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S0368 NotPetya

NotPetya is malware that was used by Sandworm Team in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While NotPetya appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, NotPetya may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. NotPetya contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.2413

Item Value
ID S0368
Associated Names ExPetr, Diskcoder.C, GoldenEye, Petrwrap, Nyetya
Type MALWARE
Version 2.0
Created 26 March 2019
Last Modified 08 March 2023
Navigation Layer View In ATT&CK® Navigator

Associated Software Descriptions

Name Description
ExPetr 1
Diskcoder.C 1
GoldenEye 2
Petrwrap 21
Nyetya 2

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
enterprise T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact NotPetya encrypts user files and disk structures like the MBR with 2048-bit RSA.243
enterprise T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services NotPetya can use two exploits in SMBv1, EternalBlue and EternalRomance, to spread itself to other remote systems on the network.243
enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery NotPetya searches for files ending with dozens of different file extensions prior to encryption.3
enterprise T1070 Indicator Removal -
enterprise T1070.001 Clear Windows Event Logs NotPetya uses wevtutil to clear the Windows event logs.23
enterprise T1036 Masquerading NotPetya drops PsExec with the filename dllhost.dat.2
enterprise T1003 OS Credential Dumping -
enterprise T1003.001 LSASS Memory NotPetya contains a modified version of Mimikatz to help gather credentials that are later used for lateral movement.246
enterprise T1021 Remote Services -
enterprise T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares NotPetya can use PsExec, which interacts with the ADMIN$ network share to execute commands on remote systems.245
enterprise T1053 Scheduled Task/Job -
enterprise T1053.005 Scheduled Task NotPetya creates a task to reboot the system one hour after infection.2
enterprise T1518 Software Discovery -
enterprise T1518.001 Security Software Discovery NotPetya determines if specific antivirus programs are running on an infected host machine.3
enterprise T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution -
enterprise T1218.011 Rundll32 NotPetya uses rundll32.exe to install itself on remote systems when accessed via PsExec or wmic.2
enterprise T1569 System Services -
enterprise T1569.002 Service Execution NotPetya can use PsExec to help propagate itself across a network.24
enterprise T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot NotPetya will reboot the system one hour after infection.23
enterprise T1078 Valid Accounts -
enterprise T1078.003 Local Accounts NotPetya can use valid credentials with PsExec or wmic to spread itself to remote systems.24
enterprise T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation NotPetya can use wmic to help propagate itself across a network.24
ics T0866 Exploitation of Remote Services NotPetya initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. 8
ics T0867 Lateral Tool Transfer NotPetya can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. 8
ics T0828 Loss of Productivity and Revenue NotPetya disrupted manufacturing facilities supplying vaccines, resulting in a halt of production and the inability to meet demand for specific vaccines. 7

Groups That Use This Software

ID Name References
G0034 Sandworm Team 93101112

References

  1. Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020. ↩↩↩↩

  2. Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant “Nyetya” Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  3. Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  4. US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  5. Russinovich, M. (2004, June 28). PsExec. Retrieved December 17, 2015. ↩

  6. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019. ↩

  7. David Voreacos, Katherine Chinglinsky, Riley Griffin 2019, December 03 Merck Cyberattacks $1.3 Billion Question: Was It an Act of War? Retrieved. 2019/12/06  ↩

  8. Joe Slowik 2019, April 10 Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments Retrieved. 2019/10/27  ↩↩

  9. NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. ↩

  10. UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020. ↩

  11. Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. ↩