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T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.12 Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.

Item Value
ID T1120
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0007
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Permissions required Administrator, SYSTEM, User
Version 1.3
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 30 March 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL ADVSTORESHELL can list connected devices.38
G0007 APT28 APT28 uses a module to receive a notification every time a USB mass storage device is inserted into a victim.49
G0067 APT37 APT37 has a Bluetooth device harvester, which uses Windows Bluetooth APIs to find information on connected Bluetooth devices. 48
S0438 Attor Attor has a plugin that collects information about inserted storage devices, modems, and phone devices.25
G0135 BackdoorDiplomacy BackdoorDiplomacy has used an executable to detect removable media, such as USB flash drives.40
S0128 BADNEWS BADNEWS checks for new hard drives on the victim, such as USB devices, by listening for the WM_DEVICECHANGE window message.67
S0234 Bandook Bandook can detect USB devices.5
S0089 BlackEnergy BlackEnergy can gather very specific information about attached USB devices, to include device instance ID and drive geometry.23
S0454 Cadelspy Cadelspy has the ability to steal information about printers and the documents sent to printers.14
S0115 Crimson Crimson has the ability to discover pluggable/removable drives to extract files from.1718
S0538 Crutch Crutch can monitor for removable drives being plugged into the compromised machine.32
S0673 DarkWatchman DarkWatchman can list signed PnP drivers for smartcard readers.34
S0062 DustySky DustySky can detect connected USB devices.26
G0020 Equation Equation has used tools with the functionality to search for specific information about the attached hard drive that could be used to identify and overwrite the firmware.50
S0679 Ferocious Ferocious can run GET.WORKSPACE in Microsoft Excel to check if a mouse is present.39
S0381 FlawedAmmyy FlawedAmmyy will attempt to detect if a usable smart card is current inserted into a card reader.41
S1044 FunnyDream The FunnyDream FilepakMonitor component can detect removable drive insertion.11
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group tools have contained an application to check performance of USB flash drives. Gamaredon Group has also used malware to scan for removable drives.4344
S1027 Heyoka Backdoor Heyoka Backdoor can identify removable media attached to victim’s machines.37
S0283 jRAT jRAT can map UPnP ports.22
S0409 Machete Machete detects the insertion of new devices by listening for the WM_DEVICECHANGE window message.42
S1026 Mongall Mongall can identify removable media attached to compromised hosts.37
S0149 MoonWind MoonWind obtains the number of removable drives from the victim.24
S0385 njRAT njRAT will attempt to detect if the victim system has a camera during the initial infection. njRAT can also detect any removable drives connected to the system.910
S0644 ObliqueRAT ObliqueRAT can discover pluggable/removable drives to extract files from.15
G0049 OilRig OilRig has used tools to identify if a mouse is connected to a targeted system.46
C0012 Operation CuckooBees During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the fsutil fsinfo drives command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.52
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered removable disks attached to a system.51
S0113 Prikormka A module in Prikormka collects information on available printers and disk drives.3
S0650 QakBot QakBot can identify peripheral devices on targeted systems.36
S0686 QuietSieve QuietSieve can identify and search removable drives for specific file name extensions.13
S0481 Ragnar Locker Ragnar Locker may attempt to connect to removable drives and mapped network drives.16
S0458 Ramsay Ramsay can scan for removable media which may contain documents for collection.2930
S0148 RTM RTM can obtain a list of smart card readers attached to the victim.2728
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet enumerates removable drives for infection.4
S1064 SVCReady SVCReady can check for the number of devices plugged into an infected host.31
S0098 T9000 T9000 searches through connected drives for removable storage devices.21
S0467 TajMahal TajMahal has the ability to identify connected Apple devices.8
G0139 TeamTNT TeamTNT has searched for attached VGA devices using lspci.47
S0647 Turian Turian can scan for removable media to collect data.40
G0010 Turla Turla has used fsutil fsinfo drives to list connected drives.45
S0452 USBferry USBferry can check for connected USB devices.35
S0136 USBStealer USBStealer monitors victims for insertion of removable drives. When dropped onto a second victim, it also enumerates drives connected to the system.33
S0366 WannaCry WannaCry contains a thread that will attempt to scan for new attached drives every few seconds. If one is identified, it will encrypt the files on the attached device.12
S0612 WastedLocker WastedLocker can enumerate removable drives prior to the encryption process.20
S0251 Zebrocy Zebrocy enumerates information about connected storage devices.19

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0009 Process OS API Execution

References

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