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T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools

Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.12

Adversaries may trigger a denial-of-service attack via legitimate system processes. It has been previously observed that the Windows Time Travel Debugging (TTD) monitor driver can be used to initiate a debugging session for a security tool (e.g., an EDR) and render the tool non-functional. By hooking the debugger into the EDR process, all child processes from the EDR will be automatically suspended. The attacker can terminate any EDR helper processes (unprotected by Windows Protected Process Light) by abusing the Process Explorer driver. In combination this will halt any attempt to restart services and cause the tool to crash.4

Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to Indicator Blocking, adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection.511 For example, adversaries may abuse the Windows process mitigation policy to block certain endpoint detection and response (EDR) products from loading their user-mode code via DLLs. By spawning a process with the PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON attribute using API calls like UpdateProcThreadAttribute, adversaries may evade detection by endpoint security solutions that rely on DLLs that are not signed by Microsoft. Alternatively, they may add new directories to an EDR tool’s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via File/Path Exclusions.314

Adversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging.6

On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.21

In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.

Furthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools.710138 For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.13

Additionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.9

Item Value
ID T1562.001
Sub-techniques T1562.001, T1562.002, T1562.003, T1562.004, T1562.006, T1562.007, T1562.008, T1562.009, T1562.010, T1562.011, T1562.012, T1562.013
Tactics TA0005
Platforms Containers, IaaS, Linux, Network Devices, Windows, macOS
Version 1.7
Created 21 February 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
C0028 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry internet settings to lower internet security. 159
S0331 Agent Tesla Agent Tesla has the capability to kill any running analysis processes and AV software.79
G1030 Agrius Agrius used several mechanisms to try to disable security tools. Agrius attempted to modify EDR-related services to disable auto-start on system reboot. Agrius used a publicly available driver, GMER64.sys typically used for anti-rootkit functionality, to selectively stop and remove security software processes.50
G1024 Akira Akira has disabled or modified security tools for defense evasion.123
G0082 APT38 APT38 has unhooked DLLs to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or anti-virus (AV) tools.141
G0143 Aquatic Panda Aquatic Panda has attempted to stop endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools on compromised systems.128
C0046 ArcaneDoor ArcaneDoor modified the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) function of targeted Cisco ASA appliances to allow the threat actor to bypass normal AAA operations.156155
S0640 Avaddon Avaddon looks for and attempts to stop anti-malware solutions.35
S0638 Babuk Babuk can stop anti-virus services on a compromised host.66
S0534 Bazar Bazar has manually loaded ntdll from disk in order to identity and remove API hooks set by security products.48
G1043 BlackByte BlackByte disabled security tools such as Windows Defender and the Raccine anti-ransomware tool during operations.135133134
S1180 BlackByte Ransomware BlackByte Ransomware adds .JS and .EXE extensions to the Microsoft Defender exclusion list. BlackByte Ransomware terminates and removes the Raccine anti-ransomware utility.89
S0252 Brave Prince Brave Prince terminates antimalware processes.19
G0060 BRONZE BUTLER BRONZE BUTLER has incorporated code into several tools that attempts to terminate anti-virus processes.124
S0482 Bundlore Bundlore can change browser security settings to enable extensions to be installed. Bundlore uses the pkill cfprefsd command to prevent users from inspecting processes.101102
S0484 Carberp Carberp has attempted to disable security software by creating a suspended process for the security software and injecting code to delete antivirus core files when the process is resumed.42
S0144 ChChes ChChes can alter the victim’s proxy configuration.32
S0611 Clop Clop can uninstall or disable security products.40
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike has the ability to use Smart Applet attacks to disable the Java SecurityManager sandbox.2829
S0608 Conficker Conficker terminates various services related to system security and Windows.87
G1052 Contagious Interview Contagious Interview has convinced victims to disable Docker and other container environments and run code on their machine natively in attempts to bypass container isolation and ensure device infection.111
C0029 Cutting Edge During Cutting Edge, threat actors disabled logging and modified the compcheckresult.cgi component to edit the Ivanti Connect Secure built-in Integrity Checker exclusion list to evade detection.157158
S0334 DarkComet DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like anti-virus.8283
S1111 DarkGate DarkGate will terminate processes associated with several security software products if identified during execution.52
S0659 Diavol Diavol can attempt to stop security software.21
S0695 Donut Donut can patch Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI), Windows Lockdown Policy (WLDP), as well as exit-related Native API functions to avoid process termination.17
S0377 Ebury Ebury can disable SELinux Role-Based Access Control and deactivate PAM modules.36
S0554 Egregor Egregor has disabled Windows Defender to evade protections.76
S0605 EKANS EKANS stops processes related to security and management software.7475
