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T1135 Network Share Discovery

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.

File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. 2 1 Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\remotesystem command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using net share. For macOS, the sharing -l command lists all shared points used for smb services.

Item Value
ID T1135
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0007
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 3.2
Created 14 December 2017
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S1129 Akira Akira can identify remote file shares for encryption.43
G0006 APT1 APT1 listed connected network shares.87
G0050 APT32 APT32 used the net view command to show all shares available, including the administrative shares such as C$ and ADMIN$.74
G0082 APT38 APT38 has enumerated network shares on a compromised host.79
G0087 APT39 APT39 has used the post exploitation tool CrackMapExec to enumerate network shares.72
G0096 APT41 APT41 used the net share command as part of network reconnaissance.7576
S0640 Avaddon Avaddon has enumerated shared folders and mapped volumes.53
S1053 AvosLocker AvosLocker has enumerated shared drives on a compromised network.6665
S0638 Babuk Babuk has the ability to enumerate network shares.57
S0606 Bad Rabbit Bad Rabbit enumerates open SMB shares on internal victim networks.37
S1081 BADHATCH BADHATCH can check a user’s access to the C$ share on a compromised machine.10
S0534 Bazar Bazar can enumerate shared drives on the domain.19
S0570 BitPaymer BitPaymer can search for network shares on the domain or workgroup using net view .33
G1043 BlackByte BlackByte enumerated network shares on victim devices.80
S1181 BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware can identify network shares connected to the victim machine.38
S1180 BlackByte Ransomware BlackByte Ransomware can identify network shares connected to the victim machine.11
S1068 BlackCat BlackCat has the ability to discover network shares on compromised networks.5150
C0015 C0015 During C0015, the threat actors executed the PowerView ShareFinder module to identify open shares.89
G0114 Chimera Chimera has used net share and net view to identify network shares of interest.78
S0660 Clambling Clambling has the ability to enumerate network shares.48
S0611 Clop Clop can enumerate network shares.55
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike can query shared drives on the local system.52
S0575 Conti Conti can enumerate remote open SMB network shares using NetShareEnum().1415
S0488 CrackMapExec CrackMapExec can enumerate the shared folders and associated permissions for a targeted network.7
S0625 Cuba Cuba can discover shared resources using the NetShareEnum API call.22
G0105 DarkVishnya DarkVishnya scanned the network for public shared folders.73
S0616 DEATHRANSOM DEATHRANSOM has the ability to use loop operations to enumerate network resources.47
S0659 Diavol Diavol has a ENMDSKS command to enumerates available network shares.26
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has identified and browsed file servers in the victim network, sometimes , viewing files pertaining to ICS or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.86
S1159 DUSTTRAP DUSTTRAP can identify and enumerate victim system network shares.70
S1247 Embargo Embargo has searched for folders, subfolders and other networked or mounted drives for follow-on encryption actions.42
S0367 Emotet Emotet has enumerated non-hidden network shares using WNetEnumResourceW. 29
S0363 Empire Empire can find shared drives on the local system.8
G1016 FIN13 FIN13 has executed net view commands for enumeration of open shares on compromised machines.8281
S0618 FIVEHANDS FIVEHANDS can enumerate network shares and mounted drives on a network.28
S0696 Flagpro Flagpro has been used to execute net view to discover mapped network shares.54
S0617 HELLOKITTY HELLOKITTY has the ability to enumerate network resources.47
S0483 IcedID IcedID has used the net view /all command to show available shares.56
G1032 INC Ransom INC Ransom has used Internet Explorer to view folders on other systems.84
S1139 INC Ransomware INC Ransomware has the ability to check for shared network drives to encrypt.34
S0260 InvisiMole InvisiMole can gather network share information.67
S0250 Koadic Koadic can scan local network for open SMB.9
S1075 KOPILUWAK KOPILUWAK can use netstat and Net to discover network shares.41
S0236 Kwampirs Kwampirs collects a list of network shares with the command net share.23
S1160 Latrodectus
Latrodectus can run C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c net view /all to discover network shares.2120
C0049 Leviathan Australian Intrusions Leviathan scanned and enumerated remote network shares in victim environments during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.91
S1199 LockBit 2.0 LockBit 2.0 can discover remote shares.44
S1202 LockBit 3.0 LockBit 3.0 can identify network shares on compromised systems.49
S1141 LunarWeb LunarWeb can identify shared resources in compromised environments.27
G1051 Medusa Group Medusa Group has identified network shares using cmd.exe /c net share.77
S1244 Medusa Ransomware Medusa Ransomware has identified networked drives.161718
S0233 MURKYTOP MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about shares on remote hosts.61
S0039 Net The net view \remotesystem and net share commands in Net can be used to find shared drives and directories on remote and local systems respectively.6
S0365 Olympic Destroyer Olympic Destroyer will attempt to enumerate mapped network shares to later attempt to wipe all files on those shares.60
C0012 Operation CuckooBees During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net share command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.92
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered network disks mounted to the system using netstat.90
S0165 OSInfo OSInfo discovers shares on the network62
S0013 PlugX PlugX has a module to enumerate network shares.3132
S0192 Pupy Pupy can list local and remote shared drives and folders over SMB.4
S0650 QakBot QakBot can use net share to identify network shares for use in lateral movement.2425
S1242 Qilin Qilin has the ability to list network drives.3635
S0686 QuietSieve QuietSieve can identify and search networked drives for specific file name extensions.69
S0458 Ramsay Ramsay can scan for network drives which may contain documents for collection.1213
S1212 RansomHub RansomHub has the ability to target specific network shares for encryption.58
S1073 Royal Royal can enumerate the shared resources of a given IP addresses using the API call NetShareEnum.45
S1085 Sardonic Sardonic has the ability to execute the net view command.30
S0444 ShimRat ShimRat can enumerate connected drives for infected host machines.64
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can enumerate shares on a compromised host.5
G0054 Sowbug Sowbug listed remote shared drives that were accessible from a victim.85
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet enumerates the directories of a network resource.63
G0131 Tonto Team Tonto Team has used tools such as NBTscan to enumerate network shares.71
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot module shareDll/mshareDll discovers network shares via the WNetOpenEnumA API.3940
G0081 Tropic Trooper Tropic Trooper used netview to scan target systems for shared resources.83
S0612 WastedLocker WastedLocker can identify network adjacent and accessible drives.59
S0689 WhisperGate WhisperGate can enumerate connected remote logical drives.46
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used the “net view” command to locate mapped network shares.88
S0251 Zebrocy Zebrocy identifies network drives when they are added to victim systems.68

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1028 Operating System Configuration Enable Windows Group Policy “Do Not Allow Anonymous Enumeration of SAM Accounts and Shares” security setting to limit users who can enumerate network shares.3

References

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