T1557.003 DHCP Spoofing
Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation.
DHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.1 The typical server-client interaction is as follows:
-
The client broadcasts a
DISCOVER
message. -
The server responds with an
OFFER
message, which includes an available network address. -
The client broadcasts a
REQUEST
message, which includes the network address offered. -
The server acknowledges with an
ACK
message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.
Adversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers.26 Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network.
DHCPv6 clients can receive network configuration information without being assigned an IP address by sending a INFORMATION-REQUEST (code 11)
message to the All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers
multicast address.3 Adversaries may use their rogue DHCP server to respond to this request message with malicious network configurations.
Rather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e, Service Exhaustion Flood) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP allocation pool.
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | T1557.003 |
Sub-techniques | T1557.001, T1557.002, T1557.003 |
Tactics | TA0006, TA0009 |
Platforms | Linux, Windows, macOS |
Version | 1.1 |
Created | 24 March 2022 |
Last Modified | 21 October 2022 |
Mitigations
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M1037 | Filter Network Traffic | Consider filtering DHCP traffic on ports 67 and 68 to/from unknown or untrusted DHCP servers. Additionally, port security may also be enabled on layer switches. Furthermore, consider enabling DHCP snooping on layer 2 switches as it will prevent DHCP spoofing attacks and starvation attacks. Consider tracking available IP addresses through a script or a tool. |
M1031 | Network Intrusion Prevention | Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.4 |
Detection
ID | Data Source | Data Component |
---|---|---|
DS0015 | Application Log | Application Log Content |
DS0029 | Network Traffic | Network Traffic Content |
References
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Droms, R. (1997, March). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol. Retrieved March 9, 2022. ↩
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Irwin, Ullrich, J. (2009, March 16). new rogue-DHCP server malware. Retrieved January 14, 2022. ↩
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J. Bound, et al. (2003, July). Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6). Retrieved June 27, 2022. ↩
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Microsoft. (2006, August 31). DHCP Server Operational Events. Retrieved March 7, 2022. ↩
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Shoemaker, E. (2015, December 31). Solution: Monitor DHCP Scopes and Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks with PRTG and PowerShell. Retrieved March 7, 2022. ↩
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Symantec. (2009, March 22). W32.Tidserv.G. Retrieved January 14, 2022. ↩
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Mollema, D. (2019, March 4). The worst of both worlds: Combining NTLM Relaying and Kerberos delegation . Retrieved August 15, 2022. ↩