G1003 Ember Bear Ember Bear uses the NirSoft AdvancedRun utility to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus through stopping the WinDefend service on victim machines. Ember Bear disables Windows Defender via registry key changes.136
G0037 FIN6 FIN6 has deployed a utility script named kill.bat to disable anti-virus.119
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has delivered macros which can tamper with Microsoft Office security settings.121122
S0249 Gold Dragon Gold Dragon terminates anti-malware processes if they’re found running on the system.19
S0477 Goopy Goopy has the ability to disable Microsoft Outlook’s security policies to disable macro warnings.59
G0078 Gorgon Group Gorgon Group malware can attempt to disable security features in Microsoft Office and Windows Defender using the taskkill command.125
S0531 Grandoreiro Grandoreiro can hook APIs, kill processes, break file system paths, and change ACLs to prevent security tools from running.55
S0132 H1N1 H1N1 kills and disables services for Windows Security Center, and Windows Defender.22
S0061 HDoor HDoor kills anti-virus found on the victim.53
S0601 Hildegard Hildegard has modified DNS resolvers to evade DNS monitoring tools.54
C0038 HomeLand Justice During HomeLand Justice, threat actors modified and disabled components of endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions including Microsoft Defender Antivirus.154
S0434 Imminent Monitor Imminent Monitor has a feature to disable Windows Task Manager.18
G1032 INC Ransom INC Ransom can use SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe, a native Windows utility, to disable Windows Defender.103
G0119 Indrik Spider Indrik Spider used PsExec to leverage Windows Defender to disable scanning of all downloaded files and to restrict real-time monitoring.113 Indrik Spider has used MpCmdRun to revert the definitions in Microsoft Defender.112 Additionally, Indrik Spider has used WMI to stop or uninstall and reset anti-virus products and other defensive services.112
S0201 JPIN JPIN can lower security settings by changing Registry keys.46
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has been observed turning off Windows Security Center and can hide the AV software window from the view of the infected user.138137
S0669 KOCTOPUS KOCTOPUS will attempt to delete or disable all Registry keys and scheduled tasks related to Microsoft Security Defender and Security Essentials.57
C0035 KV Botnet Activity KV Botnet Activity used various scripts to remove or disable security tools, such as http_watchdog and firewallsd, as well as tools related to other botnet infections, such as mips_ff, on victim devices.147
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally, Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.131129130132.
S1199 LockBit 2.0 LockBit 2.0 can disable firewall rules and anti-malware and monitoring software including Windows Defender.7877
S1202 LockBit 3.0 LockBit 3.0 can disable security tools to evade detection including Windows Defender.697071
S0372 LockerGoga LockerGoga installation has been immediately preceded by a “task kill” command in order to disable anti-virus.31
S1213 Lumma Stealer Lumma Stealer has attempted to bypass Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by removing the string “AmsiScanBuffer” from the “clr.dll” module in memory to prevent it from being called.43
S1048 macOS.OSAMiner macOS.OSAMiner has searched for the Activity Monitor process in the System Events process list and kills the process if running. macOS.OSAMiner also searches the operating system’s install.log for apps matching its hardcoded list, killing all matching process names.92
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has disabled antivirus services on targeted systems in order to upload malicious payloads.127
S1169 Mango Mango contains an unused capability to block endpoint security solutions from loading user-mode code hooks via a DLL in a specified process by using the UpdateProcThreadAttribute API to set the PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_MITIGATION_POLICY to PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON for an identified process. 80
S0449 Maze Maze has disabled dynamic analysis and other security tools including IDA debugger, x32dbg, and OllyDbg.90 It has also disabled Windows Defender’s Real-Time Monitoring feature and attempted to disable endpoint protection services.91
G1051 Medusa Group Medusa Group has terminated antivirus services utilizing the gaze.exe executable and utilizing psexec.exe.72107108 Medusa Group has also leveraged I/O control codes (IOCTLs) for terminating and deleting processes of identified security tools.72
S1244 Medusa Ransomware Medusa Ransomware has terminated antivirus services utilizing the gaze.exe executable.72 Medusa Ransomware has also terminated antivirus services utilizing PowerShell scripts.7273
S0576 MegaCortex MegaCortex was used to kill endpoint security processes.47
S0455 Metamorfo Metamorfo has a function to kill processes associated with defenses and can prevent certain processes from launching.6768
S0688 Meteor Meteor can attempt to uninstall Kaspersky Antivirus or remove the Kaspersky license; it can also add all files and folders related to the attack to the Windows Defender exclusion list.58
G0069 MuddyWater MuddyWater can disable the system’s local proxy settings.110
S1135 MultiLayer Wiper MultiLayer Wiper removes the Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) service from infected devices along with all present shadow copies.50
S0228 NanHaiShu NanHaiShu can change Internet Explorer settings to reduce warnings about malware activity.41
S0336 NanoCore NanoCore can modify the victim’s anti-virus.8586
S0457 Netwalker Netwalker can detect and terminate active security software-related processes on infected systems.2425
C0002 Night Dragon During Night Dragon, threat actors disabled anti-virus and anti-spyware tools in some instances on the victim’s machines. The actors also disabled proxy settings to allow direct communication from victims to the Internet.160
G1040 Play
Play has used tools including GMER, IOBit, and PowerTool to disable antivirus software.114115
S0223 POWERSTATS POWERSTATS can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys.30
