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T1204.001 Malicious Link

An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File.

Item Value
ID T1204.001
Sub-techniques T1204.001, T1204.002, T1204.003, T1204.004, T1204.005
Tactics TA0002
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 1.2
Created 11 March 2020
Last Modified 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0584 AppleJeus AppleJeus’s spearphishing links required user interaction to navigate to the malicious website.41
G0007 APT28 APT28 has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.117118
G0016 APT29 APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to click on a malicious link.6162
G0022 APT3 APT3 has lured victims into clicking malicious links delivered through spearphishing.66
G0050 APT32 APT32 has lured targets to download a Cobalt Strike beacon by including a malicious link within spearphishing emails.818239
G0064 APT33 APT33 has lured users to click links to malicious HTML applications delivered via spearphishing emails.121122
G0082 APT38 APT38 has used links to execute a malicious Visual Basic script.56
G0087 APT39 APT39 has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users to click on a malicious link.7980
S0475 BackConfig BackConfig has compromised victims via links to URLs hosting malicious content.40
S0534 Bazar Bazar can gain execution after a user clicks on a malicious link to decoy landing pages hosted on Google Docs.345
G0098 BlackTech BlackTech has used e-mails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.33
S1039 Bumblebee Bumblebee has relied upon a user downloading a file from a OneDrive link for execution.3736
C0011 C0011 During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on student targets to click on a malicious link sent via email.133
C0021 C0021 During C0021, the threat actors lured users into clicking a malicious link which led to the download of a ZIP archive containing a malicious .LNK file.131
G0080 Cobalt Group Cobalt Group has sent emails containing malicious links that require users to execute a file or macro to infect the victim machine.10010135
G0142 Confucius Confucius has lured victims into clicking on a malicious link sent through spearphishing.54
G1052 Contagious Interview Contagious Interview has lured victims to click on a malicious link that led to download of a malicious payload.107 Contagious Interview has also leveraged links to malicious payloads on social media and code repositories.107
G1034 Daggerfly Daggerfly has used strategic website compromise to deliver a malicious link requiring user interaction.92
G1006 Earth Lusca Earth Lusca has sent spearphishing emails that required the user to click on a malicious link and subsequently open a decoy document with a malicious loader.125
G0066 Elderwood Elderwood has leveraged multiple types of spearphishing in order to attempt to get a user to open links.9089
S0367 Emotet Emotet has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through spearphishing.2930
G0120 Evilnum Evilnum has sent spearphishing emails designed to trick the recipient into opening malicious shortcut links which downloads a .LNK file.67
G1011 EXOTIC LILY EXOTIC LILY has used malicious links to lure users into executing malicious payloads.99
G0085 FIN4 FIN4 has lured victims to click malicious links delivered via spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts).8584
G0046 FIN7 FIN7 has used malicious links to lure victims into downloading malware.42
G0061 FIN8 FIN8 has used emails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.575958
G0047 Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on a link pointing to a malicious HTML file leading to follow-on malicious content.9897
S1138 Gootloader Gootloader has been executed through malicious links presented to users as internet search results.2625
S0531 Grandoreiro Grandoreiro has used malicious links to gain execution on victim machines.12
S0561 GuLoader GuLoader has relied upon users clicking on links to malicious documents.7
S0499 Hancitor Hancitor has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.19
S0528 Javali Javali has achieved execution through victims clicking links to malicious websites.20
S0585 Kerrdown Kerrdown has gained execution through victims opening malicious links.39
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has lured victims into clicking malicious links.53
S0669 KOCTOPUS KOCTOPUS has relied on victims clicking on a malicious link delivered via email.34
S1160 Latrodectus Latrodectus has been executed through malicious links distributed in email campaigns.1817
G0140 LazyScripter LazyScripter has relied upon users clicking on links to malicious files.34
G0065 Leviathan Leviathan has sent spearphishing email links attempting to get a user to click.123124
G1014 LuminousMoth LuminousMoth has lured victims into clicking malicious Dropbox download links delivered through spearphishing.76
G0095 Machete Machete has has relied on users opening malicious links delivered through spearphishing to execute malware.109110111
G0059 Magic Hound Magic Hound has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious links embedded in emails.7877
S0530 Melcoz Melcoz has gained execution through victims opening malicious links.20
G0103 Mofang Mofang’s spearphishing emails required a user to click the link to connect to a compromised website.83
G0021 Molerats Molerats has sent malicious links via email trick users into opening a RAR archive and running an executable.5051
G0069 MuddyWater MuddyWater has distributed URLs in phishing e-mails that link to lure documents.104106105
