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T1638 Adversary-in-the-Middle

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as Transmitted Data Manipulation or Endpoint Denial of Service.

Adversary-in-the-Middle can be achieved through several mechanisms. For example, a malicious application may register itself as a VPN client, effectively redirecting device traffic to adversary-owned resources. Registering as a VPN client requires user consent on both Android and iOS; additionally, a special entitlement granted by Apple is needed for iOS devices. Alternatively, a malicious application with escalation privileges may utilize those privileges to gain access to network traffic.

Specific to Android devices, adversary-in-the-disk is a type of AiTM attack where adversaries monitor and manipulate data that is exchanged between applications and external storage.214 To accomplish this, a malicious application firsts requests for access to multimedia files on the device (READ_EXTERNAL STORAGE and WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE), then the application reads data on the device and/or writes malware to the device. Though the request for access is common, when used maliciously, adversaries may access files and other sensitive data due to abusing the permission. Multiple applications were shown to be vulnerable against this attack; however, scrutiny of permissions and input validations may mitigate this attack.

Outside of a mobile device, adversaries may be able to capture traffic by employing a rogue base station or Wi-Fi access point. These devices will allow adversaries to capture network traffic after it has left the device, while it is flowing to its destination. On a local network, enterprise techniques could be used, such as ARP Cache Poisoning or DHCP Spoofing.

If applications properly encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to adversaries, depending on the point of capture. For example, properly implementing Apple’s Application Transport Security (ATS) and Android’s Network Security Configuration (NSC) may prevent sensitive data leaks.3

Item Value
ID T1638
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0035
Platforms Android, iOS
Version 2.2
Created 05 April 2022
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0288 KeyRaider Most KeyRaider samples hook SSLRead and SSLWrite functions in the itunesstored process to intercept device communication with the Apple App Store.5
S0407 Monokle Monokle can install attacker-specified certificates to the device’s trusted certificate store, enabling an adversary to perform adversary-in-the-middle attacks.6
S1062 S.O.V.A. S.O.V.A. has included adversary-in-the-middle capabilities.7

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1009 Encrypt Network Traffic Applications that properly encrypt network traffic may evade some forms of AiTM behavior.
M1006 Use Recent OS Version Recent OS versions have made it more difficult for applications to register as VPN providers.

References

  1. Check Point Research Team. (2018, August 12). Man-in-the-Disk: A New Attack Surface for Android Apps. Retrieved October 31, 2023. ↩

  2. Drozhzhin, A. (2018, August 27). Man-in-the-Disk: A new and dangerous way to hack Android. Retrieved October 31, 2023. ↩

  3. Lee, A., Ramirez, T. (2018, August 15). A Security Analyst’s Guide to Network Security Configuration in Android P . Retrieved February 7, 2024. ↩

  4. Makkaveev, S. (2018, August 12). Man-in-the-Disk: Android Apps Exposed via External Storage. Retrieved October 31, 2023. ↩

  5. Yair Amit. (2013, March 12). Malicious Profiles - The Sleeping Giant of iOS Security. Retrieved November 17, 2024. ↩

  6. Claud Xiao. (2015, August 30). KeyRaider: iOS Malware Steals Over 225,000 Apple Accounts to Create Free App Utopia. Retrieved December 12, 2016. ↩

  7. ThreatFabric. (2021, September 9). S.O.V.A. - A new Android Banking trojan with fowl intentions. Retrieved February 6, 2023. ↩