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T1430 Location Tracking

Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device.

On Android, applications holding the ACCESS_COAURSE_LOCATION or ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permissions provide access to the device’s physical location. On Android 10 and up, declaration of the ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION permission in an application’s manifest will allow applications to request location access even when the application is running in the background.2 Some adversaries have utilized integration of Baidu map services to retrieve geographical location once the location access permissions had been obtained.51

On iOS, applications must include the NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription, NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription, and/or NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription keys in their Info.plist file depending on the extent of requested access to location information.3 On iOS 8.0 and up, applications call requestWhenInUseAuthorization() to request access to location information when the application is in use or requestAlwaysAuthorization() to request access to location information regardless of whether the application is in use. With elevated privileges, an adversary may be able to access location data without explicit user consent with the com.apple.locationd.preauthorized entitlement key.4

Item Value
ID T1430
Sub-techniques T1430.001, T1430.002
Tactics TA0035, TA0032
Platforms Android, iOS
Version 1.2
Created 25 October 2017
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1061 AbstractEmu AbstractEmu can access a device’s location.52
S0309 Adups Adups transmitted location information.35
S1095 AhRat AhRat can track the device’s location.23
S0304 Android/Chuli.A Android/Chuli.A stole geo-location data.40
S0292 AndroRAT AndroRAT tracks the device location.12
S0422 Anubis Anubis can retrieve the device’s GPS location.31
S1079 BOULDSPY BOULDSPY can get a device’s location using GPS or network.56
S1094 BRATA BRATA can track the device’s location.10
S0655 BusyGasper BusyGasper can collect the device’s location information based on cellular network or GPS coordinates.45
C0033 C0033 During C0033, PROMETHIUM used StrongPity to access the device’s location.59
S0529 CarbonSteal CarbonSteal can access the device’s location and track the device over time.25
S0480 Cerberus Cerberus can collect the device’s location.27
S1083 Chameleon Chameleon has gathered device location data.15
S0323 Charger Charger checks the local settings of the device and does not run its malicious logic if the device is located in Ukraine, Russia, or Belarus.32
S0555 CHEMISTGAMES CHEMISTGAMES has collected the device’s location.17
S0425 Corona Updates Corona Updates can track the device’s location.18
S1243 DCHSpy DCHSpy has collected location data.22
S0505 Desert Scorpion Desert Scorpion can track the device’s location.39
S1092 Escobar Escobar can request coarse and fine location permissions to track the device.21
S0507 eSurv eSurv can track the device’s location.28
S0405 Exodus Exodus Two can extract the GPS coordinates of the device.53
S1080 Fakecalls Fakecalls can access a device’s location.19
S0182 FinFisher FinFisher tracks the latitude and longitude coordinates of the infected device.44
S0408 FlexiSpy FlexiSpy can track the device’s location.7
S1093 FlyTrap FlyTrap can collect device geolocation data.36
S0577 FrozenCell FrozenCell has used an online cell tower geolocation service to track targets.8
S0535 Golden Cup Golden Cup can track the device’s location.33
S0551 GoldenEagle GoldenEagle has tracked location.25
S0421 GolfSpy GolfSpy can track the device’s location.20
S0536 GPlayed GPlayed can request the device’s location.55
S0544 HenBox HenBox can track the device’s location.1
S1128 HilalRAT HilalRAT can access a device’s location.37
S1077 Hornbill Hornbill can access a device’s location and check if GPS is enabled. Hornbill has logic to only log location changes greater than 70 meters.26
S0463 INSOMNIA INSOMNIA can track the device’s location.4
S1185 LightSpy LightSpy has accessed the device’s GPS location.48504947
S0485 Mandrake Mandrake can collect the device’s location.46
S0407 Monokle Monokle can track the device’s location.51
C0054 Operation Triangulation During Operation Triangulation, the threat actors monitored the device’s geolocation.1658
S0399 Pallas Pallas tracks the latitude and longitude coordinates of the infected device.44
S0289 Pegasus for iOS Pegasus for iOS update and sends the location of the phone.38
S0291 PJApps PJApps has the capability to collect and leak the victim’s location.12
S1241 RatMilad RatMilad has collected the device’s last known location.34
S0295 RCSAndroid RCSAndroid can record location.54
S0549 SilkBean SilkBean has access to the device’s location.25
S0327 Skygofree Skygofree can track the device’s location.14
S1195 SpyC23 SpyC23 can access the device’s location.24
S0324 SpyDealer SpyDealer harvests location data from victims.5
S0305 SpyNote RAT SpyNote RAT collects the device’s location.9
S0328 Stealth Mango Stealth Mango can perform GPS location tracking as well as capturing coordinates as when an SMS message or call is received.29
S1082 Sunbird Sunbird can access a device’s location.26
S0329 Tangelo Tangelo contains functionality to gather GPS coordinates.29
S1069 TangleBot TangleBot can request location permissions.13
S0558 Tiktok Pro Tiktok Pro can track the device’s location.11
S1216 TriangleDB TriangleDB has monitored the device’s geolocation, which includes coordinates, altitude, bearing and speed.16
S0418 ViceLeaker ViceLeaker can collect location information, including GPS coordinates.4243
S0506 ViperRAT ViperRAT can track the device’s location.30
G0112 Windshift Windshift has included location tracking capabilities in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.57
S0314 X-Agent for Android X-Agent for Android was believed to have been used to obtain locational data of Ukrainian artillery forces.41

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1012 Enterprise Policy If devices are enrolled using Apple User Enrollment or using a profile owner enrollment mode for Android, device controls prevent the enterprise from accessing the device’s physical location. This is typically used for a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) deployment.
M1014 Interconnection Filtering Filtering requests by checking request origin information may provide some defense against spurious operators.6
M1006 Use Recent OS Version On Android 11 and up, users are not prompted with the option to select “Allow all the time” and must navigate to the settings page to manually select this option. On iOS 14 and up, users can select whether to provide Precise Location for each installed application.
M1011 User Guidance Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as access to location information. Users should also protect their account credentials and enable multi-factor authentication options when available.

References

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