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T1021.007 Cloud Services

Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using Valid Accounts that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user.

Many enterprises federate centrally managed user identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command line interface (CLI) (e.g., Cloud API), using commands such as Connect-AZAccount for Azure PowerShell, Connect-MgGraph for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and gcloud auth login for the Google Cloud CLI.

In some cases, adversaries may be able to authenticate to these services via Application Access Token instead of a username and password.

Item Value
ID T1021.007
Sub-techniques T1021.001, T1021.002, T1021.003, T1021.004, T1021.005, T1021.006, T1021.007
Tactics TA0008
Platforms Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS
Version 1.0
Created 21 February 2023
Last Modified 14 April 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0016 APT29 APT29 has leveraged compromised high-privileged on-premises accounts synced to Office 365 to move laterally into a cloud environment, including through the use of Azure AD PowerShell.2


ID Mitigation Description
M1032 Multi-factor Authentication Use multi-factor authentication on cloud services whenever possible.
M1026 Privileged Account Management Limit the number of high-privileged domain and cloud accounts, and ensure that these are not used for day-to-day operations. Ensure that on-premises accounts do not have privileged cloud permissions and that isolated, cloud-only accounts are used for managing cloud environments.1


ID Data Source Data Component
DS0028 Logon Session Logon Session Creation