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S0013 PlugX

PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) with modular plugins that has been used by multiple threat groups.6532

Item Value
ID S0013
Associated Names Thoper, TVT, DestroyRAT, Sogu, Kaba, Korplug
Type MALWARE
Version 3.2
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 11 September 2025
Navigation Layer View In ATT&CK® Navigator

Associated Software Descriptions

Name Description
Thoper 4
TVT 4
DestroyRAT 1
Sogu 651
Kaba 5
Korplug 61

Techniques Used

Domain ID Name Use
enterprise T1071 Application Layer Protocol -
enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols PlugX can be configured to use HTTP for command and control.821311 PlugX has also used HTTPS for C2.15
enterprise T1071.004 DNS PlugX can be configured to use DNS for command and control.2
enterprise T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution -
enterprise T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder PlugX adds Run key entries in the Registry to establish persistence.819131976 PlugX has established persistence via the registry keys HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.8
enterprise T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter -
enterprise T1059.003 Windows Command Shell PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim.812131516
enterprise T1543 Create or Modify System Process -
enterprise T1543.003 Windows Service PlugX can be added as a service to establish persistence. PlugX also has a module to change service configurations as well as start, control, and delete services.16191221
enterprise T1074 Data Staged -
enterprise T1074.001 Local Data Staging PlugX has collected and staged the victim’s computer files for exfiltration.9
enterprise T1622 Debugger Evasion PlugX has made calls to Windows API CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent and exits if it detects a debugger.7
enterprise T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information PlugX decompresses and decrypts itself using the Microsoft API call RtlDecompressBuffer.11811 PlugX has also decrypted its payloads in memory.810137
enterprise T1573 Encrypted Channel -
enterprise T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography PlugX can use RC4 encryption in C2 communications.811
enterprise T1480 Execution Guardrails -
enterprise T1480.002 Mutual Exclusion PlugX has leveraged a mutex in its infection process.87
enterprise T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel PlugX has exfiltrated stolen data and files to its C2 server.916
enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery PlugX has a module to enumerate drives and find files recursively.810111 PlugX has also checked the path from which it is running for specific parameters prior to execution. 897
enterprise T1564 Hide Artifacts -
enterprise T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories PlugX can modify the characteristics of folders to hide them from the compromised user.11 PlugX has also modified file attributes to hidden and system.87
enterprise T1564.003 Hidden Window PlugX has the ability to execute a command on a hidden desktop.8
enterprise T1574 Hijack Execution Flow -
enterprise T1574.001 DLL PlugX has the ability to use DLL search order hijacking for installation on targeted systems.1116 PlugX has also used DLL side-loading to evade anti-virus.522019141817 PlugX has also used a legitimately signed executable to side-load a malicious payload within a DLL file.81013167
enterprise T1562 Impair Defenses -
enterprise T1562.004 Disable or Modify System Firewall PlugX has modified local firewall rules on victim machines to enable a random, high-number listening port for subsequent access and C2 activity.23
enterprise T1070 Indicator Removal -
enterprise T1070.004 File Deletion PlugX has the remove itself and other artifacts.89
enterprise T1070.009 Clear Persistence PlugX has deleted registry keys that store data and maintained persistence.8
enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer PlugX has a module to download and execute files on the compromised machine.191511
enterprise T1056 Input Capture -
enterprise T1056.001 Keylogging PlugX has a module for capturing keystrokes per process including window titles.1
enterprise T1680 Local Storage Discovery PlugX has collected a list of all mapped drives on the infected host.8
enterprise T1036 Masquerading -
enterprise T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service In one instance, menuPass added PlugX as a service with a display name of “Corel Writing Tools Utility.”12
enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location PlugX has been disguised as legitimate Adobe and PotPlayer files.11 PlugX has also imitated legitimate software directories and file names through the creation and storage of a legitimate EXE and the malicious DLLs.813167
enterprise T1112 Modify Registry PlugX has a module to create, delete, or modify Registry keys.819
enterprise T1106 Native API PlugX can use the Windows API functions GetProcAddress, LoadLibrary, and CreateProcess to execute another process.8116
enterprise T1135 Network Share Discovery PlugX has a module to enumerate network shares.81
enterprise T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol PlugX can be configured to use raw TCP or UDP for command and control.82
enterprise T1571 Non-Standard Port PlugX has used random, high-number, non-standard ports to listen for subsequent actions and C2 activities.23
enterprise T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information PlugX can use API hashing and modify the names of strings to evade detection.1811
enterprise T1027.001 Binary Padding PlugX has utilized junk code and opaque predicates in payloads to hinder analysis.8
enterprise T1027.007 Dynamic API Resolution PlugX has leveraged obfuscated Windows API function calls that were concealed as unique names, or hashes of the Windows API.8
enterprise T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File PlugX has leveraged XOR encryption with the key of 123456789.8
enterprise T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery PlugX can identify removable media attached to compromised hosts.9
enterprise T1057 Process Discovery PlugX has a module to list the processes running on a machine.1
enterprise T1012 Query Registry PlugX can enumerate and query for information contained within the Windows Registry.816
enterprise T1620 Reflective Code Loading PlugX has loaded its payload into memory.81315167
enterprise T1091 Replication Through Removable Media PlugX has copied itself to infected removable drives for propagation to other victim devices.9
enterprise T1053 Scheduled Task/Job -
enterprise T1053.005 Scheduled Task PlugX has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence.8
enterprise T1113 Screen Capture PlugX allows the operator to capture screenshots.1
enterprise T1082 System Information Discovery PlugX has collected system information including OS version, processor information, RAM size, location, host name, IP, and screen size of the infected host.8
enterprise T1614 System Location Discovery PlugX has obtained the location of the victim device by leveraging GetSystemDefaultLCID.8
enterprise T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery PlugX has captured victim IP address details of the targeted machine.89
enterprise T1049 System Network Connections Discovery PlugX has a module for enumerating TCP and UDP network connections and associated processes using the netstat command.1
enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery PlugX has the ability to gather the username from the victim’s machine.8
enterprise T1124 System Time Discovery PlugX has identified system time through its GetSystemInfo command.8
enterprise T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution -
enterprise T1127.001 MSBuild A version of PlugX loads as shellcode within a .NET Framework project using msbuild.exe, presumably to bypass application control techniques.14
enterprise T1204 User Execution -
enterprise T1204.002 Malicious File PlugX has leveraged an initial executable disguised as a legitimate document to trick the target into opening it.1013
enterprise T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion -
enterprise T1497.001 System Checks PlugX checks if VMware tools is running in the background by searching for any process named “vmtoolsd”.22
enterprise T1102 Web Service -
enterprise T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver PlugX uses Pastebin to store C2 addresses.14

