumerate bindings in the service control manager.3 |
| enterprise | T1087 | Account Discovery | - |
| enterprise | T1087.001 | Local Account | Stuxnet enumerates user accounts of the local host.3 |
| enterprise | T1087.002 | Domain Account | Stuxnet enumerates user accounts of the domain.3 |
| enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | - |
| enterprise | T1071.001 | Web Protocols | Stuxnet uses HTTP to communicate with a command and control server. 3 |
| enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | - |
| enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom Method | Stuxnet encrypts exfiltrated data via C2 with static 31-byte long XOR keys.3 |
| enterprise | T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | - |
| enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows Service | Stuxnet uses a driver registered as a boot start service as the main load-point.3 |
| enterprise | T1132 | Data Encoding | - |
| enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard Encoding | Stuxnet transforms encrypted binary data into an ASCII string in order to use it as a URL parameter value.3 |
| enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Stuxnet decrypts resources that are loaded into memory and executed.3 |
| enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | - |
| enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric Cryptography | Stuxnet encodes the payload of system information sent to the command and control servers using a one byte 0xFF XOR key. Stuxnet also uses a 31-byte long static byte string to XOR data sent to command and control servers. The servers use a different static key to encrypt replies to the implant.3 |
| enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | Stuxnet checks for specific operating systems on 32-bit machines, Registry keys, and dates for vulnerabilities, and will exit execution if the values are not met.3 |
| enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Stuxnet sends compromised victim information via HTTP.3 |
| enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Stuxnet used MS10-073 and an undisclosed Task Scheduler vulnerability to escalate privileges on local Windows machines.3 |
| enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services | Stuxnet propagates using the MS10-061 Print Spooler and MS08-067 Windows Server Service vulnerabilities.3 |
| enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels | Stuxnet has the ability to generate new C2 domains.3 |
| enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Stuxnet uses a driver to scan for specific filesystem driver objects.3 |
| enterprise | T1562 | Impair Defenses | Stuxnet reduces the integrity level of objects to allow write actions.3 |
| enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | Stuxnet can delete OLE Automation and SQL stored procedures used to store malicious payloads.3 |
| enterprise | T1070.004 | File Deletion | Stuxnet uses an RPC server that contains a routine for file deletion and also removes itself from the system through a DLL export by deleting specific files.3 |
| enterprise | T1070.006 | Timestomp | Stuxnet extracts and writes driver files that match the times of other legitimate files.3 |
| enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | Stuxnet uses an RPC server that contains a file dropping routine and support for payload version updates for P2P communications within a victim network.3 |
| enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | Stuxnet can create registry keys to load driver files.3 |
| enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Stuxnet uses the SetSecurityDescriptorDacl API to reduce object integrity levels.3 |
| enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | Stuxnet enumerates the directories of a network resource.3 |
| enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Stuxnet uses encrypted configuration blocks and writes encrypted files to disk.3 |
| enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | Stuxnet enumerates removable drives for infection.3 |
| enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | - |
| enterprise | T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection | Stuxnet injects an entire DLL into an existing, newly created, or preselected trusted process.3 |
| enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | - |
| enterprise | T1090.001 | Internal Proxy | Stuxnet installs an RPC server for P2P communications.3 |
| enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | Stuxnet searches the Registry for indicators of security programs.3 |
| enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | Stuxnet can propagate via peer-to-peer communication and updates using RPC.3 |
| enterprise | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Stuxnet propagates to available network shares.3 |
| enterprise | T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media | Stuxnet can propagate via removable media using an autorun.inf file or the CVE-2010-2568 LNK vulnerability.3 |
| enterprise | T1014 | Rootkit | Stuxnet uses a Windows rootkit to mask its binaries and other relevant files.3 |
| enterprise | T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | - |
| enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | Stuxnet schedules a network job to execute two minutes after host infection.3 |
| enterprise | T1505 | Server Software Component | - |
| enterprise | T1505.001 | SQL Stored Procedures | Stuxnet used xp_cmdshell to store and execute SQL code.3 |
| enterprise | T1129 | Shared Modules | Stuxnet calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.3 |
| enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | - |
| enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software Discovery | Stuxnet enumerates the currently running processes related to a variety of security products.3 |
| enterprise | T1553 | Subvert Trust Controls | - |
| enterprise | T1553.002 | Code Signing | Stuxnet used a digitally signed driver with a compromised Realtek certificate.3 |
| enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Stuxnet collects system information including computer and domain names, OS version, and S7P paths.3 |
| enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Stuxnet collects the IP address of a compromised system.3 |
| enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery | Stuxnet collects the time and date of a system when it is infected.3 |
| enterprise | T1080 | Taint Shared Content | Stuxnet infects remote servers via network shares and by infecting WinCC database views with malicious code.3 |
| enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | - |
| enterprise | T1078.001 | Default Accounts | Stuxnet infected WinCC machines via a hardcoded database server password.3 |
| enterprise | T1078.002 | Domain Accounts | Stuxnet attempts to access network resources with a domain account’s credentials.3 |
| enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | Stuxnet used WMI with an explorer.exe token to execute on a remote share.3 |
| ics | T0807 | Command-Line Interface | Stuxnet will store and execute SQL code that will extract and execute Stuxnet from the saved CAB file using xp_cmdshell with the following command: set @s = master..xp _ cmdshell extrac32 /y +@t+ +@t+x; exec(@s); 3 |
| ics | T0885 | Commonly Used Port | Stuxnet attempts to contact command and control servers on port 80 to send basic information about the computer it has compromised. 3 |
| ics | T0866 | Exploitation of Remote Services | Stuxnet executes malicious SQL commands in the WinCC database server to propagate to remote systems. The malicious SQL commands include xp_cmdshell, sp_dumpdbilog, and sp_addextendedproc. 3 |
| ics | T0891 | Hardcoded Credentials | Stuxnet uses a hardcoded password in the WinCC software’s database server as one of the mechanisms used to propagate to nearby systems. 3 |
| ics | T0874 | Hooking | Stuxnet modifies the Import Address Tables DLLs to hook specific APIs that are used to open project files. 3 |
| ics | T0877 | I/O Image | Stuxnet copies the input area of an I/O image into data blocks with a one second interval between copies, forming a 21 second recording of the input area. The input area contains information being passed to the PLC from a peripheral. For example, the current state of a valve or the temperature of a device. 3 |
| ics | T0867 | Lateral Tool Transfer | Stuxnet sends an SQL statement that creates a table and inserts a binary value into the table. The binary value is a hex string representation of the main Stuxnet DLL as an executable file (formed using resource 210) and an updated configuration data block. 3 |
| ics | T0835 | Manipulate I/O Image | When the peripheral output is written to, sequence C intercepts the output and ensures it is not written to the process image output. The output is the instructions the PLC sends to a device to change its operating behavior. By intercepting the peripheral output, Stuxnet prevents an operator from noticing unauthorized commands sent to the peripheral. 3 |
| ics | T0831 | Manipulation of Control | Stuxnet can reprogram a PLC and change critical parameters in such a way that legitimate commands can be overridden or intercepted. In addition, Stuxnet can apply inappropriate command sequences or parameters to cause damage to property. 3 |
| ics | T0832 | Manipulation of View | Stuxnet manipulates the view of operators replaying process input and manipulating the I/O image to evade detection and inhibit protection functions. 4 3 |
| ics | T0849 | Masquerading | Stuxnet renames s7otbxdx.dll, a dll responsible for handling communications with a PLC. It replaces this dll file with its own version that allows it to intercept any calls that are made to access the PLC. 3 |
| ics | T0821 | Modify Controller Tasking | Stuxnet infects OB1 so that its malicious code sequence is executed at the start of a cycle. It also infects OB35. OB35 acts as a watchdog, and on certain conditions, it can stop the execution of OB1. 3 |
| ics | T0836 | Modify Parameter | In states 3 and 4 Stuxnet sends two network bursts (done through the DP_SEND primitive). The data in the frames are instructions for the frequency converter drives. For example one of the frames contains records that change the maximum frequency (the speed at which the motor will operate). The frequency converter drives consist of parameters, which can be remotely configured via Profibus. One can write new values to these parameters changing the behavior of the device. 3 |
