G0096 APT41
APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.34
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | G0096 |
Associated Names | Wicked Panda |
Version | 3.1 |
Created | 23 September 2019 |
Last Modified | 23 March 2023 |
Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Associated Group Descriptions
Name | Description |
---|---|
Wicked Panda | 1 |
Techniques Used
Domain | ID | Name | Use |
---|---|---|---|
enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | During C0017, APT41 used a ConfuserEx obfuscated BADPOTATO exploit to abuse named-pipe impersonation for local NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privilege escalation.7 |
enterprise | T1098 | Account Manipulation | APT41 has added user accounts to the User and Admin groups.3 |
enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | - |
enterprise | T1071.001 | Web Protocols | APT41 used HTTP to download payloads for CVE-2019-19781 and CVE-2020-10189 exploits.5 During C0017, APT41 ran |
enterprise | T1071.002 | File Transfer Protocols | APT41 used exploit payloads that initiate download via ftp.5 |
enterprise | T1071.004 | DNS | APT41 used DNS for C2 communications.34 |
enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | - |
enterprise | T1560.001 | Archive via Utility | APT41 created a RAR archive of targeted files for exfiltration.3 |
enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom Method | During C0017, APT41 hex-encoded PII data prior to exfiltration.7 |
enterprise | T1197 | BITS Jobs | APT41 used BITSAdmin to download and install payloads.51 |
enterprise | T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | - |
enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | APT41 created and modified startup files for persistence.34 APT41 added a registry key in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost to establish persistence for Cobalt Strike.5 |
enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force | - |
enterprise | T1110.002 | Password Cracking | APT41 performed password brute-force attacks on the local admin account.3 |
enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | - |
enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShell | APT41 leveraged PowerShell to deploy malware families in victims’ environments.35 |
enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines.3 |
APT41 used a batch file to install persistence for the Cobalt Strike BEACON loader.5 During C0017, APT41 used |
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enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix Shell | APT41 executed file /bin/pwd in activity exploiting CVE-2019-19781 against Citrix devices.5 |
enterprise | T1059.007 | JavaScript | During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells on compromised systems.7 |
enterprise | T1136 | Create Account | - |
enterprise | T1136.001 | Local Account | APT41 has created user accounts.3 |
enterprise | T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | - |
enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows Service | APT41 modified legitimate Windows services to install malware backdoors.34 APT41 created the StorSyncSvc service to provide persistence for Cobalt Strike.5 |
enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | APT41 used a ransomware called Encryptor RaaS to encrypt files on the targeted systems and provide a ransom note to the user.3 |
enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | APT41 has uploaded files and data from a compromised host.4 During C0017, APT41 collected information related to compromised machines as well as Personal Identifiable Information (PII) from victim networks.7 |
enterprise | T1001 | Data Obfuscation | - |
enterprise | T1001.003 | Protocol Impersonation | During C0017, APT41 frequently configured the URL endpoints of their stealthy passive backdoor LOWKEY.PASSIVE to masquerade as normal web application traffic on an infected server.7 |
enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged | - |
enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data Staging | During C0017, APT41 copied the local SAM and SYSTEM Registry hives to a staging directory.7 |
enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | During C0017, APT41 used the DUSTPAN loader to decrypt embedded payloads.7 |
enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution | - |
enterprise | T1568.002 | Domain Generation Algorithms | APT41 has used DGAs to change their C2 servers monthly.3 |
enterprise | T1546 | Event Triggered Execution | - |
enterprise | T1546.008 | Accessibility Features | APT41 leveraged sticky keys to establish persistence.3 |
enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | - |
enterprise | T1480.001 | Environmental Keying | APT41 has encrypted payloads using the Data Protection API (DPAPI), which relies on keys tied to specific user accounts on specific machines. APT41 has also environmentally keyed second stage malware with an RC5 key derived in part from the infected system’s volume serial number.6 |
enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | - |
enterprise | T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol | During C0017, APT41 exfiltrated victim data via DNS lookups by encoding and prepending it as subdomains to the attacker-controlled domain.7 |
enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration.7 |
