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T1069 Permission Groups Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.

Adversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.2

Item Value
ID T1069
Sub-techniques T1069.001, T1069.002, T1069.003
Tactics TA0007
Platforms Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Version 2.5
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 15 April 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0022 APT3 APT3 has a tool that can enumerate the permissions associated with Windows groups.11
S0335 Carbon Carbon uses the net group command.8
S0483 IcedID IcedID has the ability to identify Workgroup membership.6
S0233 MURKYTOP MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about groups.5
S0445 ShimRatReporter ShimRatReporter gathered the local privileges for the infected host.3
S0623 Siloscape Siloscape checks for Kubernetes node permissions.7
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the Get-ManagementRoleAssignment PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate Exchange management role assignments through an Exchange Management Shell.12
G0092 TA505 TA505 has used TinyMet to enumerate members of privileged groups.9 TA505 has also run net group /domain.10
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot can identify the groups the user on a compromised host belongs to.4

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0015 Application Log Application Log Content
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0036 Group Group Enumeration
DS0009 Process Process Creation

References

  1. Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021. ↩

  2. Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020. ↩

  3. Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020. ↩

  4. Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020. ↩

  5. FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. ↩

  6. Kessem, L., et al. (2017, November 13). New Banking Trojan IcedID Discovered by IBM X-Force Research. Retrieved July 14, 2020. ↩

  7. Prizmant, D. (2021, June 7). Siloscape: First Known Malware Targeting Windows Containers to Compromise Cloud Environments. Retrieved June 9, 2021. ↩

  8. GovCERT. (2016, May 23). Technical Report about the Espionage Case at RUAG. Retrieved November 7, 2018. ↩

  9. Frydrych, M. (2020, April 14). TA505 Continues to Infect Networks With SDBbot RAT. Retrieved May 29, 2020. ↩

  10. Hiroaki, H. and Lu, L. (2019, June 12). Shifting Tactics: Breaking Down TA505 Group’s Use of HTML, RATs and Other Techniques in Latest Campaigns. Retrieved May 29, 2020. ↩

  11. Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016. ↩

  12. Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020. ↩