G0069 MuddyWater
MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).3 Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.51112946
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | G0069 |
Associated Names | Earth Vetala, MERCURY, Static Kitten, Seedworm, TEMP.Zagros |
Version | 4.1 |
Created | 18 April 2018 |
Last Modified | 22 March 2023 |
Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Associated Group Descriptions
Name | Description |
---|---|
Earth Vetala | 8 |
MERCURY | 7 |
Static Kitten | 78 |
Seedworm | 1178 |
TEMP.Zagros | 1078 |
Techniques Used
Domain | ID | Name | Use |
---|---|---|---|
enterprise | T1548 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | - |
enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account Control | MuddyWater uses various techniques to bypass UAC.1 |
enterprise | T1087 | Account Discovery | - |
enterprise | T1087.002 | Domain Account | MuddyWater has used cmd.exe net user /domain to enumerate domain users.8 |
enterprise | T1583 | Acquire Infrastructure | - |
enterprise | T1583.006 | Web Services | MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub to distribute tools.78 |
enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | - |
enterprise | T1071.001 | Web Protocols | MuddyWater has used HTTP for C2 communications.28 |
enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | - |
enterprise | T1560.001 | Archive via Utility | MuddyWater has used the native Windows cabinet creation tool, makecab.exe, likely to compress stolen data to be uploaded.11 |
enterprise | T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | - |
enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | MuddyWater has added Registry Run key KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEncoding to establish persistence.101312986 |
enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | - |
enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShell | MuddyWater has used PowerShell for execution.101413111129846 |
enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | MuddyWater has used a custom tool for creating reverse shells.11 |
enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual Basic | MuddyWater has used VBScript files to execute its POWERSTATS payload, as well as macros.1014131112986 |
enterprise | T1059.006 | Python | MuddyWater has used developed tools in Python including Out1.8 |
enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScript | MuddyWater has used JavaScript files to execute its POWERSTATS payload.1104 |
enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne and other tools, including by dumping passwords saved in victim email.5118 |
enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | MuddyWater has run tools including Browser64 to steal passwords saved in victim web browsers.118 |
enterprise | T1132 | Data Encoding | - |
enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard Encoding | MuddyWater has used tools to encode C2 communications including Base64 encoding.28 |
enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged | - |
enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data Staging | MuddyWater has stored a decoy PDF file within a victim’s %temp% folder.6 |
enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | MuddyWater decoded base64-encoded PowerShell commands using a VBS file.101416 |
enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | - |
enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric Cryptography | MuddyWater has used AES to encrypt C2 responses.6 |
enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | MuddyWater has used C2 infrastructure to receive exfiltrated data.9 |
enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | MuddyWater has exploited the Microsoft Exchange memory corruption vulnerability (CVE-2020-0688).4 |
enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | MuddyWater has exploited the Office vulnerability CVE-2017-0199 for execution.2 |
enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services | MuddyWater has exploited the Microsoft Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).4 |
enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | MuddyWater has used malware that checked if the ProgramData folder had folders or files with the keywords “Kasper,” “Panda,” or “ESET.”13 |
enterprise | T1589 | Gather Victim Identity Information | - |
enterprise | T1589.002 | Email Addresses | MuddyWater has specifically targeted government agency employees with spearphishing e-mails.7 |
enterprise | T1574 | Hijack Execution Flow | - |
enterprise | T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading | MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.4 |
enterprise | T1562 | Impair Defenses | - |
enterprise | T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | MuddyWater can disable the system’s local proxy settings.8 |
enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | MuddyWater has used malware that can upload additional files to the victim’s machine.13198 |
enterprise | T1559 | Inter-Process Communication | - |
enterprise | T1559.001 | Component Object Model | MuddyWater has used malware that has the capability to execute malicious code via COM, DCOM, and Outlook.1324 |
enterprise | T1559.002 | Dynamic Data Exchange | MuddyWater has used malware that can execute PowerShell scripts via DDE.13 |
enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | - |
enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Name or Location | MuddyWater has disguised malicious executables and used filenames and Registry key names associated with Windows Defender.10127 |
enterprise | T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels | MuddyWater has used one C2 to obtain enumeration scripts and monitor web logs, but a different C2 to send data back.12 |
enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | - |
enterprise | T1027.003 | Steganography | MuddyWater has stored obfuscated JavaScript code in an image file named temp.jpg.1 |
enterprise | T1027.004 | Compile After Delivery | MuddyWater has used the .NET csc.exe tool to compile executables from downloaded C# code.1 |
enterprise | T1027.010 | Command Obfuscation | MuddyWater has used Daniel Bohannon’s Invoke-Obfuscation framework and obfuscated PowerShell scripts.515 The group has also used other obfuscation methods, including Base64 obfuscation of VBScripts and PowerShell commands.5101312286 |
enterprise | T1588 | Obtain Capabilities | - |
enterprise | T1588.002 | Tool | MuddyWater has made use of legitimate tools ConnectWise and Remote Utilities to gain access to target environment.7 |
