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T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).2

Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features or Terminal Services DLL for Persistence.1

Item Value
ID T1021.001
Sub-techniques T1021.001, T1021.002, T1021.003, T1021.004, T1021.005, T1021.006, T1021.007, T1021.008
Tactics TA0008
Platforms Windows
Version 1.4
Created 11 February 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G1030 Agrius Agrius tunnels RDP traffic through deployed web shells to access victim environments via compromised accounts.55 Agrius used the Plink tool to tunnel RDP connections for remote access and lateral movement in victim environments.56
G1024 Akira Akira has used RDP for lateral movement.54
G0006 APT1 The APT1 group is known to have used RDP during operations.77
C0051 APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used RDP for lateral movement.84
G0022 APT3 APT3 enables the Remote Desktop Protocol for persistence.68 APT3 has also interacted with compromised systems to browse and copy files through RDP sessions.67
G0087 APT39 APT39 has been seen using RDP for lateral movement and persistence, in some cases employing the rdpwinst tool for mangement of multiple sessions.3940
G0096 APT41 APT41 used RDP for lateral movement.7431 APT41 used NATBypass to expose local RDP ports on compromised systems to the Internet.73
G1023 APT5 APT5 has moved laterally throughout victim environments using RDP.30
G0143 Aquatic Panda Aquatic Panda leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally via RDP in victim environments.47
G0001 Axiom Axiom has used RDP during operations.52
G1043 BlackByte BlackByte has used RDP to access other hosts within victim networks.3837
G0108 Blue Mockingbird Blue Mockingbird has used Remote Desktop to log on to servers interactively and manually copy files to remote hosts.61
C0015 C0015 During C0015, the threat actors used RDP to access specific network hosts of interest.85
C0018 C0018 During C0018, the threat actors opened a variety of ports to establish RDP connections, including ports 28035, 32467, 41578, and 46892.79
C0032 C0032 During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles utilized RDP throughout an operation.81
S0030 Carbanak Carbanak enables concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) sessions.14
G0114 Chimera Chimera has used RDP to access targeted systems.75
G0080 Cobalt Group Cobalt Group has used Remote Desktop Protocol to conduct lateral movement.53
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.1110
C0029 Cutting Edge During Cutting Edge, threat actors used RDP with compromised credentials for lateral movement.80
S0334 DarkComet DarkComet can open an active screen of the victim’s machine and take control of the mouse and keyboard.22
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has moved laterally via RDP.72
G0051 FIN10 FIN10 has used RDP to move laterally to systems in the victim environment.59
G1016 FIN13 FIN13 has remotely accessed compromised environments via Remote Desktop Services (RDS) for lateral movement.60
G0037 FIN6 FIN6 used RDP to move laterally in victim networks.5758
G0046 FIN7 FIN7 has used RDP to move laterally in victim environments.48
G0061 FIN8 FIN8 has used RDP for lateral movement.36
G0117 Fox Kitten Fox Kitten has used RDP to log in and move laterally in the target environment.6970
G1001 HEXANE HEXANE has used remote desktop sessions for lateral movement.51
C0038 HomeLand Justice During HomeLand Justice, threat actors primarily used RDP for lateral movement in the victim environment.8283
S0434 Imminent Monitor Imminent Monitor has a module for performing remote desktop access.7
G1032 INC Ransom
INC Ransom has used RDP to move laterally.26282725
G0119 Indrik Spider Indrik Spider has used RDP for lateral movement.49
S0283 jRAT jRAT can support RDP control.19
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has used RDP for direct remote point-and-click access.24
S0250 Koadic Koadic can enable remote desktop on the victim’s machine.8
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.6665
G0065 Leviathan Leviathan has targeted RDP credentials and used it to move through the victim environment.71
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.4241
G1051 Medusa Group Medusa Group has used RDP to conduct lateral movement and exfiltrate data.76 Medusa Group has also utilized the Windows executable mstsc.exe for RDP activities through the command mstsc.exe /v:{hostname/ip}.76
G0045 menuPass menuPass has used RDP connections to move across the victim network.6364
S0385 njRAT njRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.20
G0049 OilRig OilRig has used Remote Desktop Protocol for lateral movement. The group has also used tunneling tools to tunnel RDP into the environment.3432313333
G0040 Patchwork Patchwork attempted to use RDP to move laterally.35
S0192 Pupy Pupy can enable/disable RDP connection and can start a remote desktop session using a browser web socket client.9
S0583 Pysa Pysa has laterally moved using RDP connections.21
S0262 QuasarRAT QuasarRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.56
S1187 reGeorg reGeorg can be used to tunnel RDP connections.15
S0379 Revenge RAT Revenge RAT has a plugin to perform RDP access.16
G1015 Scattered Spider Scattered Spider has used RDP to enable lateral movement.62
S0461 SDBbot SDBbot has the ability to use RDP to connect to victim’s machines.18
S0382 ServHelper ServHelper has commands for adding a remote desktop user and sending RDP traffic to the attacker through a reverse SSH tunnel.17
G0091 Silence Silence has used RDP for lateral movement.50
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used RDP sessions from public-facing systems to internal servers.78
G1017 Volt Typhoon Volt Typhoon has moved laterally to the Domain Controller via RDP using a compromised account with domain administrator privileges.29
S0670 WarzoneRAT WarzoneRAT has the ability to control an infected PC using RDP.13
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used RDP for lateral movement and to deploy ransomware interactively.44434645
S0350 zwShell zwShell has used RDP for lateral movement.12
S0412 ZxShell ZxShell has remote desktop functionality.23

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1047 Audit Audit the Remote Desktop Users group membership regularly. Remove unnecessary accounts and groups from Remote Desktop Users groups.
M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary.
M1035 Limit Access to Resource Over Network Use remote desktop gateways.
M1032 Multi-factor Authentication Use multi-factor authentication for remote logins.4
M1030 Network Segmentation Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network.
M1028 Operating System Configuration Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server.3
M1026 Privileged Account Management Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP.
M1018 User Account Management Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary.

References

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