enterprise | T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service | During C0017, APT41 used Cloudflare services for data exfiltration.7 |
enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | APT41 exploited CVE-2020-10189 against Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central, and CVE-2019-19781 to compromise Citrix Application Delivery Controllers (ADC) and gateway devices.5 |
During C0017, APT41 exploited CVE-2021-44207 in the USAHerds application and CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j, as well as other .NET deserialization, SQL injection, and directory traversal vulnerabilities to gain initial access.7 | |||
enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | APT41 leveraged the follow exploits in their operations: CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2015-1641, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2019-3396.3 |
enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | During C0017, APT41 abused named pipe impersonation for privilege escalation.7 |
enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | APT41 compromised an online billing/payment service using VPN access between a third-party service provider and the targeted payment service.3 |
enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels | APT41 used the Steam community page as a fallback mechanism for C2.3 |
enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | APT41 has executed file /bin/pwd on exploited victims, perhaps to return architecture related information.5 |
enterprise | T1574 | Hijack Execution Flow | During C0017, APT41 established persistence by loading malicious libraries via modifications to the Import Address Table (IAT) within legitimate Microsoft binaries.7 |
enterprise | T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking | APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as Winnti RAT.1 |
enterprise | T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading | APT41 used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware.3 |
enterprise | T1574.006 | Dynamic Linker Hijacking | APT41 has configured payloads to load via LD_PRELOAD.1 |
enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | - |
enterprise | T1070.001 | Clear Windows Event Logs | APT41 attempted to remove evidence of some of its activity by clearing Windows security and system events.3 |
enterprise | T1070.003 | Clear Command History | APT41 attempted to remove evidence of some of its activity by deleting Bash histories.3 |
enterprise | T1070.004 | File Deletion | APT41 deleted files from the system.3 |
enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | APT41 used certutil to download additional files.514 During C0017, APT41 downloaded malicious payloads onto compromised systems.7 |
enterprise | T1056 | Input Capture | - |
enterprise | T1056.001 | Keylogging | APT41 used a keylogger called GEARSHIFT on a target system.3 |
enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | - |
enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or Service | APT41 has created services to appear as benign system tools.4 During C0017, APT41 used |
enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Name or Location | APT41 attempted to masquerade their files as popular anti-virus software.34 During C0017, APT41 used file names beginning with USERS, SYSUSER, and SYSLOG for DEADEYE, and changed KEYPLUG file extensions from .vmp to .upx likely to avoid hunting detections.7 |
enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.34 |
enterprise | T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels | APT41 used the storescyncsvc.dll BEACON backdoor to download a secondary backdoor.5 |
enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | APT41 used a malware variant called WIDETONE to conduct port scans on specified subnets.3 |
enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | APT41 used the net share command as part of network reconnaissance.34 |
enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | APT41 used VMProtected binaries in multiple intrusions.5 During C0017, APT41 broke malicious binaries, including DEADEYE and KEYPLUG, into multiple sections on disk to evade detection.7 |
enterprise | T1027.002 | Software Packing | During C0017, APT41 used VMProtect to slow the reverse engineering of malicious binaries.7 |
enterprise | T1588 | Obtain Capabilities | - |
enterprise | T1588.002 | Tool | APT41 has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz, pwdump, PowerSploit, and Windows Credential Editor.3 For C0017, APT41 obtained publicly available tools such as YSoSerial.NET, ConfuserEx, and BadPotato.7 |
enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | - |
enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | APT41 has used hashdump, Mimikatz, and the Windows Credential Editor to dump password hashes from memory and authenticate to other user accounts.34 |
enterprise | T1003.002 | Security Account Manager | During C0017, APT41 copied the SAM and SYSTEM Registry hives for credential harvesting.7 |
enterprise | T1566 | Phishing | - |
enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | APT41 sent spearphishing emails with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially compromise their victims.3 |
enterprise | T1542 | Pre-OS Boot | - |