enterprise | T1137 | Office Application Startup | - |
enterprise | T1137.001 | Office Template Macros | MuddyWater has used a Word Template, Normal.dotm, for persistence.9 |
enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | - |
enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with Mimikatz and procdump64.exe.5118 |
enterprise | T1003.004 | LSA Secrets | MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne.511 |
enterprise | T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials | MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne.511 |
enterprise | T1566 | Phishing | - |
enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments to recipients.51013278 4 |
enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link | MuddyWater has sent targeted spearphishing e-mails with malicious links.78 |
enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | MuddyWater has used malware to obtain a list of running processes on the system.132 |
enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | - |
enterprise | T1090.002 | External Proxy | MuddyWater has controlled POWERSTATS from behind a proxy network to obfuscate the C2 location.11 MuddyWater has used a series of compromised websites that victims connected to randomly to relay information to command and control (C2).98 |
enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Software | MuddyWater has used a legitimate application, ScreenConnect, to manage systems remotely and move laterally.87 |
enterprise | T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | - |
enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.9 |
enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | MuddyWater has used malware that can capture screenshots of the victim’s machine.13 |
enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connectivity on the target machine.8 |
enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software Discovery | MuddyWater has used malware to check running processes against a hard-coded list of security tools often used by malware researchers.13 |
enterprise | T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution | - |
enterprise | T1218.003 | CMSTP | MuddyWater has used CMSTP.exe and a malicious INF to execute its POWERSTATS payload.10 |
enterprise | T1218.005 | Mshta | MuddyWater has used mshta.exe to execute its POWERSTATS payload and to pass a PowerShell one-liner for execution.1013 |
enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32 | MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged rundll32.exe in a Registry Run key to execute a .dll.13 |
enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victim’s OS version and machine name.1312986 |
enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | MuddyWater has used malware to collect the victim’s IP address and domain name.13 |
enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connections on the target machine.8 |
enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victim’s username.138 |
enterprise | T1552 | Unsecured Credentials | - |
enterprise | T1552.001 | Credentials In Files | MuddyWater has run a tool that steals passwords saved in victim email.11 |
enterprise | T1204 | User Execution | - |
enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious Link | MuddyWater has distributed URLs in phishing e-mails that link to lure documents.78 |
enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious File | MuddyWater has attempted to get users to enable macros and launch malicious Microsoft Word documents delivered via spearphishing emails.5101312297846 |
enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | - |
enterprise | T1102.002 | Bidirectional Communication | MuddyWater has used web services including OneHub to distribute remote access tools.7 |
enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | MuddyWater has used malware that leveraged WMI for execution and querying host information.131124 |
Software
References
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ClearSky Cyber Security. (2018, November). MuddyWater Operations in Lebanon and Oman: Using an Israeli compromised domain for a two-stage campaign. Retrieved November 29, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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ClearSky. (2019, June). Iranian APT group ‘MuddyWater’ Adds Exploits to Their Arsenal. Retrieved May 14, 2020. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Cyber National Mission Force. (2022, January 12). Iranian intel cyber suite of malware uses open source tools. Retrieved September 30, 2022. ↩
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FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK. (2022, February 24). Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against Global Government and Commercial Networks. Retrieved September 27, 2022. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Lancaster, T.. (2017, November 14). Muddying the Water: Targeted Attacks in the Middle East. Retrieved March 15, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Malhortra, A and Ventura, V. (2022, January 31). Iranian APT MuddyWater targets Turkish users via malicious PDFs, executables. Retrieved June 22, 2022. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2018, December 10). Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms. Retrieved December 14, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Adamitis, D. et al. (2019, May 20). Recent MuddyWater-associated BlackWater campaign shows signs of new anti-detection techniques. Retrieved June 5, 2019. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 10). MuddyWater expands operations. Retrieved November 2, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Villanueva, M., Co, M. (2018, June 14). Another Potential MuddyWater Campaign uses Powershell-based PRB-Backdoor. Retrieved July 3, 2018. ↩↩↩
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Bohannon, D.. (2017, March 13). Invoke-Obfuscation - PowerShell Obfuscator. Retrieved June 18, 2017. ↩
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Lunghi, D. and Horejsi, J.. (2019, June 10). MuddyWater Resurfaces, Uses Multi-Stage Backdoor POWERSTATS V3 and New Post-Exploitation Tools. Retrieved May 14, 2020. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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NCSC GCHQ. (2022, January 27). Small Sieve Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved August 22, 2022. ↩