Skip to content

T1018 Remote System Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or net view using Net.

Adversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) or other passive means (such as local Arp cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.

Adversaries may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage Network Device CLI commands on network devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network.31

Item Value
ID T1018
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0007
CAPEC ID CAPEC-292
Platforms Linux, Network, Windows, macOS
Version 3.3
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 20 April 2022

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0552 AdFind AdFind has the ability to query Active Directory for computers.678
G0016 APT29 APT29 has used AdFind to enumerate remote systems.57
G0022 APT3 APT3 has a tool that can detect the existence of remote systems.2276
G0050 APT32 APT32 has enumerated DC servers using the command net group “Domain Controllers” /domain. The group has also used the ping command.72
G0087 APT39 APT39 has used NBTscan and custom tools to discover remote systems.737475
S0099 Arp Arp can be used to display a host’s ARP cache, which may include address resolutions for remote systems.1516
S0093 Backdoor.Oldrea Backdoor.Oldrea can enumerate and map ICS-specific systems in victim environments.26
S0534 Bazar Bazar can enumerate remote systems using Net View.24
S0570 BitPaymer BitPaymer can use net view to discover remote systems.42
S0521 BloodHound BloodHound can enumerate and collect the properties of domain computers, including domain controllers.12
G0060 BRONZE BUTLER BRONZE BUTLER typically use ping and Net to enumerate systems.58
S0335 Carbon Carbon uses the net view command.35
G0114 Chimera Chimera has utilized various scans and queries to find domain controllers and remote services in the target environment.59
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike uses the native Windows Network Enumeration APIs to interrogate and discover targets in a Windows Active Directory network.495051
S0244 Comnie Comnie runs the net view command
S0575 Conti
Conti has the ability to discover hosts on a target network.19
S0488 CrackMapExec CrackMapExec can discover active IP addresses, along with the machine name, within a targeted network.14
G0009 Deep Panda Deep Panda has used ping to identify other machines of interest.61
S0659 Diavol Diavol can use the ARP table to find remote hosts to scan.21
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has likely obtained a list of hosts in the victim environment.68
S0694 DRATzarus DRATzarus can search for other machines connected to compromised host and attempt to map the network.34
S0091 Epic Epic uses the net view command on the victim’s machine.47
G0053 FIN5 FIN5 has used the open source tool Essential NetTools to map the network and build a list of targets.77
G0037 FIN6 FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft’s built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.63
G0061 FIN8 FIN8 has used dsquery and other Active Directory utilities to enumerate hosts; they have also used nltest.exe /dclist to retrieve a list of domain controllers.7071
S0696 Flagpro Flagpro has been used to execute net view on a targeted system.43
G0117 Fox Kitten Fox Kitten has used Angry IP Scanner to detect remote systems.54
G0093 GALLIUM GALLIUM used a modified version of NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers over the network as well as ping to identify remote systems.53
S0698 HermeticWizard HermeticWizard can find machines on the local network by gathering known local IP addresses through DNSGetCacheDataTable, GetIpNetTable,WNetOpenEnumW(RESOURCE_GLOBALNET, RESOURCETYPE_ANY),NetServerEnum,GetTcpTable, and GetAdaptersAddresses.52
G0119 Indrik Spider Indrik Spider has used PowerView to enumerate all Windows Server, Windows Server 2003, and Windows 7 instances in the Active Directory database.65
S0604 Industroyer Industroyer can enumerate remote computers in the compromised network.33
G0004 Ke3chang Ke3chang has used network scanning and enumeration tools, including Ping.67
S0599 Kinsing Kinsing has used a script to parse files like /etc/hosts and SSH known_hosts to discover remote systems.18
S0236 Kwampirs Kwampirs collects a list of available servers with the command net view.36
G0077 Leafminer Leafminer used Microsoft’s Sysinternals tools to gather detailed information about remote systems.69
G0045 menuPass menuPass uses scripts to enumerate IP ranges on the victim network. menuPass has also issued the command net view /domain to a PlugX implant to gather information about remote systems on the network.7879
S0233 MURKYTOP MURKYTOP has the capability to identify remote hosts on connected networks.28
G0019 Naikon Naikon has used a netbios scanner for remote machine identification.56
S0590 NBTscan NBTscan can list NetBIOS computer names.910
S0039 Net Commands such as net view can be used in Net to gather information about available remote systems.5
S0385 njRAT njRAT can identify remote hosts on connected networks.29
S0359 Nltest Nltest may be used to enumerate remote domain controllers using options such as /dclist and /dsgetdc.17
S0365 Olympic Destroyer Olympic Destroyer uses Windows Management Instrumentation to enumerate all systems in the network.46
G0116 Operation Wocao Operation Wocao can use the ping command to discover remote systems.60
S0165 OSInfo OSInfo performs a connection test to discover remote systems in the network22
S0097 Ping Ping can be used to identify remote systems within a network.11
S0428 PoetRAT PoetRAT used Nmap for remote system discovery.39
S0650 QakBot QakBot can identify remote systems through the net view command.3738
S0241 RATANKBA RATANKBA runs the net view /domain and net view commands.48
S0125 Remsec Remsec can ping or traceroute a remote host.41
S0684 ROADTools ROADTools can enumerate Azure AD systems and devices.13
G0106 Rocke Rocke has looked for IP addresses in the known_hosts file on the infected system and attempted to SSH into them.55
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about computers listed in AD.8081
S0140 Shamoon Shamoon scans the C-class subnet of the IPs on the victim’s interfaces.20
S0063 SHOTPUT SHOTPUT has a command to list all servers in the domain, as well as one to locate domain controllers on a domain.45
G0091 Silence Silence has used Nmap to scan the corporate network, build a network topology, and identify vulnerable hosts.64
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can enumerate and collect the properties of domain computers.4
S0646 SpicyOmelette SpicyOmelette can identify payment systems, payment gateways, and ATM systems in compromised environments.32
S0018 Sykipot Sykipot may use net view /domain to display hostnames of available systems on a network.27
S0586 TAINTEDSCRIBE The TAINTEDSCRIBE command and execution module can perform target system enumeration.31
G0027 Threat Group-3390 Threat Group-3390 has used the net view command.66
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot can enumerate computers and network devices.25
S0609 TRITON TRITON’s TsLow python module pings controllers over the TriStation protocol.30
G0010 Turla Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover remote systems on a local network using the net view and net view /DOMAIN commands. Turla has also used net group “Domain Computers” /domain, net group “Domain Controllers” /domain, and net group “Exchange Servers” /domain to enumerate domain computers, including the organization’s DC and Exchange Server.4762
S0452 USBferry USBferry can use net view to gather information about remote systems.23
S0366 WannaCry WannaCry scans its local network segment for remote systems to try to exploit and copy itself to.40
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used networkdll for network discovery and psfin specifically for financial and point of sale indicators. Wizard Spider has also used AdFind and nltest/dclist to enumerate domain computers, including the domain controller.88283684
S0248 yty yty uses the net view command for discovery.44

