T1575 Native API
Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls.
The NDK allows developers to write native code in C or C++ that is compiled directly to machine code, avoiding all intermediate languages and steps in compilation that higher level languages, like Java, typically have. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is the component that allows Java functions in the Android app to call functions in a native library.1
Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.2
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | T1575 |
| Sub-techniques | |
| Tactics | TA0030, TA0041 |
| Platforms | Android |
| Version | 2.0 |
| Created | 28 April 2020 |
| Last Modified | 24 October 2025 |
Procedure Examples
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0540 | Asacub | Asacub has implemented functions in native code.7 |
| S0432 | Bread | Bread has used native code in an attempt to disguise malicious functionality.10 |
| S0529 | CarbonSteal | CarbonSteal has seen native libraries used in some reported samples 8 |
| S1083 | Chameleon | Chameleon has used the KeyguardManager API to evaluate the device’s locking mechanism and the AlarmManager API to schedule tasks.3 |
| S0555 | CHEMISTGAMES | CHEMISTGAMES has utilized native code to decrypt its malicious payload.9 |
| S1231 | GodFather | GodFather has hooked onto the getEnabledAccessibilityServiceList API to return an empty list of active services, which hides GodFather and other active services.6 |
| S0544 | HenBox | HenBox has contained native libraries.5 |
| S1185 | LightSpy | LightSpy’s main executable and modules use native libraries to execute targeted functionality.13121114 |
| C0054 | Operation Triangulation | During Operation Triangulation, the threat actors use the Audio Queue API to record audio.1516 |
| S0545 | TERRACOTTA | TERRACOTTA has included native modules.4 |
References
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Google. (2019, December 27). Getting Started with the NDK. Retrieved April 28, 2020. ↩
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M. Peck, C. Northern. (2016, August 22). Analyzing the Effectiveness of App Vetting Tools in the Enterprise. Retrieved April 28, 2020. ↩
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ThreatFabric. (2023, December 21). Android Banking Trojan Chameleon can now bypass any Biometric Authentication. Retrieved July 7, 2025. ↩
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Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team. (2020, August). TERRACOTTA Android Malware: A Technical Study. Retrieved December 18, 2020. ↩
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A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019. ↩
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Ortega, F. Pratapagiri, V. (2025, June 18). Your Mobile App, Their Playground: The Dark Side of Virtualization. Retrieved July 16, 2025. ↩
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T. Shishkova. (2018, August 28). The rise of mobile banker Asacub. Retrieved December 14, 2020. ↩
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A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020. ↩
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B. Leonard, N. Mehta. (2019, November 21). The Secret Life of Sandworms. Retrieved December 31, 2020. ↩
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A. Guertin, V. Kotov, Android Security & Privacy Team. (2020, January 9). PHA Family Highlights: Bread (and Friends) . Retrieved April 27, 2020. ↩
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Dmitry Bestuzhev. (2025, April 7). The Coordinated Kill Switch: LightSpy’s iOS Destructive Plugin Architecture Manages Device Disablement. Retrieved April 14, 2025. ↩
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Melikov, D. (2024, April 11). LightSpy Returns: Renewed Espionage Campaign Targets Southern Asia, Possibly India. Retrieved January 14, 2025. ↩
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ThreatFabric. (2023, October 2). LightSpy mAPT Mobile Payment System Attack. Retrieved January 17, 2025. ↩
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ThreatFabric. (2024, October 29). LightSpy: Implant for iOS. Retrieved January 30, 2025. ↩
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Kucherin, G., et al. (2023, October 23). The outstanding stealth of Operation Triangulation. Retrieved April 18, 2024. ↩
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Larin, B. (2023, December 27). Operation Triangulation: The last (hardware) mystery. Retrieved April 18, 2024. ↩