enterprise | T1542.003 | Bootkit | APT41 deployed Master Boot Record bootkits on Windows systems to hide their malware and maintain persistence on victim systems.3 |
enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | APT41 malware TIDYELF loaded the main WINTERLOVE component by injecting it into the iexplore.exe process.3 |
enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | APT41 used a tool called CLASSFON to covertly proxy network communications.3 During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic.7 |
enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | - |
enterprise | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | APT41 used RDP for lateral movement.31 |
enterprise | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | APT41 has transferred implant files using Windows Admin Shares.1 |
enterprise | T1496 | Resource Hijacking | APT41 deployed a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool in a victim’s environment.3 |
enterprise | T1014 | Rootkit | APT41 deployed rootkits on Linux systems.31 |
enterprise | T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | - |
enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | APT41 used a compromised account to create a scheduled task on a system.31 During C0017, APT41 used the following Windows scheduled tasks for DEADEYE dropper persistence on US state government networks: |
enterprise | T1505 | Server Software Component | - |
enterprise | T1505.003 | Web Shell | During C0017, APT41 deployed JScript web shells through the creation of malicious ViewState objects.7 |
enterprise | T1553 | Subvert Trust Controls | - |
enterprise | T1553.002 | Code Signing | APT41 leveraged code-signing certificates to sign malware when targeting both gaming and non-gaming organizations.34 |
enterprise | T1195 | Supply Chain Compromise | - |
enterprise | T1195.002 | Compromise Software Supply Chain | APT41 gained access to production environments where they could inject malicious code into legitimate, signed files and widely distribute them to end users.3 |
enterprise | T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution | - |
enterprise | T1218.001 | Compiled HTML File | APT41 used compiled HTML (.chm) files for targeting.3 |
enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32 | APT41 has used rundll32.exe to execute a loader.1 |
enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | During C0017, APT41 issued ping -n 1 ((cmd /c dir c:\|findstr Number).split()[-1]+ commands to find the volume serial number of compromised systems.7 |
enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | APT41 collected MAC addresses from victim machines.34 During C0017, APT41 used |
enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | APT41 has enumerated IP addresses of network resources and used the netstat command as part of network reconnaissance. The group has also used a malware variant, HIGHNOON, to enumerate active RDP sessions.34 |
enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | APT41 used the WMIEXEC utility to execute whoami commands on remote machines.3During C0017, APT41 used |
enterprise | T1569 | System Services | - |
enterprise | T1569.002 | Service Execution | APT41 used svchost.exe and Net to execute a system service installed to launch a Cobalt Strike BEACON loader.54 |
enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | APT41 used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.31 |
enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare services for C2 communications.7 |
enterprise | T1102.001 | Dead Drop Resolver | APT41 used legitimate websites for C2 through dead drop resolvers (DDR), including GitHub, Pastebin, and Microsoft TechNet.3 During C0017, APT41 used dead drop resolvers on two separate tech community forums for their KEYPLUG Windows-version backdoor; notably APT41 updated the community forum posts frequently with new dead drop resolvers during the campaign.7 |
enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit.34 |
Software
References
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Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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FireEye. (2019). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage andcyber crime operationAPT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. ↩
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Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Rostovcev, N. (2021, June 10). Big airline heist APT41 likely behind a third-party attack on Air India. Retrieved August 26, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Glyer, C, et al. (2020, March). This Is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved April 28, 2020. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Carr, N. (2019, October 30). Nick Carr Status Update APT41 Environmental Keying. Retrieved June 23, 2020. ↩
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Rufus Brown, Van Ta, Douglas Bienstock, Geoff Ackerman, John Wolfram. (2022, March 8). Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2022. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Leong, R., Perez, D., Dean, T. (2019, October 31). MESSAGETAP: Who’s Reading Your Text Messages?. Retrieved May 11, 2020. ↩
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Insikt Group. (2021, February 28). China-Linked Group RedEcho Targets the Indian Power Sector Amid Heightened Border Tensions. Retrieved March 22, 2021. ↩