G1048 UNC3886
UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.21
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | G1048 |
| Associated Names | |
| Version | 1.0 |
| Created | 29 May 2025 |
| Last Modified | 24 October 2025 |
| Navigation Layer | View In ATT&CK® Navigator |
Techniques Used
| Domain | ID | Name | Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| enterprise | T1548 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | UNC3886 has used vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) that contained modified descriptor XML files with the acceptance-level set to partner which allowed for privilege escalation.3 |
| enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | - |
| enterprise | T1560.001 | Archive via Utility | UNC3886 has used Gzip and the Windows command makecab to compress files and stolen credentials from victim systems.34 |
| enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom Method | UNC3886 has XOR encrypted and Gzip compressed captured credentials.4 |
| enterprise | T1037 | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | UNC3886 has attempted to bypass digital signature verification checks at startup by adding a command to the startup config /etc/init.d/localnet within the rootfs.gz archive of both FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer devices.2 |
| enterprise | T1037.004 | RC Scripts | UNC3886 has placed a bash installation script into /etc/rc.local.d/ to establish persistence.3 |
| enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | - |
| enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShell | UNC3886 has used a PowerShell script to search memory dumps for credentials.3 |
| enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | UNC3886 has executed Windows commands on guest virtual machines through vmtoolsd.exe.3 |
| enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix Shell | UNC3886 has used a bash script to install malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).3 |
| enterprise | T1059.006 | Python | UNC3886 has used Python scripts to enumerate ESXi hosts and guest VMs.1 |
| enterprise | T1059.008 | Network Device CLI | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 accessed the Junos OS CLI on targeted devices.65 |
| enterprise | T1059.012 | Hypervisor CLI | UNC3886 has used the esxcli command line utility to modify firewall rules, install malware, and for artifact removal.31 |
| enterprise | T1554 | Compromise Host Software Binary | UNC3886 has trojanized Fortinet firmware and replaced the legitimate /usr/bin/tac_plus TACACS+ daemon for Linux with a malicious version containing credential logging functionality.42 |
| enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | - |
| enterprise | T1555.005 | Password Managers | UNC3886 has targeted KeyPass password database files for credential access.3 |
| enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged | - |
| enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data Staging | |
UNC3886 has staged captured credentials in var/log/ldapd<unique_keyword>.2.gz.4 |
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| enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware implants to deobfuscate incoming C2 messages and encoded archives.65 |
| enterprise | T1587 | Develop Capabilities | - |
| enterprise | T1587.001 | Malware | UNC3886 has deployed custom malware families on Fortinet and VMware systems.2 |
| enterprise | T1587.004 | Exploits | UNC3886 has used zero-day vulnerabilities CVE-2022-41328 against FortiOS and CVE-2023-20867 and CVE-2023-34048 against VMware vCenter.142 |
| enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | - |
| enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric Cryptography | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 malware used the RC4 cipher to encrypt outgoing C2 messages.5 |
| enterprise | T1675 | ESXi Administration Command | UNC3886 used vmtoolsd.exe to run commands on guest virtual machines from a compromised ESXi host.3142 |
| enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 uploaded specified files from compromised devices to a remote server. 6 |
| enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | UNC3886 has exploited CVE-2022-42475 in FortiOS SSL VPNs to obtain access.42 |
| enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | UNC3886 has exoloited CVE-2023-34048 to enable command execution on vCenter servers and CVE-2023-20867 in VMware Tools to execute unauthenticated Guest Operations from ESXi hosts to guest VMs.4 |
| enterprise | T1212 | Exploitation for Credential Access | UNC3886 exploited CVE-2022-22948 in VMware vCenter to obtain encrypted credentials from the vCenter postgresDB.4 |
| enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | UNC3886 has exploited zero-day vulnerability CVE-2023-20867 to enable execution of privileged commands across Windows, Linux, and PhotonOS (vCenter) guest VMs.1 |
| enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels | UNC3886 has employed layers of redundancy to maintain access to compromised environments including network devices, hypervisors, and virtual machines.4 |
| enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | UNC3886 has used vmtoolsd.exe to enumerate files on guest machines.31 |
| enterprise | T1564 | Hide Artifacts | - |
| enterprise | T1564.011 | Ignore Process Interrupts | UNC3886 modified the startup file /etc/init.d/localnet to execute the line nohup /bin/support & so the script would run when the system was rebooted.2 |
| enterprise | T1562 | Impair Defenses | - |
| enterprise | T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | UNC3886 has disabled OpenSSL digital signature verification of system files through corruption of boot files.2 |
| enterprise | T1562.003 | Impair Command History Logging | UNC3886 has tampered with and disabled logging services on targeted systems.1 |
| enterprise | T1562.004 | Disable or Modify System Firewall | UNC3886 has used the TABLEFLIP traffic redirection utility and the esxcli command line to modify firewall rules.312 |
| enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | - |
| enterprise | T1070.004 | File Deletion | UNC3886 has used the the esxcli command line to remove files created by malicious vSphere Installation Bundles from disk.32 |
| enterprise | T1070.006 | Timestomp | UNC3886 has used scripts to timestomp ESXi hosts prior to installing malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).1 |
