DET0219 Detection Strategy for Escape to Host
| Item |
Value |
| ID |
DET0219 |
| Version |
1.0 |
| Created |
21 October 2025 |
| Last Modified |
21 October 2025 |
Technique Detected: T1611 (Escape to Host)
Analytics
Containers
AN0612
Detection of container escape attempts via bind mounts, privileged containers, or abuse of docker.sock. Defenders may observe anomalous volume mount configurations (e.g., hostPath to / or /proc), unexpected privileged container launches, or use of container administration commands to access host resources. These events typically correlate with subsequent process execution on the host outside of normal container isolation.
Log Sources
Mutable Elements
| Field |
Description |
| AllowedHostPaths |
List of directories permitted for hostPath volumes. Any access beyond these paths may be suspicious. |
| PrivilegedContainerThreshold |
Number of privileged container launches expected in the environment. Exceeding this may indicate adversary behavior. |
Linux
AN0613
Detection of Linux container escape attempts via syscalls (unshare, keyctl, mount) or process execution outside container namespaces. Defenders may correlate unusual system calls from containerized processes with subsequent process creation on the host or modification of host resources.
Log Sources
| Data Component |
Name |
Channel |
| OS API Execution (DC0021) |
auditd:SYSCALL |
unshare, mount, keyctl, setns syscalls executed by containerized processes |
| Process Creation (DC0032) |
linux:Sysmon |
process creation events linked to container namespaces executing host-level binaries |
Mutable Elements
| Field |
Description |
| SyscallWhitelist |
Expected syscalls by containerized workloads. Deviations may signal an escape attempt. |
| TimeWindow |
Defines correlation window (e.g., 60s) between suspicious syscalls and follow-on host process activity. |
Windows
AN0614
Detection of Windows container escape attempts by observing processes accessing host directories, symbolic link abuse, or privilege escalation attempts. Defenders may detect anomalous process execution with access to system-level directories outside of container boundaries.
Log Sources
Mutable Elements
| Field |
Description |
| RestrictedHostDirs |
Critical system paths containers should not access (e.g., C:\Windows, C:\ProgramData). |
ESXi
AN0615
Detection of ESXi escape attempts by monitoring for anomalies in hypervisor logs such as unexpected VM operations, privilege escalation events, or attempts to load malicious kernel modules within the hypervisor environment.
Log Sources
| Data Component |
Name |
Channel |
| Kernel Module Load (DC0031) |
esxi:vmkernel |
VM exit/entry anomalies, unexpected hypercalls, or kernel module loading |
Mutable Elements
| Field |
Description |
| AllowedKernelModules |
Modules permitted in the hypervisor. Loading any module outside of this list may indicate compromise. |