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T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Item Value
ID T1041
Sub-techniques
Tactics TA0010
Platforms Linux, Windows, macOS
Version 2.2
Created 31 May 2017
Last Modified 07 April 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0045 ADVSTORESHELL ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2.83
S1025 Amadey Amadey has sent victim data to its C2 servers.70
S0584 AppleJeus AppleJeus has exfiltrated collected host information to a C2 server.89
S0622 AppleSeed AppleSeed can exfiltrate files via the C2 channel.124
G0022 APT3 APT3 has a tool that exfiltrates data over the C2 channel.134
G0050 APT32 APT32‘s backdoor has exfiltrated data using the already opened channel with its C&C server.129
G0087 APT39 APT39 has exfiltrated stolen victim data through C2 communications.130
S0373 Astaroth Astaroth exfiltrates collected information from its r1.log file to the external C2 server. 87
S0438 Attor Attor has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.19
S1029 AuTo Stealer AuTo Stealer can exfiltrate data over actor-controlled C2 servers via HTTP or TCP.64
S0031 BACKSPACE Adversaries can direct BACKSPACE to upload files to the C2 Server.66
S0234 Bandook Bandook can upload files from a victim’s machine over the C2 channel.77
S0239 Bankshot Bankshot exfiltrates data over its C2 channel.105
S0268 Bisonal Bisonal has added the exfiltrated data to the URL over the C2 channel.108
S0520 BLINDINGCAN BLINDINGCAN has sent user and system information to a C2 server via HTTP POST requests.9394
S0657 BLUELIGHT BLUELIGHT has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.62
S0651 BoxCaon BoxCaon uploads files and data from a compromised host over the existing C2 channel.59
S1039 Bumblebee Bumblebee can send collected data in JSON format to C2.111
C0017 C0017 During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration.148
S0077 CallMe CallMe exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.54
S0351 Cannon Cannon exfiltrates collected data over email via SMTP/S and POP3/S C2 channels.73
S0484 Carberp Carberp has exfiltrated data via HTTP to already established C2 servers.9798
S0572 Caterpillar WebShell Caterpillar WebShell can upload files over the C2 channel.109
S0674 CharmPower CharmPower can exfiltrate gathered data to a hardcoded C2 URL via HTTP POST.58
G0114 Chimera Chimera has used Cobalt Strike C2 beacons for data exfiltration.146
S0667 Chrommme Chrommme can exfiltrate collected data via C2.40
G0142 Confucius Confucius has exfiltrated stolen files to its C2 server.127
S1024 CreepySnail CreepySnail can connect to C2 for data exfiltration.20
S0115 Crimson Crimson can exfiltrate stolen information over its C2.11
S0538 Crutch Crutch can exfiltrate data over the primary C2 channel (Dropbox HTTP API).71
S0687 Cyclops Blink Cyclops Blink has the ability to upload exfiltrated files to a C2 server.16
S1021 DnsSystem DnsSystem can exfiltrate collected data to its C2 server.17
S0600 Doki Doki has used Ngrok to establish C2 and exfiltrate data.45
S0502 Drovorub Drovorub can exfiltrate files over C2 infrastructure.69
S0062 DustySky DustySky has exfiltrated data to the C2 server.25
S0024 Dyre Dyre has the ability to send information staged on a compromised host externally to C2.123
S0377 Ebury Ebury can exfiltrate SSH credentials through custom DNS queries.118
S0367 Emotet Emotet has been seen exfiltrating system information stored within cookies sent within an HTTP GET request back to its C2 servers. 72
S0363 Empire Empire can send data gathered from a target through the command and control channel.98
S0568 EVILNUM EVILNUM can upload files over the C2 channel from the infected host.91
S0696 Flagpro Flagpro has exfiltrated data to the C2 server.119
S0381 FlawedAmmyy FlawedAmmyy has sent data collected from a compromised host to its C2 servers.95
S0661 FoggyWeb FoggyWeb can remotely exfiltrate sensitive information from a compromised AD FS server.29
C0001 Frankenstein During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which sent the data back to the adversary’s C2.8
S1044 FunnyDream FunnyDream can execute commands, including gathering user information, and send the results to C2.5
G0093 GALLIUM GALLIUM used Web shells and HTRAN for C2 and to exfiltrate data.131
G0047 Gamaredon Group A Gamaredon Group file stealer can transfer collected files to a hardcoded C2 server.22
S0493 GoldenSpy GoldenSpy has exfiltrated host environment information to an external C2 domain via port 9006.122
S0588 GoldMax GoldMax can exfiltrate files over the existing C2 channel.3839
S0477 Goopy Goopy has the ability to exfiltrate data over the Microsoft Outlook C2 channel.21
S0531 Grandoreiro Grandoreiro can send data it retrieves to the C2 server.15
