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T1112 Modify Registry

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in persistence and execution.

Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. 1 Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.

Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via Reg or other utilities using the Win32 API. 5 Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. 7 4

The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. 2 Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system’s SMB/Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.

Item Value
ID T1112
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0005
Platforms Windows
Version 1.3
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 21 April 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0677 AADInternals AADInternals can modify registry keys as part of setting a new pass-through authentication agent.14
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values.26
S0331 Agent Tesla Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries.17
S1025 Amadey Amadey has overwritten registry keys for persistence.89
G0073 APT19 APT19 uses a Port 22 malware variant to modify several Registry keys.181
G0050 APT32 APT32‘s backdoor has modified the Windows Registry to store the backdoor’s configuration. 173
G0082 APT38 APT38 uses a tool called CLEANTOAD that has the capability to modify Registry keys.160
G0096 APT41 APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.167168
S0438 Attor Attor‘s dispatcher can modify the Run registry key.127
S0640 Avaddon Avaddon modifies several registry keys for persistence and UAC bypass.19
S0031 BACKSPACE BACKSPACE is capable of deleting Registry keys, sub-keys, and values on a victim system.124
S0245 BADCALL BADCALL modifies the firewall Registry key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfileGloballyOpenPorts\List.32
S0239 Bankshot Bankshot writes data into the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Pniumj.92
S0268 Bisonal Bisonal has deleted Registry keys to clean up its prior activity.139
S0570 BitPaymer BitPaymer can set values in the Registry to help in execution.83
S1070 Black Basta Black Basta can modify the Registry to enable itself to run in safe mode and to modify the icons and file extensions for encrypted files.112107109110111108
S1068 BlackCat BlackCat has the ability to add the following registry key on compromised networks to maintain persistence: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services \LanmanServer\Paramenters75
G0108 Blue Mockingbird Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Registry modifications to specify a DLL payload.165
S0348 Cardinal RAT Cardinal RAT sets HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load to point to its executable.114
S0261 Catchamas Catchamas creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a Windows Service.150
S0572 Caterpillar WebShell Caterpillar WebShell has a command to modify a Registry key.151
S0631 Chaes Chaes can modify Registry values to stored information and establish persistence.88
S0674 CharmPower CharmPower can remove persistence-related artifacts from the Registry.46
S0023 CHOPSTICK CHOPSTICK may modify Registry keys to store RC4 encrypted configuration information.103
S0660 Clambling Clambling can set and delete Registry keys.37
S0611 Clop Clop can make modifications to Registry keys.51
S0154 Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike can modify Registry values within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to enable the execution of additional code.73
S0126 ComRAT ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads.2120
S0608 Conficker Conficker adds keys to the Registry at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services and various other Registry locations.5455
S0488 CrackMapExec CrackMapExec can create a registry key using wdigest.15
S0115 Crimson Crimson can set a Registry key to determine how long it has been installed and possibly to indicate the version number.143
S0527 CSPY Downloader CSPY Downloader can write to the Registry under the %windir% variable to execute tasks.13
S0334 DarkComet DarkComet adds a Registry value for its installation routine to the Registry Key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System Enable LUA=”0” and HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\DC3_FEXEC.6566
S1066 DarkTortilla DarkTortilla has modified registry keys for persistence.125
S0673 DarkWatchman DarkWatchman can modify Registry values to store configuration strings, keylogger, and output of components.64
S1033 DCSrv DCSrv has created Registry keys for persistence.132
G0035 Dragonfly Dragonfly has modified the Registry to perform multiple techniques through the use of Reg.169
G1006 Earth Lusca Earth Lusca modified the registry using the command reg add “HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment” /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_SZ /d “[file path]” for persistence.78
G1003 Ember Bear Ember Bear has used an open source batch script to modify Windows Defender registry keys.180
S0568 EVILNUM EVILNUM can make modifications to the Regsitry for persistence.101
S0343 Exaramel for Windows Exaramel for Windows adds the configuration to the Registry in XML format.74
S0569 Explosive Explosive has a function to write itself to Registry values.93
S0267 FELIXROOT FELIXROOT deletes the Registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\rundll32.exe\shell\open.52
S0679 Ferocious Ferocious has the ability to add a Class ID in the current user Registry hive to enable persistence mechanisms.135
G0061 FIN8 FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities.159
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has removed security settings for VBA macro execution by changing registry values HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\VBAWarnings and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\AccessVBOM.171172
S0666 Gelsemium Gelsemium can modify the Registry to store its components.69