G0129 Mustang Panda Mustang Panda has sent malicious links including links directing victims to a Google Drive folder.434445464849 Mustang Panda has also utilized webpages with Javascript code that downloads malicious payloads to the victim device.47
G1020 Mustard Tempest Mustard Tempest has lured users into downloading malware through malicious links in fake advertisements and spearphishing emails.11232
S0198 NETWIRE NETWIRE has been executed through convincing victims into clicking malicious links.87
C0002 Night Dragon During Night Dragon, threat actors enticed users to click on links in spearphishing emails to download malware.126
S0644 ObliqueRAT ObliqueRAT has gained execution on targeted systems through luring users to click on links to malicious URLs.2324
G0049 OilRig OilRig has delivered malicious links to achieve execution on the target system.94959693
C0022 Operation Dream Job During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured users into executing a malicious link to disclose private account information or provide initial access.130129
C0016 Operation Dust Storm During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors relied on a victim clicking on a malicious link sent via email.128
C0005 Operation Spalax During Operation Spalax, the threat actors relied on a victim to click on a malicious link distributed via phishing emails.127
S1017 OutSteel OutSteel has relied on a user to click a malicious link within a spearphishing email.6
G0040 Patchwork Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to try to get users to click, download and open malicious files.63646540
S0435 PLEAD PLEAD has been executed via malicious links in e-mails.33
S0453 Pony Pony has attempted to lure targets into clicking links in spoofed emails from legitimate banks.31
S0650 QakBot QakBot has gained execution through users opening malicious links.13151614121011
S1242 Qilin Qilin has been executed by luring victims into clicking links in spearphishing emails.2827
G1039 RedCurl RedCurl has used malicious links to infect the victim machines.8687
C0047 RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations Mustang Panda distributed hyperlinks that would result in an MSC file running a PowerShell command to download and install a remotely-hosted MSI file during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.134
G1031 Saint Bear Saint Bear has, in addition to email-based phishing attachments, used malicious websites masquerading as legitimate entities to host links to malicious files for user execution.655
S1018 Saint Bot Saint Bot has relied on users to click on a malicious link delivered via a spearphishing.6
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.88
G0121 Sidewinder Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious links to gain execution in the target environment.113114115116
S0649 SMOKEDHAM SMOKEDHAM has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.21
S1086 Snip3 Snip3 has been executed through luring victims into clicking malicious links.22
S1124 SocGholish SocGholish has lured victims into interacting with malicious links on compromised websites for execution.32
S0646 SpicyOmelette SpicyOmelette has been executed through malicious links within spearphishing emails.35
S1030 Squirrelwaffle Squirrelwaffle has relied on victims to click on a malicious link send via phishing campaigns.9
G1018 TA2541 TA2541 has used malicious links to cloud and web services to gain execution on victim machines.608
G0092 TA505 TA505 has used lures to get users to click links in emails and attachments. For example, TA505 makes their malware look like legitimate Microsoft Word documents, .pdf and/or .lnk files. 6869707172737475
G1037 TA577 TA577 has lured users into executing malicious JavaScript files by sending malicious links via email.18
G1038 TA578 TA578 has placed malicious links in contact forms on victim sites, often spoofing a copyright complaint, to redirect users to malicious file downloads.18
G0134 Transparent Tribe Transparent Tribe has directed users to open URLs hosting malicious content.2324
S0436 TSCookie TSCookie has been executed via malicious links embedded in e-mails spoofing the Ministries of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan.38
G0010 Turla Turla has used spearphishing via a link to get users to download and run their malware.91
C0037 Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution distributed a PDF attachment containing a malicious link to a Pikabot installer.132
G0112 Windshift Windshift has used links embedded in e-mails to lure victims into executing malicious code.52
G1035 Winter Vivern Winter Vivern has mimicked legitimate government-related domains to deliver malicious webpages containing links to documents or other content for user execution.120119
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has lured victims into clicking a malicious link delivered through spearphishing.108
G0128 ZIRCONIUM ZIRCONIUM has used malicious links in e-mails to lure victims into downloading malware.102103

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity.
M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content If a link is being visited by a user, block unknown or unused files in transit by default that should not be downloaded or by policy from suspicious sites as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some download scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious files.
M1017 User Training Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events.

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