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0022 File File Access
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation
DS0009 Process Process Creation

References

  1. CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware. Retrieved June 7, 2021. ↩

  2. Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 30, 2020. ↩

  3. US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. ↩

  4. Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022. ↩

  5. Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015. ↩

  6. Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020. ↩↩

  7. McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019. ↩

  8. Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020. ↩↩

  9. Bezroutchko, A. (2019, November 19). NBTscan man page. Retrieved March 17, 2021. ↩

  10. SecTools. (2003, June 11). NBTscan. Retrieved March 17, 2021. ↩

  11. Microsoft. (n.d.). Ping. Retrieved April 8, 2016. ↩

  12. Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020. ↩

  13. Dirk-jan Mollema. (2020, April 16). Introducing ROADtools - The Azure AD exploration framework. Retrieved January 31, 2022. ↩

  14. byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020. ↩

  15. Microsoft. (n.d.). Arp. Retrieved April 17, 2016. ↩

  16. Palo Alto Networks. (2021, November 24). Cortex XDR Analytics Alert Reference: Uncommon ARP cache listing via arp.exe. Retrieved December 7, 2021. ↩

  17. ss64. (n.d.). NLTEST.exe - Network Location Test. Retrieved February 14, 2019. ↩

  18. Singer, G. (2020, April 3). Threat Alert: Kinsing Malware Attacks Targeting Container Environments. Retrieved April 1, 2021. ↩

  19. Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021. ↩

  20. FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017. ↩

  21. Neeamni, D., Rubinfeld, A.. (2021, July 1). Diavol - A New Ransomware Used By Wizard Spider?. Retrieved November 12, 2021. ↩

  22. Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016. ↩↩

  23. Chen, J.. (2020, May 12). Tropic Trooper’s Back: USBferry Attack Targets Air gapped Environments. Retrieved May 20, 2020. ↩

  24. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, July 16). A BAZAR OF TRICKS: FOLLOWING TEAM9’S DEVELOPMENT CYCLES. Retrieved November 18, 2020. ↩

  25. Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020. ↩

  26. Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021. ↩

  27. Blasco, J. (2011, December 12). Another Sykipot sample likely targeting US federal agencies. Retrieved March 28, 2016. ↩

  28. FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. ↩

  29. Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2013, June 28). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1009: “njRAT” Uncovered. Retrieved June 4, 2019. ↩