Groups That Use This Software

ID Name References
G1047 Velvet Ant Velvet Ant heavily relies on variants of PlugX for various phases of operations.23
G1034 Daggerfly Daggerfly has used PlugX loaders as part of intrusions.25
G0096 APT41 APT41 used a variant of PlugX to connect to Windows and Linux systems via SSH and Samba/CIFS.2726
G0022 APT3 5
G0126 Higaisa 28
G0027 Threat Group-3390 229301817
G1021 Cinnamon Tempest 31
G0093 GALLIUM 32
G0001 Axiom 334
G0045 menuPass 191234
G0062 TA459 35
G1014 LuminousMoth 3736
G0017 DragonOK 3
G0044 Winnti Group 38
G0129 Mustang Panda 8394013414243111624

References

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  2. Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  3. Miller-Osborn, J., Grunzweig, J.. (2015, April). Unit 42 Identifies New DragonOK Backdoor Malware Deployed Against Japanese Targets. Retrieved November 4, 2015. ↩↩

  4. Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. ↩↩↩

  5. Scott, M.. (2014, June 10). Clandestine Fox, Part Deux. Retrieved January 14, 2016. ↩↩↩↩↩

  6. Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  7. Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, September 8). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets Government Officials. Retrieved September 9, 2025. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  8. Alexandre Cote Cyr. (2022, March 23). Mustang Panda’s Hodur: Old tricks, new Korplug variant. Retrieved September 9, 2025. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  9. Asheer Malhotra, Jungsoo An, Kendall Mc. (2022, May 5). Mustang Panda deploys a new wave of malware targeting Europe. Retrieved August 4, 2025. ↩↩↩↩