S0032 gh0st RAT gh0st RAT has altered the InstallTime subkey.53
G0078 Gorgon Group Gorgon Group malware can deactivate security mechanisms in Microsoft Office by editing several keys and values under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\.178
S0531 Grandoreiro Grandoreiro can modify the Registry to store its configuration at HKCU\Software\ under frequently changing names including %USERNAME% and ToolTech-RM.80
S0342 GreyEnergy GreyEnergy modifies conditions in the Registry and adds keys.27
S0697 HermeticWiper HermeticWiper has the ability to modify Registry keys to disable crash dumps, colors for compressed files, and pop-up information about folders and desktop items.120121122
S0376 HOPLIGHT HOPLIGHT has modified Managed Object Format (MOF) files within the Registry to run specific commands and create persistence on the system.123
S0203 Hydraq Hydraq creates a Registry subkey to register its created service, and can also uninstall itself later by deleting this value. Hydraq‘s backdoor also enables remote attackers to modify and delete subkeys.133134
S0537 HyperStack HyperStack can add the name of its communication pipe to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\parameters\NullSessionPipes.18
S0260 InvisiMole InvisiMole has a command to create, set, copy, or delete a specified Registry key or value.136137
S0271 KEYMARBLE KEYMARBLE has a command to create Registry entries for storing data under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WABE\DataPath.63
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has modified Registry settings for default file associations to enable all macros and for persistence.175176174177
S0669 KOCTOPUS KOCTOPUS has added and deleted keys from the Registry.77
S0356 KONNI KONNI has modified registry keys of ComSysApp, Svchost, and xmlProv on the machine to gain persistence.128129
S0397 LoJax LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk ’ to ‘autocheck autoche ’.85
S0447 Lokibot Lokibot has modified the Registry as part of its UAC bypass process.70
G1014 LuminousMoth LuminousMoth has used malware that adds Registry keys for persistence.163162
S1060 Mafalda Mafalda can manipulate the system registry on a compromised host.33
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has modified Registry settings for security tools.166
S0576 MegaCortex MegaCortex has added entries to the Registry for ransom contact information.104
S1059 metaMain metaMain can write the process ID of a target process into the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\DDE\tpid Registry value as part of its reflective loading activity.33
S0455 Metamorfo Metamorfo has written process names to the Registry, disabled IE browser features, deleted Registry keys, and changed the ExtendedUIHoverTime key.152153154155
S1047 Mori Mori can write data to HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA and HKLM\Software\NFC\ and delete Registry values.3938
S0256 Mosquito Mosquito can modify Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft[dllname] to store configuration values. Mosquito also modifies Registry keys under HKCR\CLSID...\InprocServer32 with a path to the launcher.61
S0205 Naid Naid creates Registry entries that store information about a created service and point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.145
S0336 NanoCore NanoCore has the capability to edit the Registry.9091
S0691 Neoichor Neoichor has the ability to configure browser settings by modifying Registry entries under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer.29
S0210 Nerex Nerex creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service.141
S0457 Netwalker Netwalker can add the following registry entry: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE{8 random characters}.102
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE can modify the Registry to store its configuration information.119
C0002 Night Dragon During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and manipulate the Registry.105
S0385 njRAT njRAT can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.8182
C0006 Operation Honeybee During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that modified registry keys.183
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, the threat actors enabled Wdigest by changing the HKLM\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest registry value from 0 (disabled) to 1 (enabled).184
S0229 Orz Orz can perform Registry operations.43
S0664 Pandora Pandora can write an encrypted token to the Registry to enable processing of remote commands.116
G0040 Patchwork A Patchwork payload deletes Resiliency Registry keys created by Microsoft Office applications in an apparent effort to trick users into thinking there were no issues during application runs.161
S1050 PcShare PcShare can delete its persistence mechanisms from the registry.10
S0158 PHOREAL PHOREAL is capable of manipulating the Registry.84
S0517 Pillowmint Pillowmint has modified the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM to store a malicious payload.31
S0501 PipeMon PipeMon has modified the Registry to store its encrypted payload.130
S0254 PLAINTEE PLAINTEE uses reg add to add a Registry Run key for persistence.16
S0013 PlugX PlugX has a module to create, delete, or modify Registry keys.149
S0428 PoetRAT PoetRAT has made registry modifications to alter its behavior upon execution.138
S0012 PoisonIvy PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new system device.30
S0518 PolyglotDuke PolyglotDuke can write encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry.40
S0441 PowerShower PowerShower has added a registry key so future powershell.exe instances are spawned off-screen by default, and has removed all registry entries that are left behind during the dropper process.86
S1058 Prestige Prestige has the ability to register new registry keys for a new extension handler via HKCR\.enc and HKCR\enc\shell\open\command.22
S0583 Pysa Pysa has modified the registry key “SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System” and added the ransom note.76
