T0855 Unauthorized Command Message
Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device’s actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. 2
In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. 3 1
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | T0855 |
| Sub-techniques | |
| Tactics | TA0106 |
| Platforms | None |
| Version | 1.2 |
| Created | 21 May 2020 |
| Last Modified | 16 April 2025 |
Procedure Examples
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| C0028 | 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team issued unauthorized commands to substation breaks after gaining control of operator workstations and accessing a distribution management system (DMS) application. 13 |
| C0034 | 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the MicroSCADA SCIL-API to specify a set of SCADA instructions, including the sending of unauthorized commands to substation devices.12 |
| S1045 | INCONTROLLER | INCONTROLLER can send custom Modbus commands to write register values on Schneider PLCs.8 |
| S0604 | Industroyer | Using its protocol payloads, Industroyer sends unauthorized commands to RTUs to change the state of equipment. 11 |
| S1072 | Industroyer2 | Industroyer2 is capable of sending command messages from the compromised device to target remote stations to open data channels, retrieve the location and values of Information Object Addresses (IOAs), and modify the IO state values through Select Before Operate I/O, Select/Execute, and Invert Default State operations.910 |
| C0020 | Maroochy Water Breach | In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer.14 |
| C0030 | Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack | In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles leveraged Triton to send unauthorized command messages to the Triconex safety controllers.15 |
Mitigations
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M0802 | Communication Authenticity | Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e.g., legacy controllers, RTUs). |
| M0937 | Filter Network Traffic | Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid messages. |
| M0807 | Network Allowlists | Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. 6 |
| M0930 | Network Segmentation | Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. 4 5 6 7 |
| M0813 | Software Process and Device Authentication | Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. |
| M0818 | Validate Program Inputs | Devices and programs that receive command messages from remote systems (e.g., control servers) should verify those commands before taking any actions on them. |
References
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Benjamin Freed 2019, March 13 Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ↩
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Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 ↩
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Zack Whittaker 2017, April 12 Dallas’ emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ↩
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Karen Scarfone; Paul Hoffman 2009, September Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ↩
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Keith Stouffer 2015, May Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2018/03/28 ↩
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Department of Homeland Security 2016, September Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ↩↩
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Dwight Anderson 2014 Protect Critical Infrastructure Systems With Whitelisting Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ↩
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DHS/CISA. (2022, May 25). Alert (AA22-103A) APT Cyber Tools Targeting ICS/SCADA Devices. Retrieved September 28, 2022. ↩
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Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Raymond Leong, Chris Sistrunk, Ken Proska, Corey Hildebrandt, Keith Lunden, Nathan Brubaker. (2022, April 25). INDUSTROYER.V2: Old Malware Learns New Tricks. Retrieved March 30, 2023. ↩
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Forescout. (2022, July 14). Industroyer2 and INCONTROLLER In-depth Technical Analysis of the Most Recent ICS-specific Malware. Retrieved March 30, 2023. ↩
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Anton Cherepanov, ESET 2017, June 12 Win32/Industroyer: A new threat for industrial control systems Retrieved. 2017/09/15 ↩
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Ken Proska, John Wolfram, Jared Wilson, Dan Black, Keith Lunden, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Nathan Brubaker, Tyler Mclellan, Chris Sistrunk. (2023, November 9). Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against Operational Technology. Retrieved March 28, 2024. ↩
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Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. ↩
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Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 ↩
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Miller, S. Reese, E. (2018, June 7). A Totally Tubular Treatise on TRITON and TriStation. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