| ics | T0889 | Modify Program | Stuxnet infects PLCs with different code depending on the characteristics of the target system. An infection sequence consists of code blocks and data blocks that will be downloaded to the PLC to alter its behavior. 3 |
| ics | T0801 | Monitor Process State | Stuxnet examines fields recorded by the DP_RECV monitor to determine if the target system is in a particular state of operation. 3 |
| ics | T0834 | Native API | Stuxnet calls system function blocks which are part of the operating system running on the PLC. Theyre used to execute system tasks, such as reading the system clock (SFC1) and generating data blocks on the fly. 3 |
| ics | T0842 | Network Sniffing | DP_RECV is the name of a standard function block used by network coprocessors. It is used to receive network frames on the Profibus a standard industrial network bus used for distributed I/O. The original block is copied to FC1869, and then replaced by a malicious block. Each time the function is used to receive a packet, the malicious Stuxnet block takes control: it will call the original DP_RECV in FC1869 and then perform postprocessing on the packet data. The replaced DP_RECV block (later on referred to as the DP_RECV monitor) is meant to monitor data sent by the frequency converter drives to the 315-2 CPU via CP 342-5 Profibus communication modules. 3 |
| ics | T0843 | Program Download | Stuxnet‘s infection sequence consists of code blocks and data blocks that will be downloaded to the PLC to alter its behavior. 3 |
| ics | T0873 | Project File Infection | Stuxnet copies itself into Step 7 projects in such a way that it automatically executes when the Step 7 project is loaded. 3 |
| ics | T0886 | Remote Services | Stuxnet executes malicious SQL commands in the WinCC database server to propagate to remote systems. The malicious SQL commands include xp_cmdshell, sp_dumpdbilog, and sp_addextendedproc. 3 |
| ics | T0888 | Remote System Information Discovery | Stuxnet enumerates and parses the System Data Blocks (SDB) using the s7blk_findfirst and s7blk_findnext API calls in s7otbxdx.dll. Stuxnet must find an SDB with the DWORD at offset 50h equal to 0100CB2Ch. This specifies that the system uses the Profibus communications processor module CP 342-5. In addition, specific values are searched for and counted: 7050h and 9500h. 7050h is assigned to part number KFC750V3 which appears to be a frequency converter drive (also known as variable frequency drive) manufactured by Fararo Paya in Teheran, Iran. 9500h is assigned to Vacon NX frequency converter drives manufactured by Vacon based in Finland.3 |
| ics | T0847 | Replication Through Removable Media | Stuxnet was able to self-replicate by being spread through removable drives. A willing insider or unknown third party, such as a contractor, may have brought the removable media into the target environment. 3 The earliest version of Stuxnet relied on physical installation, infecting target systems when an infected configuration file carried by a USB stick was opened. 4 |
| ics | T0851 | Rootkit | One of Stuxnet‘s rootkits is contained entirely in the fake s7otbxdx.dll. In order to continue existing undetected on the PLC it needs to account for at least the following situations: read requests for its own malicious code blocks, read requests for infected blocks (OB1, OB35, DP_RECV), and write requests that could overwrite Stuxnets own code. Stuxnet contains code to monitor and intercept these types of requests. The rootkit modifies these requests so that Stuxnets PLC code is not discovered or damaged. 4 |
| ics | T0869 | Standard Application Layer Protocol | Stuxnet uses a thread to monitor a data block DB890 of sequence A or B. This thread is constantly running and probing this block (every 5 minutes). On an infected PLC, if block DB890 is found and contains a special magic value (used by Stuxnet to identify his own block DB890), this blocks data can be read and written. This thread is likely used to optimize the way sequences A and B work, and modify their behavior when the Step7 editor is opened. 3 |
| ics | T0863 | User Execution | Stuxnet infects DLL’s associated with the WinCC Simatic manager which are responsible for opening project files. If a user opens an uninfected project file using a compromised manager, the file will be infected with Stuxnet code. If an infected project is opened with the Simatic manager, the modified data file will trigger a search for the xyz.dll file. If the xyz.dll file is not found in any of the specified locations, the malicious DLL will be loaded and executed by the manager. 3 |
References
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CISA. (2010, September 10). ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-272-01). Retrieved December 7, 2020. ↩
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Matrosov, A., Rodionov, E., Harley, D., Malcho, J.. (n.d.). Stuxnet Under the Microscope. Retrieved December 7, 2020. ↩
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Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22 ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Ralph Langner. (2013, November). To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve. Retrieved December 7, 2020. ↩↩↩↩