  30. Johnson, B, et. al. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 6, 2021. ↩

  31. USG. (2020, May 12). MAR-10288834-2.v1 – North Korean Trojan: TAINTEDSCRIBE. Retrieved March 5, 2021. ↩

  32. CTU. (2018, September 27). Cybercriminals Increasingly Trying to Ensnare the Big Financial Fish. Retrieved September 20, 2021. ↩

  33. Anton Cherepanov. (2017, June 12). Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial controls systems. Retrieved December 18, 2020. ↩

  34. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation ‘Dream Job’ Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021. ↩

  35. GovCERT. (2016, May 23). Technical Report about the Espionage Case at RUAG. Retrieved November 7, 2018. ↩

  36. Symantec Security Response Attack Investigation Team. (2018, April 23). New Orangeworm attack group targets the healthcare sector in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. Retrieved May 8, 2018. ↩

  37. CS. (2020, October 7). Duck Hunting with Falcon Complete: A Fowl Banking Trojan Evolves, Part 2. Retrieved September 27, 2021. ↩

  38. Kuzmenko, A. et al. (2021, September 2). QakBot technical analysis. Retrieved September 27, 2021. ↩

  39. Mercer, W, et al. (2020, April 16). PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors. Retrieved April 27, 2020. ↩

  40. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019. ↩

  41. Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016. ↩

  42. Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021. ↩

  43. Hada, H. (2021, December 28). Flagpro The new malware used by BlackTech. Retrieved March 25, 2022. ↩

  44. Schwarz, D., Sopko J. (2018, March 08). Donot Team Leverages New Modular Malware Framework in South Asia. Retrieved June 11, 2018. ↩

  45. Falcone, R. and Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved January 22, 2016. ↩

  46. Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. ↩

  47. Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014. ↩↩

  48. Trend Micro. (2017, February 27). RATANKBA: Delving into Large-scale Watering Holes against Enterprises. Retrieved May 22, 2018. ↩

  49. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017. ↩

  50. Mavis, N. (2020, September 21). The Art and Science of Detecting Cobalt Strike. Retrieved April 6, 2021. ↩

  51. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021. ↩

  52. ESET. (2022, March 1). IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard: New wiper and worm targetingUkraine. Retrieved April 10, 2022. ↩

  53. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019. ↩

  54. CISA. (2020, September 15). Iran-Based Threat Actor Exploits VPN Vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 21, 2020. ↩

  55. Liebenberg, D.. (2018, August 30). Rocke: The Champion of Monero Miners. Retrieved May 26, 2020. ↩

  56. Vrabie, V. (2021, April 23). NAIKON – Traces from a Military Cyber-Espionage Operation. Retrieved June 29, 2021. ↩

  57. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021. ↩

  58. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018. ↩

  59. Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved January 19, 2021. ↩

  60. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020. ↩

  61. Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014. ↩

  62. Faou, M. (2020, May). From Agent.btz to ComRAT v4: A ten-year journey. Retrieved June 15, 2020. ↩

  63. FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016. ↩

  64. Group-IB. (2018, September). Silence: Moving Into the Darkside. Retrieved May 5, 2020. ↩

  65. Symantec Threat Intelligence. (2020, June 25). WastedLocker: Symantec Identifies Wave of Attacks Against U.S. Organizations. Retrieved May 20, 2021. ↩

  66. Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018. ↩

  67. Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018. ↩

  68. US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. ↩

  69. Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018. ↩

  70. Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018. ↩

  71. Martin Zugec. (2021, July 27). Deep Dive Into a FIN8 Attack - A Forensic Investigation. Retrieved September 1, 2021. ↩

  72. Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018. ↩

  73. Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019. ↩

  74. Rusu, B. (2020, May 21). Iranian Chafer APT Targeted Air Transportation and Government in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Retrieved May 22, 2020. ↩

  75. Symantec. (2018, February 28). Chafer: Latest Attacks Reveal Heightened Ambitions. Retrieved May 22, 2020. ↩

  76. Chen, X., Scott, M., Caselden, D.. (2014, April 26). New Zero-Day Exploit targeting Internet Explorer Versions 9 through 11 Identified in Targeted Attacks. Retrieved January 14, 2016. ↩

  77. Bromiley, M. and Lewis, P. (2016, October 7). Attacking the Hospitality and Gaming Industries: Tracking an Attacker Around the World in 7 Years. Retrieved October 6, 2017. ↩

  78. PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017. ↩

  79. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017. ↩

  80. Cherepanov, A.. (2016, December 13). The rise of TeleBots: Analyzing disruptive KillDisk attacks. Retrieved June 10, 2020. ↩

  81. Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020. ↩

  82. John, E. and Carvey, H. (2019, May 30). Unraveling the Spiderweb: Timelining ATT&CK Artifacts Used by GRIM SPIDER. Retrieved May 12, 2020. ↩

  83. Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020. ↩

  84. The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020. ↩

Back to top