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T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception

Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.

If a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. 2

Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user’s personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). 1

Other methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users’ phones.3

Item Value
ID T1111
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0006
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 2.1
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G1044 APT42 APT42 has intercepted SMS-based one-time passwords and has set up two-factor authentication.8 Additionally, APT42 has used cloned or fake websites to capture MFA tokens.9
G0114 Chimera Chimera has registered alternate phone numbers for compromised users to intercept 2FA codes sent via SMS.7
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has used a proprietary tool to intercept one time passwords required for two-factor authentication.6
G1004 LAPSUS$ LAPSUS$ has replayed stolen session token and passwords to trigger simple-approval MFA prompts in hope of the legitimate user will grant necessary approval.10
C0049 Leviathan Australian Intrusions Leviathan abused compromised appliance access to collect multifactor authentication token values during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.12
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom collection method to intercept two-factor authentication soft tokens.11
S1104 SLOWPULSE SLOWPULSE can log credentials on compromised Pulse Secure VPNs during the DSAuth::AceAuthServer::checkUsernamePasswordACE-2FA authentication procedure.4
S0018 Sykipot Sykipot is known to contain functionality that enables targeting of smart card technologies to proxy authentication for connections to restricted network resources using detected hardware tokens.5

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1017 User Training Remove smart cards when not in use.

References

  1. Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  2. Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023. ↩

  3. Perez, D. et al. (2021, April 20). Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day. Retrieved February 5, 2024. ↩

  4. Blasco, J. (2012, January 12). Sykipot variant hijacks DOD and Windows smart cards. Retrieved January 10, 2016. ↩

  5. KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024. ↩

  6. Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024. ↩

  7. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromises. Retrieved October 9, 2024. ↩

  8. Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran’s APT42 Operations. Retrieved October 9, 2024. ↩

  9. MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022. ↩

  10. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020. ↩

  11. CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025. ↩