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T1112 Modify Registry

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.

Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. 1 Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.

Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via Reg or other utilities using the Win32 API. 2 Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. 3 4

The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. 5 Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system’s SMB/Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.

Item Value
ID T1112
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0005
CAPEC ID CAPEC-203
Platforms Windows
Permissions required Administrator, SYSTEM, User
Version 1.2
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 13 August 2020

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0677 AADInternals AADInternals can modify registry keys as part of setting a new pass-through authentication agent.11
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values.18
S0331 Agent Tesla Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries.32
G0073 APT19 APT19 uses a Port 22 malware variant to modify several Registry keys.145
G0050 APT32 APT32‘s backdoor has modified the Windows Registry to store the backdoor’s configuration. 146
G0082 APT38 APT38 uses a tool called CLEANTOAD that has the capability to modify Registry keys.140
G0096 APT41 APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.158159
S0438 Attor Attor‘s dispatcher can modify the Run registry key.115
S0640 Avaddon Avaddon modifies several registry keys for persistence and UAC bypass.62
S0031 BACKSPACE BACKSPACE is capable of deleting Registry keys, sub-keys, and values on a victim system.31
S0245 BADCALL BADCALL modifies the firewall Registry key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfileGloballyOpenPorts\List.16
S0239 Bankshot Bankshot writes data into the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Pniumj.94
S0268 Bisonal Bisonal has deleted Registry keys to clean up its prior activity.56
S0570 BitPaymer BitPaymer can set values in the Registry to help in execution.119
G0108 Blue Mockingbird Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Registry modifications to specify a DLL payload.147
S0348 Cardinal RAT Cardinal RAT sets HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load to point to its executable.129
S0261 Catchamas Catchamas creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a Windows Service.79
S0572 Caterpillar WebShell Caterpillar WebShell has a command to modify a Registry key.50
S0631 Chaes Chaes stored its instructions in a config file in the Registry.111
S0674 CharmPower CharmPower can remove persistence-related artifacts from the Registry.118
S0023 CHOPSTICK CHOPSTICK may store RC4 encrypted configuration information in the Windows Registry.72
S0660 Clambling Clambling can set and delete Registry keys.114
S0611 Clop Clop can make modifications to Registry keys.15
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike can modify Registry values within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to enable the execution of additional code.124
S0126 ComRAT ComRAT has encrypted and stored its orchestrator code in the Registry as well as a PowerShell script into the WsqmCons Registry key.6970
S0608 Conficker Conficker adds keys to the Registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services and various other Registry locations.4041
S0488 CrackMapExec CrackMapExec can create a registry key using wdigest.8
S0115 Crimson Crimson can set a Registry key to determine how long it has been installed and possibly to indicate the version number.76
S0527 CSPY Downloader CSPY Downloader can write to the Registry under the %windir% variable to execute tasks.13
S0334 DarkComet DarkComet adds a Registry value for its installation routine to the Registry Key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System Enable LUA=”0” and HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\DC3_FEXEC.135136
S0673 DarkWatchman DarkWatchman can store configuration strings, keylogger, and output of components in the Registry.71
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has modified the Registry to perform multiple techniques through the use of Reg.139
S0568 EVILNUM EVILNUM can make modifications to the Regsitry for persistence.63
S0343 Exaramel for Windows Exaramel for Windows adds the configuration to the Registry in XML format.122
S0569 Explosive Explosive has a function to write itself to Registry values.88
S0267 FELIXROOT FELIXROOT deletes the Registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\rundll32.exe\shell\open.103
S0679 Ferocious Ferocious has the ability to add a Class ID in the current user Registry hive to enable persistence mechanisms.87
G0061 FIN8 FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities.157
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has removed security settings for VBA macro execution by changing registry values HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\VBAWarnings and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\AccessVBOM.149150
S0666 Gelsemium Gelsemium has the ability to store its components in the Registry.85
S0032 gh0st RAT gh0st RAT has altered the InstallTime subkey.14
