G0040 Patchwork
Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.1 378
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | G0040 |
Associated Names | Hangover Group, Dropping Elephant, Chinastrats, MONSOON, Operation Hangover |
Version | 1.5 |
Created | 31 May 2017 |
Last Modified | 22 March 2023 |
Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Associated Group Descriptions
Name | Description |
---|---|
Hangover Group | Patchwork and the Hangover Group have both been referenced as aliases for the threat group associated with Operation Monsoon.649 |
Dropping Elephant | 3 5 6 8 |
Chinastrats | 5 |
MONSOON | MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign; we use it here to refer to the actor group behind the campaign. 9 6 |
Operation Hangover | It is believed that the actors behind Patchwork are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. 9 2 |
Techniques Used
Domain | ID | Name | Use |
---|---|---|---|
enterprise | T1548 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | - |
enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account Control | Patchwork bypassed User Access Control (UAC).1 |
enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | Patchwork encrypted the collected files’ path with AES and then encoded them with base64.7 |
enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | Patchwork developed a file stealer to search C:\ and collect files with certain extensions. Patchwork also executed a script to enumerate all drives, store them as a list, and upload generated files to the C2 server.7 |
enterprise | T1197 | BITS Jobs | Patchwork has used BITS jobs to download malicious payloads.4 |
enterprise | T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | - |
enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Patchwork has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.17 |
enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | - |
enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShell | Patchwork used PowerSploit to download payloads, run a reverse shell, and execute malware on the victim’s machine.17 |
enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | Patchwork ran a reverse shell with Meterpreter.1 Patchwork used JavaScript code and .SCT files on victim machines.78 |
enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual Basic | Patchwork used Visual Basic Scripts (VBS) on victim machines.78 |
enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | - |
enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | Patchwork dumped the login data database from \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data .1 |
enterprise | T1132 | Data Encoding | - |
enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard Encoding | Patchwork used Base64 to encode C2 traffic.1 |
enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | Patchwork collected and exfiltrated files from the infected system.1 |
enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged | - |
enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data Staging | Patchwork copied all targeted files to a directory called index that was eventually uploaded to the C&C server.7 |
enterprise | T1587 | Develop Capabilities | - |
enterprise | T1587.002 | Code Signing Certificates | Patchwork has created self-signed certificates from fictitious and spoofed legitimate software companies that were later used to sign malware.4 |
enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | Patchwork has used watering holes to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.38 |
enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Patchwork uses malicious documents to deliver remote execution exploits as part of. The group has previously exploited CVE-2017-8570, CVE-2012-1856, CVE-2014-4114, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2015-1641.1536784 |
enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | A Patchwork payload has searched all fixed drives on the victim for files matching a specified list of extensions.17 |
enterprise | T1574 | Hijack Execution Flow | - |
enterprise | T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading | A Patchwork .dll that contains BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading.7 |
enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | - |
enterprise | T1070.004 | File Deletion | Patchwork removed certain files and replaced them so they could not be retrieved.7 |
enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Patchwork payloads download additional files from the C2 server.57 |
enterprise | T1559 | Inter-Process Communication | - |
enterprise | T1559.002 | Dynamic Data Exchange | Patchwork leveraged the DDE protocol to deliver their malware.7 |
enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | - |
enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Name or Location | Patchwork installed its payload in the startup programs folder as “Baidu Software Update.” The group also adds its second stage payload to the startup programs as “Net Monitor.”1 They have also dropped QuasarRAT binaries as files named microsoft_network.exe and crome.exe.8 |
enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | A Patchwork payload deletes Resiliency Registry keys created by Microsoft Office applications in an apparent effort to trick users into thinking there were no issues during application runs.7 |
enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | - |
enterprise | T1027.001 | Binary Padding | Patchwork apparently altered NDiskMonitor samples by adding four bytes of random letters in a likely attempt to change the file hashes.7 |
enterprise | T1027.002 | Software Packing | A Patchwork payload was packed with UPX.5 |
enterprise | T1027.005 | Indicator Removal from Tools | Patchwork apparently altered NDiskMonitor samples by adding four bytes of random letters in a likely attempt to change the file hashes.7 |
enterprise | T1027.010 | Command Obfuscation | Patchwork has obfuscated a script with Crypto Obfuscator.7 |
enterprise | T1588 | Obtain Capabilities | - |
enterprise | T1588.002 | Tool | Patchwork has obtained and used open-source tools such as QuasarRAT.8 |
enterprise | T1566 | Phishing | - |
enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | Patchwork has used spearphishing with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.1578 |
enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link | Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.374 |
enterprise | T1598 | Phishing for Information | - |
enterprise | T1598.003 | Spearphishing Link | Patchwork has used embedded image tags (known as web bugs) with unique, per-recipient tracking links in their emails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened messages.8 |
enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | - |
enterprise | T1055.012 | Process Hollowing | A Patchwork payload uses process hollowing to hide the UAC bypass vulnerability exploitation inside svchost.exe.1 |
enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | - |
enterprise | T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | Patchwork attempted to use RDP to move laterally.1 |
enterprise | T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | - |
enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | A Patchwork file stealer can run a TaskScheduler DLL to add persistence.7 |
enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | - |
enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software Discovery | Patchwork scanned the “Program Files” directories for a directory with the string “Total Security” (the installation path of the “360 Total Security” antivirus tool).1 |
enterprise | T1553 | Subvert Trust Controls | - |
enterprise | T1553.002 | Code Signing | Patchwork has signed malware with self-signed certificates from fictitious and spoofed legitimate software companies.4 |
enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Patchwork collected the victim computer name, OS version, and architecture type and sent the information to its C2 server. Patchwork also enumerated all available drives on the victim’s machine.17 |
enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | Patchwork collected the victim username and whether it was running as admin, then sent the information to its C2 server.17 |
enterprise | T1204 | User Execution | - |
enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious Link | Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to try to get users to click, download and open malicious files.3784 |
enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious File | Patchwork embedded a malicious macro in a Word document and lured the victim to click on an icon to execute the malware.78 |
enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | - |
enterprise | T1102.001 | Dead Drop Resolver | Patchwork hides base64-encoded and encrypted C2 server locations in comments on legitimate websites.5 |
Software
References
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Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved August 3, 2016. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Fagerland, S., et al. (2013, May). Operation Hangover: Unveiling an Indian Cyberattack Infrastructure. Retrieved September 26, 2016. ↩
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Hamada, J.. (2016, July 25). Patchwork cyberespionage group expands targets from governments to wide range of industries. Retrieved August 17, 2016. ↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Hinchliffe, A. and Falcone, R. (2020, May 11). Updated BackConfig Malware Targeting Government and Military Organizations in South Asia. Retrieved June 17, 2020. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Kaspersky Lab’s Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, July 8). The Dropping Elephant – aggressive cyber-espionage in the Asian region. Retrieved August 3, 2016. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Levene, B. et al.. (2018, March 7). Patchwork Continues to Deliver BADNEWS to the Indian Subcontinent. Retrieved March 31, 2018. ↩↩↩↩
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Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