  10. Raggi, M. et al. (2022, March 7). The Good, the Bad, and the Web Bug: TA416 Increases Operational Tempo Against European Governments as Conflict in Ukraine Escalates. Retrieved March 16, 2022. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  11. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017. ↩↩↩

  12. EclecticIQ Threat Research Team. (2023, February 2). Mustang Panda APT Group Uses European Commission-Themed Lure to Deliver PlugX Malware. Retrieved September 9, 2025. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  13. Lancaster, T. and Idrizovic, E.. (2017, June 27). Paranoid PlugX. Retrieved July 13, 2017. ↩↩↩

  14. Patrick Whitsell. (2025, August 25). Deception in Depth: PRC-Nexus Espionage Campaign Hijacks Web Traffic to Target Diplomats. Retrieved September 9, 2025. ↩↩↩↩

  15. Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, April 27). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets Russian Speakers with Updated PlugX. Retrieved September 9, 2025. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩

  16. Global Threat Center, Intelligence Team. (2020, December). APT27 Turns to Ransomware. Retrieved November 12, 2021. ↩↩

  17. Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021. ↩↩↩↩

  18. PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017. ↩↩↩↩

  19. Stewart, A. (2014). DLL SIDE-LOADING: A Thorn in the Side of the Anti-Virus Industry. Retrieved November 12, 2014. ↩

  20. Huss, D., et al. (2017, February 2). Oops, they did it again: APT Targets Russia and Belarus with ZeroT and PlugX. Retrieved April 5, 2018. ↩

  21. Lancaster, T., Idrizovic, E. (2017, June 27). Paranoid PlugX. Retrieved April 19, 2019. ↩

  22. Sygnia Team. (2024, June 3). China-Nexus Threat Group ‘Velvet Ant’ Abuses F5 Load Balancers for Persistence. Retrieved March 14, 2025. ↩↩↩

  23. Insikt Group. (2025, January 9). Chinese State-Sponsored RedDelta Targeted Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia with Adapted PlugX Infection Chain. Retrieved January 14, 2025. ↩

  24. Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024. ↩

  25. Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. ↩

  26. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024. ↩

  27. Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence Team. (2020, June 4). New LNK attack tied to Higaisa APT discovered. Retrieved March 2, 2021. ↩

  28. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017. ↩

  29. Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018. ↩

  30. SecureWorks. (n.d.). BRONZE STARLIGHT. Retrieved December 6, 2023. ↩

  31. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019. ↩

  32. Esler, J., Lee, M., and Williams, C. (2014, October 14). Threat Spotlight: Group 72. Retrieved January 14, 2016. ↩

  33. United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019. ↩

  34. Axel F. (2017, April 27). APT Targets Financial Analysts with CVE-2017-0199. Retrieved February 15, 2018. ↩

  35. Botezatu, B and etl. (2021, July 21). LuminousMoth - PlugX, File Exfiltration and Persistence Revisited. Retrieved October 20, 2022. ↩

  36. Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022. ↩

  37. Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017. ↩

  38. Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 7). China-Based APT Mustang Panda Targets Minority Groups, Public and Private Sector Organizations. Retrieved April 12, 2021. ↩

  39. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, December 29). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets NGOs. Retrieved April 13, 2021. ↩

  40. Hamzeloofard, S. (2020, January 31). New wave of PlugX targets Hong Kong | Avira Blog. Retrieved April 13, 2021. ↩

  41. Insikt Group. (2020, July 28). CHINESE STATE-SPONSORED GROUP ‘REDDELTA’ TARGETS THE VATICAN AND CATHOLIC ORGANIZATIONS. Retrieved April 13, 2021. ↩

  42. Meyers, A. (2018, June 15). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for June: MUSTANG PANDA. Retrieved April 12, 2021. ↩