G0078 Gorgon Group Gorgon Group malware can deactivate security mechanisms in Microsoft Office by editing several keys and values under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\.144
S0531 Grandoreiro Grandoreiro can store its configuration in the Registry at HKCU\Software\ under frequently changing names including %USERNAME% and ToolTech-RM.134
S0342 GreyEnergy GreyEnergy modifies conditions in the Registry and adds keys.51
S0697 HermeticWiper HermeticWiper has the ability to modify Registry keys to disable crash dumps, colors for compressed files, and pop-up information about folders and desktop items.464748
G0072 Honeybee Honeybee uses a batch file that modifies Registry keys to launch a DLL into the svchost.exe process.152
S0376 HOPLIGHT HOPLIGHT has modified Managed Object Format (MOF) files within the Registry to run specific commands and create persistence on the system.39
S0203 Hydraq Hydraq creates a Registry subkey to register its created service, and can also uninstall itself later by deleting this value. Hydraq‘s backdoor also enables remote attackers to modify and delete subkeys.3536
S0537 HyperStack HyperStack can add the name of its communication pipe to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\parameters\NullSessionPipes.28
S0260 InvisiMole InvisiMole has a command to create, set, copy, or delete a specified Registry key or value.5253
S0271 KEYMARBLE KEYMARBLE has a command to create Registry entries for storing data under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WABE\DataPath.37
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has modified Registry settings for default file associations to enable all macros and for persistence.154155153156
S0669 KOCTOPUS KOCTOPUS has added and deleted keys from the Registry.113
S0356 KONNI KONNI has modified registry keys of ComSysApp, Svchost, and xmlProv on the machine to gain persistence.9596
S0397 LoJax LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk ’ to ‘autocheck autoche ’.116
S0447 Lokibot Lokibot has modified the Registry as part of its UAC bypass process.19
S0576 MegaCortex MegaCortex has added entries to the Registry for ransom contact information.120
S0455 Metamorfo Metamorfo has written process names to the Registry, disabled IE browser features, deleted Registry keys, and changed the ExtendedUIHoverTime key.42434445
S0256 Mosquito Mosquito stores configuration values under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft[dllname] and modifies Registry keys under HKCR\CLSID...\InprocServer32with a path to the launcher.123
S0205 Naid Naid creates Registry entries that store information about a created service and point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.64
S0336 NanoCore NanoCore has the capability to edit the Registry.2021
S0691 Neoichor Neoichor has the ability to configure browser settings by modifying Registry entries under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer.27
S0210 Nerex Nerex creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service.82
S0457 Netwalker Netwalker can add the following registry entry: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE{8 random characters}.73
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE stores its configuration file within the Registry.77
S0385 njRAT njRAT can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.130131
G0116 Operation Wocao Operation Wocao has enabled Wdigest by changing the registry value from 0 to 1.143
S0229 Orz Orz can perform Registry operations.33
S0664 Pandora Pandora can write an encrypted token to the Registry to enable processing of remote commands.66
G0040 Patchwork A Patchwork payload deletes Resiliency Registry keys created by Microsoft Office applications in an apparent effort to trick users into thinking there were no issues during application runs.141
S0158 PHOREAL PHOREAL is capable of manipulating the Registry.81
S0517 Pillowmint Pillowmint has stored its malicious payload in the registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM.125
S0501 PipeMon PipeMon has stored its encrypted payload in the Registry.110
S0254 PLAINTEE PLAINTEE uses reg add to add a Registry Run key for persistence.26
S0013 PlugX PlugX has a module to create, delete, or modify Registry keys.55
S0428 PoetRAT PoetRAT has made registry modifications to alter its behavior upon execution.57
S0012 PoisonIvy PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new system device.17
S0518 PolyglotDuke PolyglotDuke can write encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.78
S0441 PowerShower PowerShower has added a registry key so future powershell.exe instances are spawned off-screen by default, and has removed all registry entries that are left behind during the dropper process.127
S0583 Pysa Pysa has modified the registry key “SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System” and added the ransom note.137
S0650 QakBot QakBot can store its configuration information in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.132133
S0269 QUADAGENT QUADAGENT modifies an HKCU Registry key to store a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications.60
S0262 QuasarRAT QuasarRAT has a command to edit the Registry on the victim’s machine.9
S0662 RCSession RCSession can write its configuration file to the Registry.114117
S0075 Reg Reg may be used to interact with and modify the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface.1