S0632 GrimAgent GrimAgent has sent data related to a compromise host over its C2 channel.60
S0391 HAWKBALL HAWKBALL has sent system information and files over the C2 channel.103
G0126 Higaisa Higaisa exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.141
S0376 HOPLIGHT HOPLIGHT has used its C2 channel to exfiltrate data.121
S0431 HotCroissant HotCroissant has the ability to download files from the infected host to the command and control (C2) server.102
S1022 IceApple IceApple‘s Multi File Exfiltrator module can exfiltrate multiple files from a compromised host as an HTTP response over C2.125
S0434 Imminent Monitor Imminent Monitor has uploaded a file containing debugger logs, network information and system information to the C2.7
S0604 Industroyer Industroyer sends information about hardware profiles and previously-received commands back to the C2 server in a POST-request.13
G0004 Ke3chang Ke3chang transferred compressed and encrypted RAR files containing exfiltration through the established backdoor command and control channel during operations.143
S0487 Kessel Kessel has exfiltrated information gathered from the infected system to the C2 server.10
S1020 Kevin Kevin can send data from the victim host through a DNS C2 channel.104
S0526 KGH_SPY KGH_SPY can exfiltrate collected information from the host to the C2 server.63
G0094 Kimsuky Kimsuky has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.140139
S0356 KONNI KONNI has sent data and files to its C2 server.747675
G0032 Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.136135137
G0065 Leviathan Leviathan has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.132
S0395 LightNeuron LightNeuron exfiltrates data over its email C2 channel.24
S0680 LitePower LitePower can send collected data, including screenshots, over its C2 channel.32
S0447 Lokibot Lokibot has the ability to initiate contact with command and control (C2) to exfiltrate stolen data.117
G1014 LuminousMoth LuminousMoth has used malware that exfiltrates stolen data to its C2 server.142
S0409 Machete Machete‘s collected data is exfiltrated over the same channel used for C2.26
S1016 MacMa MacMa exfiltrates data from a supplied path over its C2 channel.106
S1060 Mafalda Mafalda can send network system data and files to its C2 server.30
S0652 MarkiRAT MarkiRAT can exfiltrate locally stored data via its C2.41
S0459 MechaFlounder MechaFlounder has the ability to send the compromised user’s account name and hostname within a URL to C2.36
S1059 metaMain metaMain can upload collected files and data to its C2 server.100
S0455 Metamorfo Metamorfo can send the data it collects to the C2 server.107
S0084 Mis-Type Mis-Type has transmitted collected files and data to its C2 server.18
S0083 Misdat Misdat has uploaded files and data to its C2 servers.18
S0079 MobileOrder MobileOrder exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.54
S1026 Mongall Mongall can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 server.23
G0069 MuddyWater MuddyWater has used C2 infrastructure to receive exfiltrated data.144
S0034 NETEAGLE NETEAGLE is capable of reading files over the C2 channel.66
S0385 njRAT njRAT has used HTTP to receive stolen information from the infected machine.12
S0340 Octopus Octopus has uploaded stolen files and data from a victim’s machine over its C2 channel.35
S0439 Okrum Data exfiltration is done by Okrum using the already opened channel with the C2 server.101
S0264 OopsIE OopsIE can upload files from the victim’s machine to its C2 server.82
C0022 Operation Dream Job During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers.150
C0006 Operation Honeybee During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors uploaded stolen files to their C2 servers.147
C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the XServer backdoor to exfiltrate data.149
S1017 OutSteel OutSteel can upload files from a compromised host over its C2 channel.84
S1050 PcShare PcShare can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 servers.5
S0587 Penquin Penquin can execute the command code do_upload to send files to C2.43
S1031 PingPull PingPull has the ability to exfiltrate stolen victim data through its C2 channel.42
S0428 PoetRAT PoetRAT has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.49
S0441 PowerShower PowerShower has used a PowerShell document stealer module to pack and exfiltrate .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files smaller than 5MB that were modified during the past two days.50
S0238 Proxysvc Proxysvc performs data exfiltration over the control server channel using a custom protocol.86
S0078 Psylo Psylo exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.54