| enterprise | T1070.007 | Clear Network Connection History and Configurations | UNC3886 has cleared specific events that contained the threat actor’s IP address from multiple log sources.2 |
| enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used backdoor malware capable of downloading files to compromised infrastructure.6 |
| enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | UNC3886 has utilzed Python scripts to transfer files between ESXi hosts and guest VMs.1 |
| enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | - |
| enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or Service | UNC3886 has named a file ‘fgfm’ in an attempt to disguise it as the legitimate service ‘fgfmd’ which facilitates communication between FortiManager and the FortiGate firewall.2 |
| enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 created multiple strains of malware using names to mimic legitimate binaries such as appid, to, irad, lmpad, jdosd, and oemd.6 |
| enterprise | T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware with separate channels to request and carry out tasks from C2.6 |
| enterprise | T1040 | Network Sniffing | UNC3886 has used the LOOKOVER sniffer to sniff TACACS+ authentication packets.4 |
| enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | UNC3886 has deployed backdoors that communicate over TCP to compromised network devices and over VMCI to ESXi hosts.142 |
| enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used a backdoor that binds to port 45678 by default.6 |
| enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | - |
| enterprise | T1027.005 | Indicator Removal from Tools | UNC3886 has replaced atomic indicators mentioned in threat intelligence publications, sometimes as quickly as under a week after release.1 |
| enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded File | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 generated Base64-encoded files in the FreeBSD shell environment of targeted Juniper devices.65 |
| enterprise | T1588 | Obtain Capabilities | - |
| enterprise | T1588.001 | Malware | UNC3886 has used the publicly available rootkits REPTILE and MEDUSA.4 |
| enterprise | T1588.004 | Digital Certificates | UNC3886 has deployed malware using the victim’s legitimate TLS certificate obtained from a compromised FortiGate device.4 |
| enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | - |
| enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | UNC3886 has used MiniDump to dump process memory and search for cleartext credentials.3 |
| enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | UNC3886 has run scripts to list all running processes on a guest VM from an ESXi host.1 |
| enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 exploited CVE-2025-21590 to enable malicious code injection into the memory of legitimate processes.65 |
| enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware capable of establishing a SOCKS proxy connection to a specified IP and port.65 |
| enterprise | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used infrastructure associated with operational relay box (ORB) networks.6 |
| enterprise | T1021 | Remote Services | - |
| enterprise | T1021.004 | SSH | UNC3886 has established remote SSH access to targeted ESXi hosts.12 |
| enterprise | T1014 | Rootkit | UNC3886 has used the publicly available rootkits REPTILE and MEDUSA on targeted VMs.4 |
| enterprise | T1681 | Search Threat Vendor Data | UNC3886 has replaced indicators mentioned in open-source threat intelligence publications at times under a week after their release.1 |
| enterprise | T1505 | Server Software Component | - |
| enterprise | T1505.006 | vSphere Installation Bundles | UNC3886 has used vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to install malware and establish persistence across ESXi hypervisors.312 |
| enterprise | T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution | - |
| enterprise | T1218.011 | Rundll32 | UNC3886 has used rundll32.exe to execute MiniDump for dumping LSASS process memory.3 |
| enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | During RedPenguin, UNC3886 leveraged JunoOS CLI queries to obtain the interface index which contains system and network details.65 |
| enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery | UNC3886 has used installation scripts to collect the system time on targeted ESXi hosts.1 |
| enterprise | T1205 | Traffic Signaling | UNC3886 has used the TABLEFLIP traffic redirection utility to listen for specialized command packets on compromised FortiManager devices.2 |
| enterprise | T1205.001 | Port Knocking | UNC3886 maintained persistence on FortiGate Firewalls through ICMP port knocking.2 |
| enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | UNC3886 has used tools to hijack valid SSH accounts.4 |
| enterprise | T1078.001 | Default Accounts | UNC3886 has harvested and used vCenter Server service accounts.1 |
| enterprise | T1673 | Virtual Machine Discovery | UNC3886 has used scripts to enumerate ESXi hypervisors and their guest VMs.1 |
Software
References
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Alexander Marvi, Brad Slaybaugh, Ron Craft, and Rufus Brown. (2023, June 13). VMware ESXi Zero-Day Used by Chinese Espionage Actor to Perform Privileged Guest Operations on Compromised Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Alexander Marvi, Jeremy Koppen, Tufail Ahmed, and Jonathan Lepore. (2022, September 29). Bad VIB(E)s Part One: Investigating Novel Malware Persistence Within ESXi Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Punsaen Boonyakarn, Shawn Chew, Logeswaran Nadarajan, Mathew Potaczek, Jakub Jozwiak, and Alex Marvi. (2024, June 18). Cloaked and Covert: Uncovering UNC3886 Espionage Operations. Retrieved September 24, 2024. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Juniper Networks, Cybersecurity R&D. (2025, March 11). The RedPenguin Malware Incident. Retrieved June 24, 2025. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Lamparski, L. et al. (2025, March 11). Ghost in the Router: China-Nexus Espionage Actor UNC3886 Targets Juniper Routers. Retrieved June 24, 2025. ↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩↩
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Censys Research Team. (2025, March 14). JunOS and RedPenguin. Retrieved June 24, 2025. ↩