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T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) and Windows Remote Management (WinRM).3 Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.31

An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. 2 1

Item Value
ID T1047
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0002
Platforms Windows
Version 1.3
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 07 April 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0025 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, WMI in scripts were used for remote execution and system surveys. 102
S1028 Action RAT Action RAT can use WMI to gather AV products installed on an infected host.46
S0331 Agent Tesla Agent Tesla has used wmi queries to gather information from the system.63
G0016 APT29 APT29 used WMI to steal credentials and execute backdoors at a future time.105
G0050 APT32 APT32 used WMI to deploy their tools on remote machines and to gather information about the Outlook process.99
G0096 APT41 APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit.124125
S0373 Astaroth Astaroth uses WMIC to execute payloads. 47
S0640 Avaddon Avaddon uses wmic.exe to delete shadow copies.53
S0534 Bazar Bazar can execute a WMI query to gather information about the installed antivirus engine.7475
S1070 Black Basta Black Basta has used WMI to execute files over the network.35
S1068 BlackCat BlackCat can use wmic.exe to delete shadow copies on compromised networks.15
S0089 BlackEnergy A BlackEnergy 2 plug-in uses WMI to gather victim host details.33
G0108 Blue Mockingbird Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe to set environment variables.128
S1063 Brute Ratel C4 Brute Ratel C4 can use WMI to move laterally.8
S1039 Bumblebee Bumblebee can use WMI to gather system information and to spawn processes for code injection.616059
C0015 C0015 During C0015, the threat actors used wmic and rundll32 to load Cobalt Strike onto a target host.79
C0018 C0018 During C0018, the threat actors used WMIC to modify administrative settings on both a local and a remote host, likely as part of the first stages for their lateral movement; they also used WMI Provider Host (wmiprvse.exe) to execute a variety of encoded PowerShell scripts using the DownloadString method.137136
S0674 CharmPower CharmPower can use wmic to gather information from a system.39
G0114 Chimera Chimera has used WMIC to execute remote commands.100101
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike can use WMI to deliver a payload to a remote host.808179
S0488 CrackMapExec CrackMapExec can execute remote commands using Windows Management Instrumentation.7
S1066 DarkTortilla DarkTortilla can use WMI queries to obtain system information.90
S0673 DarkWatchman DarkWatchman can use WMI to execute commands.37
S0616 DEATHRANSOM DEATHRANSOM has the ability to use WMI to delete volume shadow copies.16
G0009 Deep Panda The Deep Panda group is known to utilize WMI for lateral movement.127
S0062 DustySky The DustySky dropper uses Windows Management Instrumentation to extract information about the operating system and whether an anti-virus is active.24
G1006 Earth Lusca Earth Lusca used a VBA script to execute WMI.117
S0605 EKANS EKANS can use Windows Mangement Instrumentation (WMI) calls to execute operations.27
S0367 Emotet Emotet has used WMI to execute powershell.exe.65
S0363 Empire Empire can use WMI to deliver a payload to a remote host.14
S0396 EvilBunny EvilBunny has used WMI to gather information about the system.67
S0568 EVILNUM EVILNUM has used the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) tool to enumerate infected machines.55
S0267 FELIXROOT FELIXROOT uses WMI to query the Windows Registry.38
G0037 FIN6 FIN6 has used WMI to automate the remote execution of PowerShell scripts.118
G0046 FIN7 FIN7 has used WMI to install malware on targeted systems.110
G0061 FIN8 FIN8‘s malicious spearphishing payloads use WMI to launch malware and spawn cmd.exe execution. FIN8 has also used WMIC for lateral movement as well as during and post compromise cleanup activities.114116115
S0618 FIVEHANDS FIVEHANDS can use WMI to delete files on a target machine.1617
S0381 FlawedAmmyy FlawedAmmyy leverages WMI to enumerate anti-virus on the victim.54
C0001 Frankenstein During Frankenstein, the threat actors used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running as well as to determine the operating system version.138
S1044 FunnyDream FunnyDream can use WMI to open a Windows command shell on a remote machine.25
C0007 FunnyDream During FunnyDream, the threat actors used wmiexec.vbs to run remote commands.25
G0093 GALLIUM GALLIUM used WMI for execution to assist in lateral movement as well as for installing tools across multiple assets.91
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has used WMI to execute scripts used for discovery.92
S0237 GravityRAT GravityRAT collects various information via WMI requests, including CPU information in the Win32_Processor entry (Processor ID, Name, Manufacturer and the clock speed).82
S0151 HALFBAKED HALFBAKED can use WMI queries to gather system information.23
S0617 HELLOKITTY HELLOKITTY can use WMI to delete volume shadow copies.16
S0698 HermeticWizard HermeticWizard can use WMI to create a new process on a remote machine via C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c start C:\windows\system32\\regsvr32.exe /s /iC:\windows\<filename>.dll.88
S0376 HOPLIGHT HOPLIGHT has used WMI to recompile the Managed Object Format (MOF) files in the WMI repository.41
S0483 IcedID IcedID has used WMI to execute binaries.34
S0357 Impacket Impacket‘s wmiexec module can be used to execute commands through WMI.9
G0119 Indrik Spider Indrik Spider has used WMIC to execute commands on remote computers.123
S0283 jRAT jRAT uses WMIC to identify anti-virus products installed on the victim’s machine and to obtain firewall details.58
S0265 Kazuar Kazuar obtains a list of running processes through WMI querying.48
S0250 Koadic Koadic can use WMI to execute commands.13