S0147 Pteranodon Pteranodon exfiltrates screenshot files to its C2 server.22
S0192 Pupy Pupy can send screenshots files, keylogger data, files, and recorded audio back to the C2 server.2
S0650 QakBot QakBot can send stolen information to C2 nodes including passwords, accounts, and emails.85
S0495 RDAT RDAT can exfiltrate data gathered from the infected system via the established Exchange Web Services API C2 channel.99
S0375 Remexi Remexi performs exfiltration over BITSAdmin, which is also used for the C2 channel.37
S0496 REvil REvil can exfiltrate host and malware information to C2 servers.96
S0448 Rising Sun Rising Sun can send data gathered from the infected machine via HTTP POST request to the C2.14
S0240 ROKRAT ROKRAT can send collected files back over same C2 channel.88
S0085 S-Type S-Type has uploaded data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.18
G0034 Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has sent system information to its C2 server using HTTP.133
S0461 SDBbot SDBbot has sent collected data from a compromised host to its C2 servers.95
S1019 Shark Shark has the ability to upload files from the compromised host over a DNS or HTTP C2 channel.34
S0445 ShimRatReporter ShimRatReporter sent generated reports to the C2 via HTTP POST requests.3
S0610 SideTwist SideTwist has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.53
S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can transfer files from an infected host to the C2 server.4
S0633 Sliver Sliver can exfiltrate files from the victim using the download command.6
S0533 SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOTHFULMEDIA has sent system information to a C2 server via HTTP and HTTPS POST requests.33
S0649 SMOKEDHAM SMOKEDHAM has exfiltrated data to its C2 server.90
S0615 SombRAT SombRAT has uploaded collected data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.48
S0543 Spark Spark has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.31
S1030 Squirrelwaffle Squirrelwaffle has exfiltrated victim data using HTTP POST requests to its C2 servers.65
S1037 STARWHALE STARWHALE can exfiltrate collected data to its C2 servers.44
G0038 Stealth Falcon After data is collected by Stealth Falcon malware, it is exfiltrated over the existing C2 channel.138
S1034 StrifeWater StrifeWater can send data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.67
S0491 StrongPity StrongPity can exfiltrate collected documents through C2 channels.115116
S0603 Stuxnet Stuxnet sends compromised victim information via HTTP.114
S1042 SUGARDUMP SUGARDUMP has sent stolen credentials and other data to its C2 server.92
S1064 SVCReady SVCReady can send collected data in JSON format to its C2 server.110
S0663 SysUpdate SysUpdate has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.68
S0467 TajMahal TajMahal has the ability to send collected files over its C2.120
S0595 ThiefQuest ThiefQuest exfiltrates targeted file extensions in the /Users/ folder to the command and control server via unencrypted HTTP. Network packets contain a string with two pieces of information: a file path and the contents of the file in a base64 encoded string.5152
S0671 Tomiris Tomiris can upload files matching a hardcoded set of extensions, such as .doc, .docx, .pdf, and .rar, to its C2 server.61
S0678 Torisma Torisma can send victim data to an actor-controlled C2 server.81
S0266 TrickBot TrickBot can send information about the compromised host and upload data to a hardcoded C2 server.112113
S0386 Ursnif Ursnif has used HTTP POSTs to exfil gathered information.555657
S0476 Valak Valak has the ability to exfiltrate data over the C2 channel.807879
S0670 WarzoneRAT WarzoneRAT can send collected victim data to its C2 server.47
G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has exfiltrated domain credentials and network enumeration information over command and control (C2) channels.145
S1065 Woody RAT Woody RAT can exfiltrate files from an infected machine to its C2 server.126
S0658 XCSSET XCSSET exfiltrates data stolen from a system over its C2 channel.46
S0251 Zebrocy Zebrocy has exfiltrated data to the designated C2 server using HTTP POST requests.2728
G0128 ZIRCONIUM ZIRCONIUM has exfiltrated files via the Dropbox API C2.128
S0086 ZLib ZLib has sent data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.18

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1057 Data Loss Prevention Data loss prevention can detect and block sensitive data being sent over unencrypted protocols.
M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. 1

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0022 File File Access
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Connection Creation

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