T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning
Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.
These scans may also include more broad attempts to Gather Victim Host Information that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.1 Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application).
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| ID | T1595.002 |
| Sub-techniques | T1595.001, T1595.002, T1595.003 |
| Tactics | TA0043 |
| Platforms | PRE |
| Version | 1.0 |
| Created | 02 October 2020 |
| Last Modified | 24 October 2025 |
Procedure Examples
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0007 | APT28 | APT28 has performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers.9 |
| G0016 | APT29 | APT29 has conducted widespread scanning of target environments to identify vulnerabilities for exploit.12 |
| G0096 | APT41 | APT41 used the Acunetix SQL injection vulnerability scanner in target reconnaissance operations, as well as the JexBoss tool to identify vulnerabilities in Java applications.7 |
| G0143 | Aquatic Panda | Aquatic Panda has used publicly accessible DNS logging services to identify servers vulnerable to Log4j (CVE 2021-44228).14 |
| C0029 | Cutting Edge | During Cutting Edge, threat actors used the publicly available Interactsh tool to identify Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs vulnerable to CVE-2024-21893.17 |
| G0035 | Dragonfly | Dragonfly has scanned targeted systems for vulnerable Citrix and Microsoft Exchange services.15 |
| G1006 | Earth Lusca | Earth Lusca has scanned for vulnerabilities in the public-facing servers of their targets.16 |
| G1003 | Ember Bear | Ember Bear has used publicly available tools such as MASSCAN and Acunetix for vulnerability scanning of public-facing infrastructure.6 |
| G0065 | Leviathan | Leviathan has conducted reconnaissance against target networks of interest looking for vulnerable, end-of-life, or no longer maintainted devices against which to rapidly deploy exploits.5 |
| G0059 | Magic Hound | Magic Hound has conducted widespread scanning to identify public-facing systems vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j and ProxyShell vulnerabilities; CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in on-premises MS Exchange Servers; and CVE-2018-13379 in Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPNs.1011 |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team | Sandworm Team has scanned network infrastructure for vulnerabilities as part of its operational planning.2 |
| C0058 | SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation | During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors scanned for SharePoint servers vulnerable to CVE-2025-53770.18 |
| G0139 | TeamTNT | TeamTNT has scanned for vulnerabilities in IoT devices and other related resources such as the Docker API.8 |
| G0123 | Volatile Cedar | Volatile Cedar has performed vulnerability scans of the target server.34 |
| G1035 | Winter Vivern | Winter Vivern has used remotely-hosted instances of the Acunetix vulnerability scanner.13 |
Mitigations
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1056 | Pre-compromise | This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. |
References
-
OWASP. (n.d.). OAT-014 Vulnerability Scanning. Retrieved October 20, 2020. ↩
-
Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. ↩
-
Threat Intelligence and Research. (2015, March 30). VOLATILE CEDAR. Retrieved February 8, 2021. ↩
-
ClearSky Cyber Security. (2021, January). “Lebanese Cedar” APT Global Lebanese Espionage Campaign Leveraging Web Servers. Retrieved February 10, 2021. ↩
-
CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025. ↩
-
US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024. ↩
-
Nikita Rostovcev. (2022, August 18). APT41 World Tour 2021 on a tight schedule. Retrieved February 22, 2024. ↩
-
Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021. ↩
-
Hacquebord, F. (n.d.). Pawn Storm in 2019 A Year of Scanning and Credential Phishing on High-Profile Targets. Retrieved December 29, 2020. ↩
-
Check Point. (2022, January 11). APT35 exploits Log4j vulnerability to distribute new modular PowerShell toolkit. Retrieved January 24, 2022. ↩
-
MSTIC. (2021, November 16). Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity – MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021. Retrieved January 12, 2023. ↩
-
NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021. ↩
-
Tom Hegel. (2023, March 16). Winter Vivern | Uncovering a Wave of Global Espionage. Retrieved July 29, 2024. ↩
-
Wiley, B. et al. (2021, December 29). OverWatch Exposes AQUATIC PANDA in Possession of Log4Shell Exploit Tools During Hands-on Intrusion Attempt. Retrieved January 18, 2022. ↩
-
CISA. (2020, December 1). Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets. Retrieved December 9, 2021. ↩
-
Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022. ↩
-
Lin, M. et al. (2024, February 27). Cutting Edge, Part 3: Investigating Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Exploitation and Persistence Attempts. Retrieved March 1, 2024. ↩