S0156 KOMPROGO KOMPROGO is capable of running WMI queries.31
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has used WMIC for discovery as well as to execute payloads for persistence and lateral movement.130129132131
G0065 Leviathan Leviathan has used WMI for execution.106
S0532 Lucifer Lucifer can use WMI to log into remote machines for propagation.66
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has used a tool to run cmd /c wmic computersystem get domain for discovery.104
S0449 Maze Maze has used WMI to attempt to delete the shadow volumes on a machine, and to connect a virtual machine to the network domain of the victim organization’s network.5657
G0045 menuPass menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting script wmiexec.vbs, which logs into a remote machine using WMI.107109108
S0688 Meteor Meteor can use wmic.exe as part of its effort to delete shadow copies.89
S0339 Micropsia Micropsia searches for anti-virus software and firewall products installed on the victim’s machine using WMI.7778
S0553 MoleNet MoleNet can perform WMI commands on the system.28
S0256 Mosquito Mosquito‘s installer uses WMI to search for antivirus display names.36
G0069 MuddyWater MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged WMI for execution and querying host information.95739394
G0129 Mustang Panda Mustang Panda has executed PowerShell scripts via WMI.9697
G0019 Naikon Naikon has used WMIC.exe for lateral movement.98
S0457 Netwalker Netwalker can use WMI to delete Shadow Volumes.32
S0368 NotPetya NotPetya can use wmic to help propagate itself across a network.1920
S0340 Octopus Octopus has used wmic.exe for local discovery information.40
G0049 OilRig OilRig has used WMI for execution.126
S0365 Olympic Destroyer Olympic Destroyer uses WMI to help propagate itself across a network.43
S0264 OopsIE OopsIE uses WMI to perform discovery techniques.71
C0022 Operation Dream Job During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used WMIC to executed a remote XSL script.139
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, threat actors has used WMI to execute commands.133
S0378 PoshC2 PoshC2 has a number of modules that use WMI to execute tasks.12
S0194 PowerSploit PowerSploit‘s Invoke-WmiCommand CodeExecution module uses WMI to execute and retrieve the output from a PowerShell payload.1011
S0223 POWERSTATS POWERSTATS can use WMI queries to retrieve data from compromised hosts.7273
S0184 POWRUNER POWRUNER may use WMI when collecting information about a victim.70
S0654 ProLock ProLock can use WMIC to execute scripts on targeted hosts.62
S1032 PyDCrypt PyDCrypt has attempted to execute with WMIC.42
S0650 QakBot QakBot can execute WMI queries to gather information.83
S0241 RATANKBA RATANKBA uses WMI to perform process monitoring.8586
S0375 Remexi Remexi executes received commands with wmic.exe (for WMI commands). 26
S0496 REvil REvil can use WMI to monitor for and kill specific processes listed in its configuration file.6869
S0270 RogueRobin RogueRobin uses various WMI queries to check if the sample is running in a sandbox.2122
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has used Impacket’s WMIexec module for remote code execution and VBScript to run WMI queries.102103
S0546 SharpStage SharpStage can use WMI for execution.2829
S0589 Sibot Sibot has used WMI to discover network connections and configurations. Sibot has also used the Win32_Process class to execute a malicious DLL.87
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can use WMI for lateral movement.6
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used WMI for the remote execution of files for lateral movement.134135
G0038 Stealth Falcon Stealth Falcon malware gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).113
S0380 StoneDrill StoneDrill has used the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to run tasks.49
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet used WMI with an explorer.exe token to execute on a remote share.64
S0559 SUNBURST SUNBURST used the WMI query Select * From Win32_SystemDriver to retrieve a driver listing.30
S1064 SVCReady SVCReady can use WMI queries to detect the presence of a virtual machine environment.84
S0663 SysUpdate SysUpdate can use WMI for execution on a compromised host.45
G0027 Threat Group-3390 A Threat Group-3390 tool can use WMI to execute a binary.111
S0386 Ursnif Ursnif droppers have used WMI classes to execute PowerShell commands.18
S0476 Valak Valak can use wmic process call create in a scheduled task to launch plugins and for execution.44
S0366 WannaCry WannaCry utilizes wmic to delete shadow copies.505152
G0112 Windshift Windshift has used WMI to collect information about target machines.112
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used WMI and LDAP queries for network discovery and to move laterally.121120122119
S0251 Zebrocy One variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather information.76

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1040 Behavior Prevention on Endpoint On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block processes created by WMI commands from running. Note: many legitimate tools and applications utilize WMI for command execution. 5
M1038 Execution Prevention Use application control configured to block execution of wmic.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. For example, in Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016 and above, Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy rules may be applied to block the wmic.exe application and to prevent abuse.4
M1026 Privileged Account Management Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. 1
M1018 User Account Management By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI. Restrict other users who are allowed to connect, or disallow all users to connect remotely to WMI.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation
DS0009 Process Process Creation

References

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