S0279 Proton Proton kills security tools like Wireshark that are running.93
G0024 Putter Panda Malware used by Putter Panda attempts to terminate processes corresponding to two components of Sophos Anti-Virus (SAVAdminService.exe and SavService.exe).126
S0583 Pysa Pysa has the capability to stop antivirus services and disable Windows Defender.49
S0650 QakBot QakBot has the ability to modify the Registry to add its binaries to the Windows Defender exclusion list.95
S1242 Qilin Qilin can terminate antivirus-related processes and services.991009897
C0055 Quad7 Activity Quad7 Activity has disabled the TP-Link management interface for TP-Link by killing the /usr/bin/httpd process.151153152
S0481 Ragnar Locker Ragnar Locker has attempted to terminate/stop processes and services associated with endpoint security products.88
S1130 Raspberry Robin Raspberry Robin can add an exception to Microsoft Defender that excludes the entire main drive from anti-malware scanning to evade detection.56
S1240 RedLine Stealer RedLine Stealer can disable security software and update services.26
S0496 REvil REvil can connect to and disable the Symantec server on the victim’s network.27
S0400 RobbinHood RobbinHood will search for Windows services that are associated with antivirus software on the system and kill the process.64
G0106 Rocke Rocke used scripts which detected and uninstalled antivirus software.139140
S0253 RunningRAT RunningRAT kills antimalware running process.19
S0446 Ryuk Ryuk has stopped services related to anti-virus.23
G1031 Saint Bear Saint Bear will modify registry entries and scheduled task objects associated with Windows Defender to disable its functionality.142
G1015 Scattered Spider Scattered Spider has uninstalled and disabled security tools.118
C0058 SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors disabled Microsoft Defender through Registry settings and real-time monitoring via PowerShell.149150
S1178 ShrinkLocker ShrinkLocker disables protectors used to secure the BitLocker encryption key on victim systems.6263
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY’s amsiPatch.py module can disable Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) functions.16
S0468 Skidmap Skidmap has the ability to set SELinux to permissive mode.94
C0024 SolarWinds Compromise During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the service control manager on a remote system to disable services associated with security monitoring products.148
S1234 SplatCloak SplatCloak has identified and disabled API callback features of Windows Defender and Kaspersky.65
S0058 SslMM SslMM identifies and kills anti-malware processes.53
S0491 StrongPity StrongPity can add directories used by the malware to the Windows Defender exclusions list to prevent detection.51
S0559 SUNBURST SUNBURST attempted to disable software security services following checks against a FNV-1a + XOR hashed hardcoded blocklist.20
G1018 TA2541 TA2541 has attempted to disable built-in security protections such as Windows AMSI. 105
G0092 TA505 TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender.120
G0139 TeamTNT TeamTNT has disabled and uninstalled security tools such as Alibaba, Tencent, and BMC cloud monitoring agents on cloud-based infrastructure.116117
S0595 ThiefQuest ThiefQuest uses the function kill_unwanted to obtain a list of running processes and kills each process matching a list of security related processes.60
S0004 TinyZBot TinyZBot can disable Avira anti-virus.81
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot can disable Windows Defender.61
G0010 Turla Turla has used a AMSI bypass, which patches the in-memory amsi.dll, in PowerShell scripts to bypass Windows antimalware products.106
G1048 UNC3886 UNC3886 has disabled OpenSSL digital signature verification of system files through corruption of boot files.104
S0130 Unknown Logger Unknown Logger has functionality to disable security tools, including Kaspersky, BitDefender, and MalwareBytes.96
G1047 Velvet Ant Velvet Ant attempted to disable local security tools and endpoint detection and response (EDR) software during operations.109
S0670 WarzoneRAT WarzoneRAT can disarm Windows Defender during the UAC process to evade detection.45
S0689 WhisperGate WhisperGate can download and execute AdvancedRun.exe to disable the Windows Defender Theat Protection service and set an exclusion path for the C:\ drive.383739
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has shut down or uninstalled security applications on victim systems that might prevent ransomware from executing.143144146145
S1207 XLoader XLoader loads a copy of NTDLL to evade hooks from security monitoring tools on this library.34 XLoader can add the path of its executable to the Microsoft Defender exclusion list.33
S1114 ZIPLINE ZIPLINE can add itself to the exclusion list for the Ivanti Connect Secure Integrity Checker Tool if the --exclude parameter is passed by the tar process.44
S0412 ZxShell ZxShell can kill AV products’ processes.84

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1047 Audit Periodically verify that tools are functioning appropriately – for example, that all expected hosts with EDRs or monitoring agents are checking in to the central console. Check EDRs to ensure that no unexpected exclusion paths have been added. In Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, exclusions can be reviewed with the Get-MpPreference cmdlet.15
M1038 Execution Prevention Use application control where appropriate, especially regarding the execution of tools outside of the organization’s security policies (such as rootkit removal tools) that have been abused to impair system defenses. Ensure that only approved security applications are used and running on enterprise systems.
M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions Ensure proper process and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.
M1024 Restrict Registry Permissions Ensure proper Registry permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.
M1018 User Account Management Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services.

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