G0037 FIN6
FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.23
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | G0037 |
Associated Names | Magecart Group 6, ITG08, Skeleton Spider |
Version | 3.3 |
Created | 31 May 2017 |
Last Modified | 22 March 2023 |
Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Associated Group Descriptions
Name | Description |
---|---|
Magecart Group 6 | 4 |
ITG08 | 5 |
Skeleton Spider | 1 |
Techniques Used
Domain | ID | Name | Use |
---|---|---|---|
enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | FIN6 has used has used Metasploit’s named-pipe impersonation technique to escalate privileges.3 |
enterprise | T1087 | Account Discovery | - |
enterprise | T1087.002 | Domain Account | FIN6 has used Metasploit’s PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim’s Active Directory database.2 |
enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | Following data collection, FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration.2 |
enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom Method | FIN6 has encoded data gathered from the victim with a simple substitution cipher and single-byte XOR using the 0xAA key, and Base64 with character permutation.27 |
enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | FIN6 has used a script to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy and remove data to a log file, and to bind to events from the submit payment button.27 |
enterprise | T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | - |
enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | FIN6 has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.2 |
enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force | - |
enterprise | T1110.002 | Password Cracking | FIN6 has extracted password hashes from ntds.dit to crack offline.2 |
enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | FIN6 has used scripting to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy data to a log file, and remove the original data files.23 |
enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShell | FIN6 has used PowerShell to gain access to merchant’s networks, and a Metasploit PowerShell module to download and execute shellcode and to set up a local listener.236 |
enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | FIN6 has used kill.bat script to disable security tools.3 |
enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScript | FIN6 has used malicious JavaScript to steal payment card data from e-commerce sites.7 |
enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | FIN6 has used the Stealer One credential stealer to target e-mail and file transfer utilities including FTP.6 |
enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | FIN6 has used the Stealer One credential stealer to target web browsers.6 |
enterprise | T1213 | Data from Information Repositories | FIN6 has collected schemas and user accounts from systems running SQL Server.6 |
enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | FIN6 has collected and exfiltrated payment card data from compromised systems.789 |
enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged | - |
enterprise | T1074.002 | Remote Data Staging | FIN6 actors have compressed data from remote systems and moved it to another staging system before exfiltration.2 |
enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | - |
enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric Cryptography | FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.2 |
enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | - |
enterprise | T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | FIN6 has sent stolen payment card data to remote servers via HTTP POSTs.7 |
enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | FIN6 has used tools to exploit Windows vulnerabilities in order to escalate privileges. The tools targeted CVE-2013-3660, CVE-2011-2005, and CVE-2010-4398, all of which could allow local users to access kernel-level privileges.2 |
enterprise | T1562 | Impair Defenses | - |
enterprise | T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | FIN6 has deployed a utility script named kill.bat to disable anti-virus.3 |
enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | - |
enterprise | T1070.004 | File Deletion | FIN6 has removed files from victim machines.2 |
enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | - |
enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or Service | FIN6 has renamed the “psexec” service name to “mstdc” to masquerade as a legitimate Windows service.3 |
enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft’s built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.2 |
enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | FIN6 has used Metasploit Bind and Reverse TCP stagers.7 |
enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | - |
enterprise | T1027.010 | Command Obfuscation | FIN6 has used encoded PowerShell commands.6 |
enterprise | T1588 | Obtain Capabilities | - |
enterprise | T1588.002 | Tool | FIN6 has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, and AdFind.53 |
enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | - |
enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | FIN6 has used Windows Credential Editor for credential dumping.23 |
enterprise | T1003.003 | NTDS | FIN6 has used Metasploit’s PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim’s Active Directory database.23 |
enterprise | T1566 | Phishing | - |
enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | FIN6 has targeted victims with e-mails containing malicious attachments.6 |
enterprise | T1566.003 | Spearphishing via Service | FIN6 has used fake job advertisements sent via LinkedIn to spearphish targets.5 |
enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.2 |
enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | - |
enterprise | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | FIN6 used RDP to move laterally in victim networks.23 |
enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft’s built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.2 |
enterprise | T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | - |
enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | FIN6 has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and FrameworkPOS.2 |
enterprise | T1553 | Subvert Trust Controls | - |
enterprise | T1553.002 | Code Signing | FIN6 has used Comodo code-signing certificates.5 |
enterprise | T1569 | System Services | - |
enterprise | T1569.002 | Service Execution | FIN6 has created Windows services to execute encoded PowerShell commands.3 |
enterprise | T1204 | User Execution | - |
enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious File | FIN6 has used malicious documents to lure victims into allowing execution of PowerShell scripts.6 |
enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | To move laterally on a victim network, FIN6 has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.236 |
enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | FIN6 has used Pastebin and Google Storage to host content for their operations.3 |
enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | FIN6 has used WMI to automate the remote execution of PowerShell scripts.5 |
Software
References
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CrowdStrike. (2018, February 26). CrowdStrike 2018 Global Threat Report. Retrieved October 10, 2018. ↩↩
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FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Villadsen, O. (2020, April 7). ITG08 (aka FIN6) Partners With TrickBot Gang, Uses Anchor Framework. Retrieved October 8, 2020. ↩
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Villadsen, O.. (2019, August 29). More_eggs, Anyone? Threat Actor ITG08 Strikes Again. Retrieved September 16, 2019. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Visa Public. (2019, February). FIN6 Cybercrime Group Expands Threat to eCommerce Merchants. Retrieved September 16, 2019. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Chen, J. (2019, October 10). Magecart Card Skimmers Injected Into Online Shops. Retrieved September 9, 2020. ↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Klijnsma, Y. (2018, September 11). Inside the Magecart Breach of British Airways: How 22 Lines of Code Claimed 380,000 Victims. Retrieved September 9, 2020. ↩
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Klijnsma, Y. (2018, September 19). Another Victim of the Magecart Assault Emerges: Newegg. Retrieved September 9, 2020. ↩
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Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved July 16, 2021. ↩
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Kremez, V. (2019, September 19). FIN6 “FrameworkPOS”: Point-of-Sale Malware Analysis & Internals. Retrieved September 8, 2020. ↩
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Kennelly, J., Goody, K., Shilko, J. (2020, May 7). Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents. Retrieved May 18, 2020. ↩