G0139 TeamTNT
TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.895234176
Item | Value |
---|---|
ID | G0139 |
Associated Names | |
Version | 1.2 |
Created | 01 October 2021 |
Last Modified | 19 October 2022 |
Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Techniques Used
Domain | ID | Name | Use |
---|---|---|---|
enterprise | T1098 | Account Manipulation | - |
enterprise | T1098.004 | SSH Authorized Keys | TeamTNT has added RSA keys in authorized_keys .710 |
enterprise | T1583 | Acquire Infrastructure | - |
enterprise | T1583.001 | Domains | TeamTNT has obtained domains to host their payloads.8 |
enterprise | T1595 | Active Scanning | - |
enterprise | T1595.001 | Scanning IP Blocks | TeamTNT has scanned specific lists of target IP addresses.4 |
enterprise | T1595.002 | Vulnerability Scanning | TeamTNT has scanned for vulnerabilities in IoT devices and other related resources such as the Docker API.4 |
enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | TeamTNT has used an IRC bot for C2 communications.4 |
enterprise | T1071.001 | Web Protocols | TeamTNT has the curl command to send credentials over HTTP and the curl and wget commands to download new software.5210 TeamTNT has also used a custom user agent HTTP header in shell scripts.4 |
enterprise | T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | - |
enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | TeamTNT has added batch scripts to the startup folder.1 |
enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | - |
enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShell | TeamTNT has executed PowerShell commands in batch scripts.1 |
enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | TeamTNT has used batch scripts to download tools and executing cryptocurrency miners.1 |
enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix Shell | TeamTNT has used shell scripts for execution.410 |
enterprise | T1059.009 | Cloud API | TeamTNT has leveraged AWS CLI to enumerate cloud environments with compromised credentials.11 |
enterprise | T1609 | Container Administration Command | TeamTNT executed Hildegard through the kubelet API run command and by executing commands on running containers.3 |
enterprise | T1613 | Container and Resource Discovery | TeamTNT has checked for running containers with docker ps and for specific container names with docker inspect .4 TeamTNT has also searched for Kubernetes pods running in a local network.10 |
enterprise | T1136 | Create Account | - |
enterprise | T1136.001 | Local Account | TeamTNT has created local privileged users on victim machines.5 |
enterprise | T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | - |
enterprise | T1543.002 | Systemd Service | TeamTNT has established persistence through the creation of a cryptocurrency mining system service using systemctl .410 |
enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows Service | TeamTNT has used malware that adds cryptocurrency miners as a service.1 |
enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged | - |
enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data Staging | TeamTNT has aggregated collected credentials in text files before exfiltrating.10 |
enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | TeamTNT has used a script that decodes a Base64-encoded version of WeaveWorks Scope.10 |
enterprise | T1610 | Deploy Container | TeamTNT has deployed different types of containers into victim environments to facilitate execution.54 TeamTNT has also transferred cryptocurrency mining software to Kubernetes clusters discovered within local IP address ranges.10 |
enterprise | T1587 | Develop Capabilities | - |
enterprise | T1587.001 | Malware | TeamTNT has developed custom malware such as Hildegard.3 |
enterprise | T1611 | Escape to Host | TeamTNT has deployed privileged containers that mount the filesystem of victim machine.57 |
enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | TeamTNT has sent locally staged files with collected credentials to C2 servers using cURL.10 |
enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | TeamTNT has used open-source tools such as Weave Scope to target exposed Docker API ports and gain initial access to victim environments.510 TeamTNT has also targeted exposed kubelets for Kubernetes environments.3 |
enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | TeamTNT has used a script that checks /proc/*/environ for environment variables related to AWS.10 |
enterprise | T1222 | File and Directory Permissions Modification | - |
enterprise | T1222.002 | Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification | TeamTNT has modified the permissions on binaries with chattr .410 |
enterprise | T1562 | Impair Defenses | - |
enterprise | T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | TeamTNT has disabled and uninstalled security tools such as Alibaba, Tencent, and BMC cloud monitoring agents on cloud-based infrastructure.110 |
enterprise | T1562.004 | Disable or Modify System Firewall | TeamTNT has disabled iptables .7 |
enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | - |
enterprise | T1070.002 | Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | TeamTNT has removed system logs from /var/log/syslog .7 |
enterprise | T1070.003 | Clear Command History | TeamTNT has cleared command history with history -c .410 |
enterprise | T1070.004 | File Deletion | TeamTNT has used a payload that removes itself after running. TeamTNT also has deleted locally staged files for collecting credentials or scan results for local IP addresses after exfiltrating them.110 |
enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | TeamTNT has the curl and wget commands as well as batch scripts to download new tools.510 |
enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | TeamTNT has disguised their scripts with docker-related file names.10 |
enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Name or Location | TeamTNT has replaced .dockerd and .dockerenv with their own scripts and cryptocurrency mining software.10 |
enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | TeamTNT has used masscan to search for open Docker API ports and Kubernetes clusters.2310 TeamTNT has also used malware that utilizes zmap and zgrab to search for vulnerable services in cloud environments.8 |
enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | TeamTNT has encrypted its binaries via AES and encoded files using Base64.47 |
enterprise | T1027.002 | Software Packing | TeamTNT has used UPX and Ezuri packer to pack its binaries.4 |
enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | TeamTNT has searched for attached VGA devices using lspci.10 |
enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | TeamTNT has searched for rival malware and removes it if found.4 TeamTNT has also searched for running processes containing the strings aliyun or liyun to identify machines running Alibaba Cloud Security tools.10 |
enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Software | TeamTNT has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.310 |
enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | - |
enterprise | T1021.004 | SSH | TeamTNT has used SSH to connect back to victim machines.5 TeamTNT has also used SSH to transfer tools and payloads onto victim hosts and execute them.10 |
enterprise | T1496 | Resource Hijacking | TeamTNT has deployed XMRig Docker images to mine cryptocurrency.92 TeamTNT has also infected Docker containers and Kubernetes clusters with XMRig, and used RainbowMiner and lolMiner for mining cryptocurrency.10 |
enterprise | T1014 | Rootkit | TeamTNT has used rootkits such as the open-source Diamorphine rootkit and their custom bots to hide cryptocurrency mining activities on the machine.4 10 |
enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | - |
enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software Discovery | TeamTNT has searched for security products on infected machines.110 |
enterprise | T1608 | Stage Capabilities | - |
enterprise | T1608.001 | Upload Malware | TeamTNT has uploaded backdoored Docker images to Docker Hub.9 |
enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | TeamTNT has searched for system version, architecture, disk partition, logical volume, and hostname information.110 |
enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | TeamTNT has enumerated the host machine’s IP address.4 |
enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | TeamTNT has run netstat -anp to search for rival malware connections.4 TeamTNT has also used libprocesshider to modify /etc/ld.so.preload .1 |
enterprise | T1007 | System Service Discovery | TeamTNT has searched for services such as Alibaba Cloud Security’s aliyun service and BMC Helix Cloud Security’s bmc-agent service in order to disable them.10 |
enterprise | T1569 | System Services | TeamTNT has created system services to execute cryptocurrency mining software.10 |
enterprise | T1552 | Unsecured Credentials | - |
enterprise | T1552.001 | Credentials In Files | TeamTNT has searched for unsecured AWS credentials and Docker API credentials.2410 |
enterprise | T1552.004 | Private Keys | TeamTNT has searched for unsecured SSH keys.24 |
enterprise | T1552.005 | Cloud Instance Metadata API | TeamTNT has queried the AWS instance metadata service for credentials.410 |
enterprise | T1204 | User Execution | - |
enterprise | T1204.003 | Malicious Image | TeamTNT has relied on users to download and execute malicious Docker images.9 |
enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | TeamTNT has leveraged iplogger.org to send collected data back to C2.710 |
Software
References
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AT&T Alien Labs. (2021, September 8). TeamTNT with new campaign aka Chimaera. Retrieved September 22, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Cado Security. (2020, August 16). Team TNT – The First Crypto-Mining Worm to Steal AWS Credentials. Retrieved September 22, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Fishbein, N. (2020, September 8). Attackers Abusing Legitimate Cloud Monitoring Tools to Conduct Cyber Attacks. Retrieved September 22, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Intezer. (2021, September 1). TeamTNT Cryptomining Explosion. Retrieved October 15, 2021. ↩
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Kol, Roi. Morag, A. (2020, August 25). Deep Analysis of TeamTNT Techniques Using Container Images to Attack. Retrieved September 22, 2021. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Quist, N. (2020, October 5). Black-T: New Cryptojacking Variant from TeamTNT. Retrieved September 22, 2021. ↩↩↩↩
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Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT’s Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 22, 2021. ↩↩↩↩
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Darin Smith. (2022, April 21). TeamTNT targeting AWS, Alibaba. Retrieved August 4, 2022. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Darin Smith. (2022, April 21). TeamTNT targeting AWS, Alibaba. Retrieved July 8, 2022. ↩
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Nathaniel Quist. (2021, June 4). TeamTNT Actively Enumerating Cloud Environments to Infiltrate Organizations. Retrieved February 8, 2022. ↩