S0650 QakBot QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft.6867
S0269 QUADAGENT QUADAGENT modifies an HKCU Registry key to store a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications.146
S0262 QuasarRAT QuasarRAT has a command to edit the Registry on the victim’s machine.98
S0662 RCSession RCSession can write its configuration file to the Registry.3736
S0075 Reg Reg may be used to interact with and modify the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface.1
S0511 RegDuke RegDuke can create seemingly legitimate Registry key to store its encryption key.40
S0019 Regin Regin appears to have functionality to modify remote Registry information.140
S0332 Remcos Remcos has full control of the Registry, including the ability to modify it.12
S0496 REvil REvil can modify the Registry to save encryption parameters and system information.9598979694
S0240 ROKRAT ROKRAT can modify the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\ registry key so it can bypass the VB object model (VBOM) on a compromised host.147
S0090 Rover Rover has functionality to remove Registry Run key persistence as a cleanup procedure.41
S0148 RTM RTM can delete all Registry entries created during its execution.35
S0596 ShadowPad ShadowPad can modify the Registry to store and maintain a configuration block and virtual file system.7978
S0140 Shamoon Once Shamoon has access to a network share, it enables the RemoteRegistry service on the target system. It will then connect to the system with RegConnectRegistryW and modify the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy to 1.484950
S0444 ShimRat ShimRat has registered two registry keys for shim databases.47
S0589 Sibot Sibot has modified the Registry to install a second-stage script in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\sibot.131
G0091 Silence Silence can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.164
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can modify registry keys, including to enable or disable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).11
S0533 SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOTHFULMEDIA can add, modify, and/or delete registry keys. It has changed the proxy configuration of a victim system by modifying the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry.106
S0649 SMOKEDHAM SMOKEDHAM has modified registry keys for persistence, to enable credential caching for credential access, and to facilitate lateral movement via RDP.142
S0157 SOUNDBITE SOUNDBITE is capable of modifying the Registry.84
S0142 StreamEx StreamEx has the ability to modify the Registry.118
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet can create registry keys to load driver files.117
S0559 SUNBURST SUNBURST had commands that allow an attacker to write or delete registry keys, and was observed stopping services by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\[service_name]\Start registry entries to value 4.2324 It also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.25
S0242 SynAck SynAck can manipulate Registry keys.71
S0663 SysUpdate SysUpdate can write its configuration file to Software\Classes\scConfig in either HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER.116
G0092 TA505 TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender through modification of the Registry.182
S0011 Taidoor Taidoor has the ability to modify the Registry on compromised hosts using RegDeleteValueA and RegCreateKeyExA.148
S0467 TajMahal TajMahal can set the KeepPrintedJobs attribute for configured printers in SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers to enable document stealing.62
S1011 Tarrask Tarrask is able to delete the Security Descriptor (SD) registry subkey in order to “hide” scheduled tasks.144
S0560 TEARDROP TEARDROP modified the Registry to create a Windows service for itself on a compromised host.87
G0027 Threat Group-3390 A Threat Group-3390 tool has created new Registry keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services.170116
S0665 ThreatNeedle ThreatNeedle can modify the Registry to save its configuration data as the following RC4-encrypted Registry key: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\GameCon.115
S0668 TinyTurla TinyTurla can set its configuration parameters in the Registry.72
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot can modify registry entries.42
G0010 Turla Turla has modify Registry values to store payloads.157158
S0263 TYPEFRAME TYPEFRAME can install encrypted configuration data under the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs.156
S0386 Ursnif Ursnif has used Registry modifications as part of its installation routine.5657
S0476 Valak Valak has the ability to modify the Registry key HKCU\Software\ApplicationContainer\Appsw64 to store information regarding the C2 server and downloads.605859
S0180 Volgmer Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.99100
S0670 WarzoneRAT WarzoneRAT can create HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command as a new registry key during privilege escalation.4544
S0612 WastedLocker WastedLocker can modify registry values within the Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry key.34
S0579 Waterbear Waterbear has deleted certain values from the Registry to load a malicious DLL.28
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has modified the Registry key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest by setting the UseLogonCredential registry value to 1 in order to force credentials to be stored in clear text in memory.179
S0330 Zeus Panda Zeus Panda modifies several Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ PhishingFilter\ to disable phishing filters.113
S0350 zwShell zwShell can modify the Registry.105
S0412 ZxShell ZxShell can create Registry entries to enable services to run.126

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1024 Restrict Registry Permissions Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0009 Process OS API Execution
DS0024 Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Creation

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