T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe
). 1
IFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. 2 IFEOs are represented as Debugger
values in the Registry under HKLM\SOFTWARE{\Wow6432Node}\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
where <executable>
is the binary on which the debugger is attached. 1
IFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). 3 4 Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SilentProcessExit\
. 3 4
Similar to Accessibility Features, on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures “cmd.exe,” or another program that provides backdoor access, as a “debugger” for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the “debugger” program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. 5
Similar to Process Injection, these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. 6 Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.
Malware may also use IFEO to Impair Defenses by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. 7 8
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | T1546.012 |
Sub-techniques | T1546.001, T1546.002, T1546.003, T1546.004, T1546.005, T1546.006, T1546.007, T1546.008, T1546.009, T1546.010, T1546.011, T1546.012, T1546.013, T1546.014, T1546.015 |
Tactics | TA0004, TA0003 |
Platforms | Windows |
Permissions required | Administrator, SYSTEM |
Version | 1.1 |
Created | 24 January 2020 |
Last Modified | 10 November 2020 |
Procedure Examples
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0461 | SDBbot | SDBbot has the ability to use image file execution options for persistence if it detects it is running with admin privileges on a Windows version newer than Windows 7.10 |
S0559 | SUNBURST | SUNBURST created an Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry value for the process dllhost.exe to trigger the installation of Cobalt Strike.9 |
G0088 | TEMP.Veles | TEMP.Veles has modified and added entries within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options to maintain persistence.11 |
Detection
ID | Data Source | Data Component |
---|---|---|
DS0017 | Command | Command Execution |
DS0009 | Process | Process Creation |
DS0024 | Windows Registry | Windows Registry Key Modification |
References
-
Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Retrieved December 18, 2017. ↩↩
-
Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December 18, 2017. ↩
-
Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018. ↩↩
-
Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018. ↩↩
-
Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014. ↩
-
Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017. ↩
-
FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. Retrieved December 18, 2017. ↩
-
Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December 18, 2017. ↩
-
MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021. ↩
-
Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020. ↩
-
Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019. ↩