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T1135 Network Share Discovery

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.

File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. 1 2 Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services.

Item Value
ID T1135
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0007
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Permissions required User
Version 3.1
Created 14 December 2017
Last Modified 30 March 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0006 APT1 APT1 listed connected network shares.48
G0050 APT32 APT32 used the net view command to show all shares available, including the administrative shares such as C$ and ADMIN$.53
G0082 APT38 APT38 has enumerated network shares on a compromised host.51
G0087 APT39 APT39 has used the post exploitation tool CrackMapExec to enumerate network shares.55
G0096 APT41 APT41 used the net share command as part of network reconnaissance.5758
S0640 Avaddon Avaddon has enumerated shared folders and mapped volumes.42
S1053 AvosLocker AvosLocker has enumerated shared drives on a compromised network.4140
S0638 Babuk Babuk has the ability to enumerate network shares.46
S0606 Bad Rabbit Bad Rabbit enumerates open SMB shares on internal victim networks.43
S0534 Bazar Bazar can enumerate shared drives on the domain.27
S0570 BitPaymer BitPaymer can search for network shares on the domain or workgroup using net view .23
S1068 BlackCat BlackCat has the ability to discover network shares on compromised networks.3130
C0015 C0015 During C0015, the threat actors executed the PowerView ShareFinder module to identify open shares.61
G0114 Chimera Chimera has used net share and net view to identify network shares of interest.60
S0660 Clambling Clambling has the ability to enumerate network shares.15
S0611 Clop Clop can enumerate network shares.19
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike can query shared drives on the local system.24
S0575 Conti Conti can enumerate remote open SMB network shares using NetShareEnum().1718
S0488 CrackMapExec CrackMapExec can enumerate the shared folders and associated permissions for a targeted network.5
S0625 Cuba Cuba can discover shared resources using the NetShareEnum API call.34
G0105 DarkVishnya DarkVishnya scanned the network for public shared folders.59
S0616 DEATHRANSOM DEATHRANSOM has the ability to use loop operations to enumerate network resources.16
S0659 Diavol Diavol has a ENMDSKS command to enumerates available network shares.13
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has identified and browsed file servers in the victim network, sometimes , viewing files pertaining to ICS or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.52
S0363 Empire Empire can find shared drives on the local system.9
S0618 FIVEHANDS FIVEHANDS can enumerate network shares and mounted drives on a network.33
S0696 Flagpro Flagpro has been used to execute net view to discover mapped network shares.20
S0617 HELLOKITTY HELLOKITTY has the ability to enumerate network resources.16
S0260 InvisiMole InvisiMole can gather network share information.32
S0250 Koadic Koadic can scan local network for open SMB.8
S0236 Kwampirs Kwampirs collects a list of network shares with the command net share.26
S0233 MURKYTOP MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about shares on remote hosts.39
S0039 Net The net view \remotesystem and net share commands in Net can be used to find shared drives and directories on remote and local systems respectively.4
S0365 Olympic Destroyer Olympic Destroyer will attempt to enumerate mapped network shares to later attempt to wipe all files on those shares.44
C0012 Operation CuckooBees During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net share command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.62
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered network disks mounted to the system using netstat.63
S0165 OSInfo OSInfo discovers shares on the network14
S0013 PlugX PlugX has a module to enumerate network shares.25
S0192 Pupy Pupy can list local and remote shared drives and folders over SMB.7
S0650 QakBot QakBot can use net share to identify network shares for use in lateral movement.1112
S0686 QuietSieve QuietSieve can identify and search networked drives for specific file name extensions.37
S0458 Ramsay Ramsay can scan for network drives which may contain documents for collection.3536
S1073 Royal Royal can enumerate the shared resources of a given IP addresses using the API call NetShareEnum.47
S0444 ShimRat ShimRat can enumerate connected drives for infected host machines.22
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can enumerate shares on a compromised host.6
G0054 Sowbug Sowbug listed remote shared drives that were accessible from a victim.56
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet enumerates the directories of a network resource.10
G0131 Tonto Team Tonto Team has used tools such as NBTscan to enumerate network shares.50
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot module shareDll/mshareDll discovers network shares via the WNetOpenEnumA API.2829
G0081 Tropic Trooper Tropic Trooper used netview to scan target systems for shared resources.49
S0612 WastedLocker WastedLocker can identify network adjacent and accessible drives.45
S0689 WhisperGate WhisperGate can enumerate connected remote logical drives.38
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used the “net view” command to locate mapped network shares.54
S0251 Zebrocy Zebrocy identifies network drives when they are added to victim systems.21

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1028 Operating System Configuration Enable Windows Group Policy “Do Not Allow Anonymous Enumeration of SAM Accounts and Shares” security setting to limit users who can enumerate network shares.3

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0009 Process OS API Execution

References

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