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T1092 Communication Through Removable Media

Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.

Item Value
ID T1092
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0011
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 1.0
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 14 July 2020

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0007 APT28 APT28 uses a tool that captures information from air-gapped computers via an infected USB and transfers it to network-connected computer when the USB is inserted.3
S0023 CHOPSTICK Part of APT28‘s operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.543
S0136 USBStealer USBStealer drops commands for a second victim onto a removable media drive inserted into the first victim, and commands are executed when the drive is inserted into the second victim.6

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program Disable Autoruns if it is unnecessary.2
M1028 Operating System Configuration Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.1

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0016 Drive Drive Access

References

  1. Microsoft. (2007, August 31). https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771759(v=ws.10).aspx. Retrieved April 20, 2016. ↩

  2. Microsoft. (n.d.). How to disable the Autorun functionality in Windows. Retrieved April 20, 2016. ↩

  3. Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015. ↩↩

  4. ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016. ↩

  5. FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. ↩

  6. Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017. ↩