S0511 RegDuke RegDuke can store its encryption key in the Registry.78
S0019 Regin Regin appears to have functionality to modify remote Registry information.49
S0332 Remcos Remcos has full control of the Registry, including the ability to modify it.12
S0496 REvil REvil can save encryption parameters and system information to the Registry.105106107108109
S0240 ROKRAT ROKRAT can modify the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\ registry key so it can bypass the VB object model (VBOM) on a compromised host.86
S0090 Rover Rover has functionality to remove Registry Run key persistence as a cleanup procedure.61
S0148 RTM RTM can delete all Registry entries created during its execution.112
S0596 ShadowPad ShadowPad maintains a configuration block and virtual file system in the Registry.84
S0140 Shamoon Once Shamoon has access to a network share, it enables the RemoteRegistry service on the target system. It will then connect to the system with RegConnectRegistryW and modify the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy to 1.99100101
S0444 ShimRat ShimRat has registered two registry keys for shim databases.102
S0589 Sibot Sibot has installed a second-stage script in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\sibot registry key.25
G0091 Silence Silence can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.142
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can modify registry keys, including to enable or disable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).10
S0533 SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOTHFULMEDIA can add, modify, and/or delete registry keys. It has changed the proxy configuration of a victim system by modifying the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry.54
S0649 SMOKEDHAM SMOKEDHAM has modified registry keys for persistence, to enable credential caching for credential access, and to facilitate lateral movement via RDP.67
S0157 SOUNDBITE SOUNDBITE is capable of modifying the Registry.81
S0142 StreamEx StreamEx has the ability to modify the Registry.97
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet can create registry keys to load driver files.98
S0559 SUNBURST SUNBURST had commands that allow an attacker to write or delete registry keys, and was observed stopping services by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\[service_name]\Start registry entries to value 4.2223 It also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.24
S0242 SynAck SynAck can manipulate Registry keys.128
S0663 SysUpdate SysUpdate can write its configuration file to Software\Classes\scConfig in either HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER.66
S0011 Taidoor Taidoor has the ability to modify the Registry on compromised hosts using RegDeleteValueA and RegCreateKeyExA.68
S0467 TajMahal TajMahal can set the KeepPrintedJobs attribute for configured printers in SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers to enable document stealing.121
S0560 TEARDROP TEARDROP modified the Registry to create a Windows service for itself on a compromised host.126
G0027 Threat Group-3390 A Threat Group-3390 tool has created new Registry keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services.15166
S0665 ThreatNeedle ThreatNeedle can save its configuration data as the following RC4-encrypted Registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\GameCon.104
S0668 TinyTurla TinyTurla can set its configuration parameters in the Registry.30
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot can modify registry entries.34
G0010 Turla Turla has used the Registry to store encrypted payloads.160161
S0263 TYPEFRAME TYPEFRAME can install encrypted configuration data under the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs.65
S0386 Ursnif Ursnif has used Registry modifications as part of its installation routine.9293
S0476 Valak Valak has the ability to modify the Registry key HKCU\Software\ApplicationContainer\Appsw64 to store information regarding the C2 server and downloads.899091
S0180 Volgmer Volgmer stores the encoded configuration file in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.7475
S0670 WarzoneRAT WarzoneRAT can create HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command as a new registry key during privilege escalation.5958
S0612 WastedLocker WastedLocker can modify registry values within the Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry key.29
S0579 Waterbear Waterbear has deleted certain values from the Registry to load a malicious DLL.38
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has modified the Registry key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest by setting the UseLogonCredential registry value to 1 in order to force credentials to be stored in clear text in memory.148
S0330 Zeus Panda Zeus Panda modifies several Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ PhishingFilter\ to disable phishing filters.83
S0350 zwShell zwShell can modify the Registry.138
S0412 ZxShell ZxShell can create Registry entries to enable services to run.80

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1024 Restrict Registry Permissions Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0009 Process OS API Execution
DS0024 Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Creation

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